Pashinyan risks spurning a freshly spawned chance to secure his legacy
Statesmanship vs brinkmanship

ANALYTICS  12 September 2022 - 16:31

The insipid vacuity of staying in a lugubrious imbroglio is invariably dementing, even if it delays an unwanted inevitability. The Armenian Prime Minister is presently encumbered with such a predicament. Despite this, on the final day of August, he found himself magnanimously bestowed with a fresh opportunity to ride out the melancholy and take a sober look at what he is duty-bound to continue in Brussels.

Far away from marvelling at the superficial or engaging in waggish sugar-coating, when President Ilham Aliyev shook hands with Nikol Pashinyan for the first time since the end of the Second Karabakh War, and threw a piercing glance, accompanied with a superior and condescendingly benevolent smile at the Armenian leader, the feeling in the air was not just that it was an ice-breaking moment, but was also indicative of a new chance for Yerevan, which it is kindly advised not to spurn, for its own sake.

The question is if Pashinyan will budge this time. The EU-mediated fourth trilateral meeting has put substantive peace treaty negotiations in motion, specifying 30 September as the deadline for the first draft version of a comprehensive deal to be ready. Armenia, given its track record of dithering and teetering, which manifested itself over the launch of the new Lachin route, does not yet seem to have ditched its habitual can-kicking instincts.

Neither does Yerevan appear to publicly embrace Baku’s five principles without referring to its ill-digested suggestions on the situation involving the Armenians of Karabakh and voicing these in public. Nevertheless, the litmus test defining whether Pashinyan’s government is in considerable danger of spurning its freshly spawned chance will likely be determined by the efficiency of implicit steps amounting to concessions amidst a cacophony of readily noticeable shilly-shallying.

Scope narrowed

Armenia’s hand is being forced. Azerbaijan’s coercively assertive diplomacy and readiness to neutralise the remnants of the illegal and unrecognised “NKR”, still present on its sovereign territory, have considerably narrowed the rubric of the ongoing negotiations. Both the Moscow and the increasingly more influential Brussels platforms have been dealing with the interstate domain of Azerbaijani-Armenian normalisation, focusing on delimitation and demarcation of the border, the opening of communications, and issues of a humanitarian nature.

The manner in which the discussions have been conducted seems to be commensurate with Baku’s policy objectives. Firstly, the interstate component is overwhelmingly central to negotiations. Secondly, anything to do with the fate of Karabakh Armenians has, as far as one can ascertain from publicly-known results, not been treated as a matter within the rank of principle subjects, but appropriately relegated to the league of lesser issues and consigned to Azerbaijan’s inherently fair intramural administrative adjudication.

It should also not be overlooked that, save for occasional gusts of wind manifesting themselves by blurting out of the status theme, Pashinyan has largely come to terms with acknowledging that the idea of territorial autonomy is a no-go area. Yerevan’s realistic diplomatic ambition is to furnish some guarantees from Baku over the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians residing in Azerbaijan, which the latter strictly views as a matter between itself and its citizens.

The game is afoot again

The time interval between now and the next Brussels convocation, provisionally scheduled for November, promises to yield results. President Aliyev, in a recent interview with the Italian “Il Sole 24 Ore”, stated that a comprehensive deal could be signed in a few months. According to the Armenian media outlet “Hraparak”, Pashinyan confirmed, in a close meeting with his Security Council, that a peace treaty could be concluded by the end of this momentous year.

Baku’s imminent mode of action is perfectly predictable as, unlike Yerevan, it is not encumbered with the onerous task of navigating between implicit concessions and the duty of repackaging bitter facts sugar-coated with a sufficient degree of public plausibility so as to placate the internal opposition and electorate at large.

In all probability, Baku will continue to accelerate peace treaty negotiations on the basis of the oft-quoted five principles and act with ruthless efficiency in rooting out the remaining vestiges of the separatist illegal entity based in Khankandi, with the aim of squeezing out an unconditional recognition of Azerbaijani territorial integrity from Yerevan.

Legacy to be secured

Pashinyan’s highly-glorified rise to power was undoubtedly an important moment in Armenian history. In a space of more than two years, he had an ample opportunity to preen himself on the basis of domestic electoral success. However, the most impactful moment of his political life was the Second Karabakh War, during the course of which he felt the testosterone of a high crisis and, having failed miserably, lost any worldwide reputation he might have garnered, facing a massive internal uproar.

Despite finding himself belittled, he nevertheless, managed to secure a necessary result in the post-war elections, surviving by the skin of his teeth, so unquenchable was the hatred of the Armenian public for the former regime’s supporters. According to Neil Watson, British journalist: “His continuing political existence is largely attributable to the adage that the ‘devil you know is better than that which you don’t.”

His internal challenges remain onerous, but in no way akin to the overwhelming criticality that was the case before July 2021. Defenestration is not in the offing. He is, by and large, safe electorally for the time being. It must now be his heavy-laden task to do what is necessary to ensure a legacy, enabling him to go down in history not just as the man, as his internal Armenian critics would say, who “lost Karabakh”, but one who has achieved a historic peace deal with Azerbaijan.

As British journalist Neil Watson commented: “Pashinyan has already stayed in power against all the odds. His objective now is to save face and do what he believes is best for his people. However, this may include procrastination, as he hopes the scales of Russian favour tip back in the direction of Yerevan, particularly after 2025 and the probable end of the Russian 'peacekeeping' operation.”

There are certain limits to what can be expected from the Armenian Prime Minister, yet there is also a plethora of actions that are still within his grasp. For all his cerebrally-challenged and unstatesmanlike exterior, and aptitude for bumbling, it would not be fair to begrudge him the potential to excel his often-lacklustre self in political persuasion and the art of candy-coating what is unpleasant for a wider domestic audience.

Although it is improbable that he will ever fire on all four cylinders in instigating the most sensible actions in the negotiations with Azerbaijan, once forced into a narrow field of manoeuvrability, it should not be beyond his prowess to be a carapace over Armenia’s internal turbulence and prepare it for the final lasting peace.

Pashinyan’s overall diplomatic acumen may leave a lot to be desired, and he may have fewer marbles between his ears than advertised by his supporters, but he is not a hopeless chump incapable of overcoming passing whims. The out-of-touch Karabakh narrative of the present opposition is something he has decidedly extricated himself from, yet there are more than a few toxic dregs left in his cup from the preceding users.

It is with carefully-measured honesty and accuracy that Pashinyan has to convey the real state of affairs around the negotiations whilst speaking to ordinary Armenians. Resorting to rigmarole-induced non-words or flinging a pot of paint in the form of re-rehearsals of unchanging reiterations will, in the long run, backfire and ultimately consign him to the funeral pyre of history.

And, more importantly, what Armenia is in dire need of is statesmanship, not brinkmanship. Escalation and vacillation, in the practice of which Pashinyan has already gained sufficient experience, must be left behind. The aptness of a reasonable course has perhaps never loomed so conspicuously in front of his myopic eyes.

Pashinyan now has a fresh chance to save his name, maintain his country and secure his legacy. Budging should not be touched with a barge pole and reliance on an external helper is misbegotten.

Caliber.Az