Interregnum from ceasefire to peace demonstrates its morbid side
What is Pashinyan ready to sign?

ANALYTICS  15 September 2022 - 17:00

In what was the largest escalation since the 10 November 2020 ceasefire deal, Azerbaijan and Armenia found themselves at loggerheads along the state border, not for the first time and perhaps not for the last either, during the night of 12-13 September, and thereafter on 14 September, when the clashes resumed with a heightened fierceness before being halted at around 20:00 (local time) of the same day.

The magnitude of the flare-up was to such an extent that some observers precipitately dubbed the volleys of firepower as the inauguration of a new war. Nonetheless, Azerbaijan remains indefatigable in its steadfast determination to secure its border with Armenia; each single escalation has led to strengthening its commanding presence, paving the way for the establishment of an on-ground factual basis for future delimitation. Baku is also unwaveringly set on ensuring the full implementation of the November 10 trilateral declaration, Articles 4 and 9 of which remain unfulfilled.

Pashinyan tries to reason

On 14 September, in an address to the Armenian National Assembly, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared his readiness to sign an agreement which will achieve “lasting peace and security covering an area of 29,800 square kilometres”. As crocodile tears filled his eyes, he also reiterated that Yerevan recognised Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in 1992, resorting to the old formula, initially expressed in April of this year, that the "status of Karabakh is not a goal, but it is necessary to ensure the rights and security" of the Armenians of the region.

The question arises as to what exactly that document which Pashinyan expressed his willingness to sign is meant to entail. Will it be some sort of a pre-comprehensive deal declaration, establishing mutual recognition of the territorial integrities of both sides, stating an unequivocal position on Karabakh as part of Azerbaijani sovereign land and denoting the fundamentals for a future interstate treaty with a wider remit? Or does Pashinyan mean some sort of an interim resolution exclusively regulating the state border issues?

In his parliamentary address, the Armenian Prime Minister acknowledged that the signing of such a document would earn him many enemies, going as far as to suggest that he might even be turfed out of office. It is more than probable that Pashinyan has perceived the morbid import of the recent escalation as a godsend to make a case for his electorate to support him in moving towards peace.

The agonising impossibility of reversing the state of affairs in any meaningful way without agreeing to Azerbaijan’s principal demands and the utter futility of remonstrances are likely to be central to his peace-oriented pleas to his home audience. He will also need to make a calculated effort to redress the nation’s wounds, demanding that Azerbaijan relinquishes military positions gained as a result of the clashes, which would be utterly unacceptable for Baku, and the swift return of detained soldiers and dead bodies, which could be met with an approval for the sake of goodwill.

Double-edged sword

It remains undeniable that each single escalation has so far induced two different propositions, which coalesce into one single dictum.

On one side, flare-ups of this kind appear to indicate that an auspicious environment for a peace treaty is absent and, in the light of minimal supply of mutual trust, the sides must strive to ensure fragile stability and avert any further escalation, as an initial duty. On the other side, a heavier consideration looms large, which mandates that, so long as there is no comprehensive deal that would put a definitive end to all the issues, including the demarcation and delimitation of the state border, these clashes and human losses will only be part and parcel of volatile Azerbaijani-Armenian dynamics.

The first consideration reflects truth only fragmentarily, failing to envisage a larger picture. And this is the way of looking at the state of affairs that the peace-resistant elements within Armenia seem to find close to their hearts, seeing it as an argument for Pashinyan to deviate from substantive peace talks and engage in habitual teetering. Armenia has also consistently tried to capitalise on similar incidents for the purpose of involving international actors and resuscitating the misbegotten OSCE Minsk Group, whose mandate never covered the state border issues per se.

Simultaneously, Yerevan was quick to resort to the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), requesting assistance from its foremost ally, which prompted some reaction, failing short of any tangible move. The main argument, as judiciously expressed by member country Kazakhstan, was that the border is not delimited, and any claim as to a violation of Armenian territory cannot be substantiated.

The recent escalation will also be discussed at the UN Security Council at the behest of Armenophiliac France. However, it is highly improbable that any verdict that will emanate from the discussions will put blame on one of the sides. The likelihood is that the criticality of the observance of a ceasefire and hopes for future peace will be highlighted in an evasive and condescendingly even-handed tone.

The most prevailing consideration that should be central to a deep understanding of the situation must be that any escalation or skirmish alongside the state border is a direct result of the lack of comprehensive peace between the two sides. This is the root cause of the recurrent confrontations that will remain insoluble if not dealt with, ultimately bringing about further loss of life.

Some commentators and observers might think that, for the sake of maintaining fragile stability, Azerbaijan should not have resorted to the toughest countermeasures. Self-defence, in accordance with the UN charter, can extend to the territory of an enemy nation if that land is being used to launch acts of aggression, provided that proportionality and other warfare maxims are followed. There is no evidence of the effect of Azerbaijan violating Armenian sovereign territory, although it is undeniable that, for the purpose of self-defence, objects located on the opposite side's territory were targeted, which was right and just.

It is manifestly true that Azerbaijan is ruthlessly effective in neutralising any potential threat, yet it is also undeniably the case that such a mode of action is driven by its heavy-laden duty to act with vigilance and ensure its own legitimate interests. In Baku's worldview, any good-faith concession made to Armenia is likely to be perceived by the latter as an encouragement to make a habit of initiating recurrent flare-ups so as to procrastinate on the progress of a peace agenda, in the hope of garnering support from third parties.

As the hourglass for negotiations reaches its final grain of sand, and Armenia’s incorrigible aptitude for vacillation has not slackened, the idea of tolerating a provocation is to be inimical to Baku’s drive for a peace deal. Since November 9, 2020, at no point has Yerevan made any reasonable moves without having been initially coerced by the swift application of force. Blaming Baku for not being lenient is a form of out-of-touch arrogance and wishful thinking that cannot be acquiesced with.

Pashinyan’s predicament is not enviable, to say the least. He may still, whilst looking at the dusky void of escape tunnels, discern a turbid gaslight in the shape of an external saviour. Yet the darkness of his imminent environs is only tempered by a vague radiance coming from Baku, and the candour in his rheumy eyes must follow.

Caliber.Az