Pelosi's escapade threatens Reeker’s Caucasus mission
OSCE Minsk Group is a mere decoy

ANALYTICS  19 September 2022 - 10:19

The US influence in the South Caucasus has not dwindled with irreparable consequences, but the challenges pointing to such a remote possibility remain palpable. In terms of the leverage wielded on Baku-Yerevan dynamics, the White House seems to have been on the back foot from November 2020 onwards.

As the Kremlin is one of the two key mediators between Azerbaijan and Armenia, strengthened by the fact of the Russian "peacekeepers" currently being stationed in Karabakh, with the EU incrementally upgrading its involvement in the normalisation process, it is Washington, amongst other global players, that seems to be in want of betterment of its clout. The question is how and with what policy design this could be achieved.

The appointment of Philip Reeker, a high-ranking American diplomat, as US Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations on August 24 has been perceived not just as indicative of the growth of Washington’s attention to the region at large but, specifically, to the ongoing Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations.

The mission is one of extreme delicacy and the present timing is of heightened criticality. Given all these and some other concomitants of import, it seems to be beyond doubt that the overall idea of American impartiality has been taxed with a new charge by virtue of the partisan three-day trip of US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Armenia.

Whatever the State Department's sages and sources close to them may pontificate on the separation of powers and the subtleties of the US Constitution, this is a trip which cannot be extricated from what constitutes an extended form of high-level diplomacy. In Yerevan, Pelosi did everything conceivable and humanly possible to jeopardise the mediation efforts of the US, acting not as a peacemaker, but as an ardent and passionate supporter of the Armenian cause.

New man and first reactions

But first things first. Let us begin with Reeker's new onerous task. Baku and Yerevan naturally differed in their initial reactions. Since Reeker, in his new capacity, is also tasked to serve as a US OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair, the Azerbaijani position on his mission interpreted this as a possible indication of Washington’s desire to revive the organisation which has been de facto dead for some time after achieving nothing for 29 years.

This misgiving was also exacerbated by the refusal by Hugo Guevara, US Ambassador to Azerbaijan, together with the French Ambassador, to attend an international conference in Shusha, in which more than 100 diplomats from over 50 countries participated. Baku regarded this as an affront and an intimation of disrespect towards Azerbaijani territorial integrity.

For the self-same reasons, Yerevan’s reception of the news on Reeker’s appointment was more positive, as it has given rise to its hopes that Washington does not see the inherently flawed OSCE Minsk Group as a spent force, and the US Ambassador’s decision not to visit Shusha was hailed as confirmation of the American view that the city’s status remains undetermined.

Why now?

After the Second Karabakh War of 2020, the OSCE Minsk Group essentially lost its raison d’être, with the issue of the territorial status of the former Nagorno-Karabakh region being practically shelved. For Baku, the present negotiations with Yerevan are contingent on interstate matters, particularly border delimitation, and the subject of  Karabakh Armenians constitutes an internal matter between the state and its citizens.

Armenia, on the other side, despite some reiterated rants on the old "status" issue, seems to be officially committed, if one may refer to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s own words, to ensuring the security and rights of the Armenians of Karabakh, without considering status as a goal.

The OSCE Minsk Group was an uncontested mediator between the two sides for three decades, guarding its undeserved perk with jealousy by steadfastly dismissing any other alternative mechanisms. During that extensive period, the US and France did not task any envoys of Reeker’s standing and record to mediate on Karabakh. Interestingly and rather paradoxically, this was in contrast to Russian Co-Chairs, which were mostly top-brass appointees.

The pertinent question at the moment is why, when the OSCE Minsk Group has become irrelevant, the US State Department chose someone of Reeker’s calibre for this archaic organisation with no practical import. The man in question is, after all, not an ordinary diplomat to be jetted off to different parts of the world to do a non-job.

His past speaks for itself and his credentials are light years away from being unimpressive. It would merely suffice to say that, in March 2019, he was appointed as Acting Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs of the US State Department, with a portfolio overseeing 50 countries. On 15 July 2021, he was announced as the US Charge d’Affaires to the UK, the most important American ally.

Projection of American influence

It is vital to distinguish between what seems to be probable on the surface and that which may be concealed behind the exterior of diplomatic non-words and generic adumbrations. Phillip Reeker was in the region during the 12-14 September escalations on the Azerbaijani-Armenian state border. On September 10, prior to the flare-up, he met Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and, at the height of the tensions, arrived in Baku to meet President Ilham Aliyev on 13 September.

Reeker, in both of the South Caucasian capitals, might have worn a wardrobe of two hats, the first and primary being as the US State Department Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations, and the second as the US OSCE Minsk Group Co-chair, yet it could be said that in Baku he was received in his main capacity.

Very little has been relayed to the press on Reeker’s meeting with the Azerbaijani leader, with the trip itself being deliberately, as far as one can tell, kept "low-key" which, one may assume, was upon the insistence of the visitor, as he appears intent on not being seen as divisive at this nascent stage of his mission. It can also be said he was not particularly adamant in his OSCE Co-Chair hat being emphasised, as if it should be consigned to a recycling repository.

Given Reeker’s past deeds and result-oriented approach, it is not the revitalisation of the OSCE Minsk Group that he would be expected to view as the mode of enhancement for US clout in the Azerbaijani-Armenian negotiations. The man must be after something else which is bound to be practicable and realistic. If Washington is truly set on leaving its mark, it is probable that the increased emphasis on peace negotiations leading to a comprehensive deal could be part of Reeker’s mission.

The US is naturally believed to have massive reservations on the presence of the Russian "peacekeepers" in Karabakh, with the view that this should somehow be curtailed. Washington could also be expected to encourage more proactive EU participation in the process. The US bespoke role may entail, in addition to supporting the interstate normalisation pursued under the aegis of Brussels, the involvement in substantive talks over the fate of Karabakh Armenians within Azerbaijan, thereby pacifying the Armenian diaspora in the US.

Although Baku has insistently downgraded this item to the rank of lesser issues, it may still find it within its interests to agree to such an American role, provided that considerable assurances are received in relation to the acceleration of peace talks rendering a final deal within reach. Ultimately, it could be a quid pro quo.

After all, beyond the exclusive interstate domain, which entails the demarcation and delimitation of the state border, the opening of communications and humanitarian issues, the principled agreement will in any way, inter alia, require Baku and Yerevan to recognise each other’s territorial integrity.

In other words, Armenia will be required to unequivocally accept the main precept that Karabakh belongs to Azerbaijan, with Baku, in return, guaranteeing the rights and security of the Armenians of the region on a treaty-based level. If Reeker is intent on and capable of contributing to this finality, with his OSCE Co-chair mandate being a mere decoy, then he has every chance to be successful.

As to the American sensitivity to the judiciousness of visiting Shusha, the cultural capital of Karabakh and Azerbaijan as a whole, this will need to be addressed. Whatever misguided policy objection the US Embassy in Baku may have had for declining to join the crew of diplomats in Shusha on August 27, be it attributable not to be seen with the Russian representative within the same event, or a simple preference to sojourn on a separate occasion, coordinated with Baku, on a date of their choosing - such a significant trip, in all probability, is likely to take place soon.

Pelosi and Armenia

In this vein, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's three-day trip to Yerevan, which started on September 17, is by no means going to assist Reeker's travails. It is fundamentally a question about the perceived fairness of the American attitude. The general view is that, if not to put too fine a point on it, this is a high-level vote-grabbing exercise by virtue of which she is seeking to garner the support of voters of Armenian extraction for the midterm US elections. It must be added that Pelosi is accompanied by Frank Pallone, Chairman of the House Energy Committee, and Representative Jackie Speieril, two stalwarts of the Congressional Armenian lobby.

It does not require clairvoyance skills to expect that any US riposte will be that this is not a state visit and does not reflect American foreign policy, as Pelosi is independent in her overseas voyages, with President Joe Biden having zero influence on the Speaker's decisions of this kind. In a nutshell, the Americans would say "if Azerbaijanis think this means anything in terms of the US approach to the Baku-Yerevan discourse, then they simply do not understand our system".

Well, it is not as straightforward as that. The Speaker of the House of Representatives is not a mere Congresswoman with the onerous task of satisfying the US-based Armenian Diaspora.

She is also the second in the US Presidential line of succession, after the Vice-President, which gives an extra layer of international standing to her gavel. It is because of her position as the Speaker that her recent trip to Taiwan caused such a massive uproar, which would have not been the case had she been an ordinary Representative in the lower house of Congress. It should also be borne in mind that Pelosi is the highest ranking US official to travel to Armenia since 1991.

Given the timing and the sensitivity of the whole situation, and Pelosi’s deep-entrenched pro-Armenian propensity which she reiterated to the fullest extent in her 18 September speech in Yerevan, the inevitability of her high-level trip's deleterious impact on the peace negotiations is a foregone conclusion.

As would be predicted, this misinformed Speaker displayed no single shred of aloofness and accused Baku of the recent escalation, promising a Congressional condemnation and some further punitive measures, without having initially undertaken any fact-finding mission or on-ground investigation. Plus, for all the delicacies and nuances, Pelosi acted and behaved as if she were articulating the US official position, and this will not go unnoticed.

Having said that, it should be also emphasised that any damage this move will cause or has already caused will be largely, but not exclusively, circumscribed to the imaginary domain of perceived American fairness, rather than expectations related to practical steps. And, if Philip Reeker makes a great deal of the success of his Caucasus mission, the Pelosi escapade will retrospectively be forgotten as an inconsequential, yet memorable, nuisance that should be consigned to the memory stick of history.

Caliber.Az