"US political support won't help Armenia in talks with Azerbaijan"
Caliber.Az interview with Russian expert Stanislav Pritchin

INTERVIEWS  26 September 2022 - 09:51

Caliber.Az presents an interview with Stanislav Pritchin, candidate of historical sciences and Russian expert at the Center for Post-Soviet Studies of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

- Do you share the view that the recent visit of US Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Yerevan has greatly encouraged Armenia to seek Western aid and withdraw from the CSTO?

- Even if it did, the visit to Armenia by US House Speaker Pelosi strategically changes nothing for Yerevan. This is a purely symbolic gesture, which is primarily due to the domestic political situation in the US. In the run-up to the forthcoming elections, the democrats need to retain power and they need Armenian votes. It is more likely that they are guided by their own interests rather than aiming to help Armenia and somehow influence the situation in the region.

In addition, US political support will not help Armenia to strengthen its position in the negotiation process with Azerbaijan, let alone strengthen its security. In any case, Armenia will have to sit down at the negotiating table with Azerbaijan.

The US and the West, taking advantage of Russia's difficult situation in the Ukrainian direction, are trying to test the ground and work with countries close to Moscow to expand their presence in the region. But this does not mean that the same West will be able to solve the region's problems. As practice shows, the change of the main venue from Moscow to Brussels has in no way helped Armenia to strengthen its position. Yerevan is now placing greater reliance on the US, but whether this will be effective for Armenia is highly questionable.

As for Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO and a change of foreign policy orientation, I think this is rather rhetorical. I even believe that despite the anti-Russian slogans and clamors to leave the CSTO, Armenia has no alternative to Russia as a key political partner. I also doubt that a withdrawal from the CSTO is actually possible for Armenia, whatever its grievances against the military bloc may be. This issue is too fundamental for foreign policy.

- Will Moscow use effective tools to influence Armenia's foreign policy?

- Given the unbalanced relations between Russia and Armenia, there are enough leverage tools. Another issue is that the current geopolitical situation doesn't allow Russia to use all of these tools, since the focus of Russian foreign policy is currently on other matters. The Caucasian issue is not so much peripheral now, but compared to the Ukrainian case, it is still of secondary importance.

- Do you allow the withdrawal of the Russian military base in Gyumri from Armenia?

- I think this step is too radical and Armenia is unlikely to go for it.

- How would you interpret the recent statement by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk on the need to sign a peace document between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

- Alexey Overchuk is one of the most effective high-ranking Russian officials, who also deals with the Caucasus. He supervised the intergovernmental commission, and his team worked with Azerbaijan on trade, economic and political interaction. I think that an official of such a high level would not make such a statement out of nowhere.

This is again a call for Azerbaijan and Armenia to return to the traditional and clear dialogue format mediated by Russia. Obviously, Armenia's attempt to change the talks in no way affects their efficiency, which to a large extent demonstrates that the West has no understanding of the region's realities and existing peculiarities.

- How do you assess the level of the protest base in Armenia and the potential threats to Pashinyan in case he does sign a peace agreement?

- So far, Pashinyan has managed to find a way to rely on his electorate in Armenia even after signing a ceasefire statement in November 2020, when it seemed that he won't be able to hold on to power. As we can see, he still managed to do this, as he was able to find arguments to work with the domestic electorate. Let's see if this nuance will help him this time too, in a situation where disappointment with him is growing in Armenia and the support base he had in April 2018 is gradually declining. Elections in Armenia are still a long way off, and the main thing for him here is to win back the negatives within Armenia itself. Therefore, by working with Western countries, Pashinyan is trying to create the appearance of successful negotiations and support in the international arena.

- Will the US supply arms to Armenia, and what is the likelihood of a new war on the border with Azerbaijan?

- I doubt US arms will be supplied to Armenia. Türkiye's position as a NATO member and an ally of Azerbaijan cannot be ignored here. Theoretically, under such a scenario it is even possible to use American weapons against Türkiye, which actually looks quite fantastic.

- Do you have a forecast on further Armenian-Azerbaijani relations?

- Before the aggravation on the border, the dynamics of the negotiations were quite good, at least there was some progress. But we see that the aggravation ruined many things, many people died, and there was a sensitive blow to both sides. I think that in the near future we should not expect any serious changes in the relations between the sides. For Armenia, the strategic situation is difficult. Accordingly, regardless of who will be in power - Pashinyan or someone else - somehow the issue of completing the negotiation process with Azerbaijan will have to be solved. For now, the Russian peacekeepers act as guarantors of the security of Karabakh's Armenian ethnic population, but their first five-year mandate expires in November 2025, with the possibility of extension. There is a risk that Azerbaijan will not support this extension, an option that needs to be prepared for now. It is the same for the border. Armenia needs to start the delimitation process. For Azerbaijan, the opening of transport links to Nakhchivan is crucial. This is part of the agreements reached at the end of the Second Karabakh War. Accordingly, the Armenian leadership has made certain commitments. Therefore, Azerbaijan's sometimes tough stance is largely due to the fact that the negotiation process has stalled and the agreements reached earlier are not being implemented.

Caliber.Az