Which scenario will Iran choose - Egyptian or Syrian?
Analysis by Mikhail Shereshevsky

ANALYTICS  31 October 2022 - 16:57

The Economist magazine recently published an article about the events in Iran that examines the possibility of a military coup a la Egypt. The Arab Spring, i.e mass protests by millions of Egyptians, resulted in the dictatorship's demise in 2011. This occurred, among other reasons, because the military had little desire to obey dictator Hosni Mubarak and his son, whom he was preparing to succeed, and did not defend them. Similarly, in Iran, dictator Ali Khamenei is grooming his son, Mojtaba, to succeed him, which may irritate the army. However, the army does not intervene yet.

The authors of the publication point to the following circumstances. Unlike what has been happening in the country in recent years, the Iranian regime has so far failed to suppress the protests. This opens up a number of possibilities. At the moment, Iran's top generals say they support Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, who owns all or almost all power in the country. But it is unclear how far they will go to support a seriously ill 83-year-old man who wants to appoint his son as his successor. When the protests in Egypt got out of control in 2011, the top military leadership alienated the unpopular president (who was also grooming his son to succeed him) and allowed representative democracy to flourish for a short time. Then it seized power with a military coup. In Iran, as in Egypt, the leadership of the army has vast and dirty business interests that need to be protected. If they feel that the supreme leader is drowning, they will have no incentive to go down with him.

It should be added to these arguments that there are two armies in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first is ordinary, the second is religious, that is, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), created by the regime on the basis of Islamist militias in 1979-1980 (the number is about 100,000). Most religious conscripts are recruited there. But in addition, the IRGC has its own command, special services and a special militia - the Basij, which is an essential element for suppressing protests.

For more than four decades of the regime's existence, the IRGC has subjugated key sectors of the economy and state institutions. Its leadership is extremely corrupt, and consists of millionaires and multimillionaires. These people, or their relatives and friends, manage many state-owned companies and private enterprises that live thanks to government orders and subsidies. Their well-being directly depends on the regime's existence. It is also interesting that all external military and political operations of Iran are carried out with the IRGC's help, while the regular army almost does not participate in them.

However, an ordinary army exists, and more people serve in it than in the IRGC. Its leadership also participates in various economic enterprises, but it is removed from power and the regime traditionally distrusts the army. Unlike the IRGC, the military has not yet been involved in the suppression of protests, so, theoretically, the Egyptian scenario is possible.

But one can imagine another scenario - the Syrian one, the collapse of the country into struggling enclaves - Persian, Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Arab, etc. Why?

The current protest movement is directed against tyranny. Its participants demand the elimination of the police state, the end of mass repression, the release from prison of critics of the dictatorship, the right of women to dress as they want. However, so far the movement lacks an ideology capable of uniting Iran, unlike the declining idea of an integral Shiite theocracy (a Shiite religious centralised Farsi-speaking nation).

The protesting Iranians do not discuss social and class issues, unlike the 1979 revolution, and they hardly talk about national problems related to the economic discrimination of minorities. Meanwhile, the main funds from the regions are being pumped to the capital, Tehran, and to the province of Fars, where the economy and industry are developing. Azerbaijani, Kurdish, and Arab regions are poorer, and this painful distortion of economic development is one of the reasons why these areas often become centres of riots.

The second problem is related to cultural, linguistic and political discrimination. The absence or weak presence of local languages in schools, the absence of local self-government, the forcible dominance of the Persian language, despite the fact that national minorities make up at least half of the population - all this irritates them.

In addition, part of the population of the Iranian periphery practice Sunni Islam, the number of supporters of which is constantly growing, since the birth rate is higher in these regions. This also creates a conflict with the Shiite theocracy.

During the 1979 revolution, there were many ideas about the reconstruction of society: from autonomous self-governing workers' councils in factories and the autonomy of regions within a common country to liberal constitutionalism and the market, from a Shiite centralised theocracy to political and economic models reminiscent of the USSR. Millions of people discussed, accepted or rejected these ideas, and tried to bring them to life. At that time, there was a lot of talk about the federalisation or decentralisation of Iran, about the need to grant autonomy to the regions.

However, the victorious Shiite theocracy, led first by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and then by his successor Ali Khamenei, suppressed the protests. It was then that the IRGC was first tested on the battlefield - initially it was used to suppress Kurdish and Azerbaijani protests.

The theocracy governing Iran - the regime of the supreme leader and the IRGC - had certain ideas about how to lead the country. They proposed an integral project based on Shiite Islam and the Persian language, as well as centralised management. In fact, Iran was supposed to turn into a single nation - with one religion and one language, while aiming at scientific and industrial modernisation (the regime advocated the development of technology, universities and industry).

However, as confidence in the regime declined, its ideology weakened. The children of influential officials "go crazy because they have nothing more to want", post their photos on Instagram against the backdrop of expensive villas and private pools, drink wine and go shopping in Italy, while their fathers teach people religious piety and staples. But if you can't clean up your house, why are you teaching others?

Persian nationalism is advancing and growing from below to replace Iran's official ideology. It is also supported by influential Persian emigrant media. Its symbol was the gathering of Iranians at King Cyrus' grave and Persian opposition to Islam, including some interest in Iran's traditional religion, Zoroastrianism.

In turn, local nationalism has intensified in the regions - Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Arab and others. It is not by chance that during the protests in Southern Azerbaijan, demands for national independence are voiced, and Kurdish participants in the uprising sometimes propose to transfer it to all Kurdish regions of the Middle East.

The problem is that the modern uprising does not offer any image of a common Iranian future, except that men and women will sit in bars wearing bikinis and drink wine, as shown in the pictures that the protesters draw and distribute. The author of this article has nothing against bars and open women's bodies, but it can be stated that against the background of the heroic behaviour of protesters who go bare-handed against an armed enemy, their ideas are primitive.

These may appear to be inappropriate and untimely quibbles. Furthermore, some protesters speak of Kurdish, Azerbaijani, and other peoples' unity. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. If protests continue to grow, the question of the future structure of Iran's regions and the correction of economic distortions will inevitably arise... as will the question of where their borders will be.

Behind this superficial movement, unable to articulate a political (let alone a social) alternative, are growing local nationalisms - Persian, Azerbaijani, Kurdish, and Arab.
This is how the conditions for implementing the Syrian scenario appear. What exactly is it? That struggling bureaucratic, criminal, and bourgeois local leaders will launch a fight for the redistribution of property and power in the state, relying on national and ethno-confessional ties and slogans. More specifically, for control over mixed-population areas, for which multinational village the new borders will pass through and which people will live there and which will not, for the right to collect taxes from the local population or for the central government.

If such a movement begins, neighbouring countries will inevitably pour their efforts into it, as happened in Syria. Someone will support the central government, ready, like the Assad regime, to shed waterfalls of blood. Someone, on the contrary, will give money and weapons to the national movements of the regions. Why? Both because what is happening directly affects the interests of neighbouring states, and because a weakened and dilapidated country inevitably becomes an object of expansion of neighbours.

Alas, there are no civil and ethnic wars without external intervention. The point is not that external forces are behind the protests today (rather, not), but that the weakened predator is being torn to pieces by other predators.

Despite the importance of regional autonomy, Iran needs a common idea in order to avoid a war between everyone. And it is unlikely that liberal democracy can become this idea because it does not eliminate either socio-class, regional, or ethnic-confessional conflicts. Poverty and the national question will not disappear anywhere. In addition, the great ecstatic civilisation of Iran will not become a stupid consumer society that does not care about anything except money and career. In short, it will not work to ignore the problems. The price for an infantile refusal to solve them may be too much.

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