Iran to lose its transit significance if Zangazur corridor opens
Lana Ravandi-Fadai hosted by Caliber.Az

INTERVIEWS  16 November 2022 - 16:48

Caliber.Az presents an interview with Associate Professor of the Department of Modern East and Africa of the Russian State University for the Humanities, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Lana Ravandi-Fadai.

- Baku-Tehran relations continue to be difficult, especially after the Second Karabakh War in 2022. What do you think Iran is concerned about?

- Iran considers its army to be the strongest in the region; therefore, strengthening the armies of neighbouring countries is not so important. For Iranians, the vector of the policy pursued by neighbouring states is more significant. In the case of Azerbaijan, Tehran considers Baku's policy too pro-Turkish and pro-Israeli. Speaking about a too-pro-Turkish policy, I do not mean that Iran treats Türkiye like Israel, it's just that the religious authorities of Iran are afraid of Turkic influence. It should be borne in mind that a large Azerbaijani confessional group lives in Iran, and the government fears the growth of separatism. Of course, there are Iranian Azerbaijanis who are loyal to the regime and well integrated into its structures, occupying prominent positions in Iranian politics, economy, and religious structures. However, many Azerbaijanis are dissatisfied with the fact that schooling in their language is poorly developed in the country and very few books and newspapers are published.

In general, Azerbaijani-Iranian relations are competitive. For example, in response to the joint military exercises "Three Brothers" (Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Pakistan), Iran conducted the "Mighty Iran" manoeuvres. By the way, during these exercises in the north of the country, a huge number of shortcomings were revealed in the Iranian army.

- Tehran constantly opposes foreign presence in regional countries. At the same time, the Iranian authorities are not confused by the fact that European observers have been invited to Armenia, and that Yerevan closely cooperates with the West. But Tehran always "notices" some deviations from its demands in Azerbaijan and immediately resorts to aggressive rhetoric. What do you think is the reason for such a selective approach?

- Iran tolerates Armenia's relations with Europe because it does not see a serious threat to its interests from the Europeans. Iranians are much more concerned about Azerbaijan's close relations with its ally Türkiye, as well as the growing ties with Israel, which they call the "Zionist regime" or "occupied Palestine", in principle not recognizing Israel's right to exist. Tehran is always excited if some neighbouring country establishes friendly relations with Israel. On these two points (rapprochement with both Türkiye and Israel), Iranian officials express claims to Azerbaijan.

Iran's foreign policy is based on the fact that Israel should not be on the political map of the world at all. This country is the Tehran government's main enemy. It is Israel, not Jews, because many Jews are living in Iran and there are plenty of synagogues there - only 21 in Tehran, and about 200 across the country. But the Jewish community in Iran is gradually melting away, as the older generation is dying, and the younger one is going abroad.

Another reason for Iran's aggressive rhetoric is concern about possible separatism on the part of the Iranian Azerbaijanis, the largest national minority in the country.

- What are your thoughts on Iran's opposition to the opening of the Zangazur corridor?

- Iran fears that the Zangazur corridor will cut off its way to Europe through Armenia and lead to an increase in Türkiye's influence, and as a result, NATO's penetration into the region. And the Iranians have an extremely negative attitude towards NATO, considering this bloc an aggressive organisation. In addition, Iran may lose its importance as a territory for transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan and swap supplies of Turkmen gas to Azerbaijani buyers through Iranian territory. Tehran fears that Azerbaijan and Türkiye intend to carry pipelines for pumping gas and oil through the Zangazur corridor in the future, which will reduce the transit of Iranian hydrocarbons.

So Iran's fears have some grounds. As for the Zangazur corridor's prospects, it can be predicted that Armenia will not make concessions in the future and will not take part in its construction. But Yerevan's decision may change if Armenia's economic situation deteriorates dramatically. Azerbaijan will continue to insist on the construction of the corridor, which is very profitable for it economically. This route will increase Azerbaijan's exports by $710 million, and will also save the country $10 million, which is spent every year on paying for Baku-Nakhchivan flights.

- How do you see the further development of events related to Baku and Tehran in one way or another? Can the tension escalate into something more, for example, a military confrontation?

- A military confrontation is probably not expected - Iran is too immersed in internal problems. Right these days, mass protests against the Islamic regime are taking place all over the country, some large enterprises are gripped by strikes, and even merchants in large city markets have suspended work. Therefore, Iran is not up to military action now - the main efforts of the authorities in the future will be aimed at saving the regime.

Also, Iran and Azerbaijan are neighbours, countries that play an important role in the region. And no one needs a conflict. I think they will find common ground to resolve their differences, especially since relations are only growing in terms of economic cooperation.

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