Tactics of Azerbaijan's Armed Forces during the 44-day war
An analysis by Mammad Valimammadov

ANALYTICS  07 December 2022 - 20:15

We all have the experience of 10 months of combat operations in Ukraine before our eyes and everyone can draw their own conclusions as to how long and at what pace the offensive breaks through the first line of defence and the tactical defence zone of the Ukrainian Armed Forces took, as well as which milestones in the art of tactics and operations have been reached by both sides of the war. Everyone can evaluate those for himself as everything is in front of our eyes and is happening in real-time. In this article, we will try to consider what new tendencies of development of tactics and promising methods of combat operations the Second Karabakh War (SKW) laid open.

The experience of wars and armed conflicts at the beginning of the 21st century clearly defined the basic contours of armed confrontation in future military conflicts. The high dynamics of changes in the methods of combat operations of military units and the wide range of conditions for their use make it necessary to systematize the experience of modern military conflicts. In this regard, the analysis of the SKW, which according to the overall proportion between involved formations and losses of the opposing sides can be considered as one of the most large-scale and intensive in the post-Soviet area, opens wide possibilities for the identification of current directions of development of tactics and promising methods of combat operations.

One of the main innovations of Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces was the creation of a “surrogate of operational and tactical aviation”, which was entrusted with the task of air support for the advancing ground troops. During the inter-war period, Azerbaijan decided to rely on striking and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, barrage munitions, long-range artillery and guided artillery shells. Reconnaissance strike and reconnaissance fire circuits (ROK/RYK) were created around those weapons systems, which, taking into account the characteristics of the stage of the military operations (small size, mountainous and rugged terrain) were able to successfully perform combat tasks, which were previously decided upon by operational and tactical aviation. Prior to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, no one had ever used reconnaissance strikes created on the basis of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and military drones. The creation of air groups based on unmanned aircraft allowed the resolution of the issue on gaining air dominance. In the SKW, we saw for the first time in the history of wars how air dominance was established by using unmanned aviation.

In harsh mountainous terrain, the mechanized rifles and tank units of the combined-arms formations of Azerbaijan and Armenia were forced to operate in areas accessible for the movement of armoured vehicles, which were determined by the availability of developed road infrastructure. This significantly limited the manoeuvres by their force and means, and generally did not allow for surprise moves. In addition, the limited capacity of existing road communications prevented the short-term concentration of forces and assets in those directions that would be unpredictable to the enemy.

This circumstance had a far greater effect on the activity of the Armenian Armed Forces’ defence units. In the direction of the main strikes of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, Armenian formation commanders actively used convoys of armoured vehicles at the beginning of the war, consisting of 6-12 vehicles, which concentrated on a distance of two to three kilometers from the front edge of the defence. During the advance of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, the convoys were moved to the in-advance prepared firing lines and in cooperation with the units occupying strongholds (defence areas) and artillery units directed fire, repelling the Azerbaijani Army attacks. The convoys conducted counterattacks at a minor depth of penetration in the direction of the Azerbaijani troops. However, later, with deeper integration of the Azerbaijani troops, such tactics became ineffective. The combat capabilities of the convoys no longer made it possible to stop the interlinked formations of Azerbaijani troops, and the larger mobile reserves of the Armenian army, concentrated up to 15 km from the front edge, could not get in a sufficiently organized and timely manner to the lines of deployment and transition to a counterattack, as their movements were discovered by the reconnaissance of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in a short time. The concentrations of equipment in narrow mountain passages were subjected to a powerful striking attack and in some cases, striking ambushes.

One of the main tasks which the Azerbaijani troops faced was the breakthrough of the Armenian troops' position front, which had been built and strengthened for almost 25 years and was a tiered and fortified defence line. To break through the enemy lines, the advancing Azerbaijani troops were divided into two echelons: one for strikes and another for the further development of the breakthrough. The aim of the strike echelon was to break through the enemy’s position front, after which the forces of breakthrough development were to enter the gap. The tactics of the troops of the strike echelon did not consist of the consistent acquisition of, from an engineering standpoint, enemy strongholds by the frontal attacks of unit and battalion tactical groups, but its main emphasis was rather on the widespread use of mobile teams and raid squads equipped with light weapons, designed to infiltrate into the depth of the enemy’s defence and conduct active combat operations there.

The recipe for success was simple: first, choose a place and create a hole in the enemy’s defence; then infiltrate into the enemy’s main defence force and widen this gap; attack the flanks and rear of the enemy without resorting to frontal strikes; suppress its artillery and command posts; keep the enemy from recuperating; manoeuver, and strike faster than he can respond. The initial breakthrough was to be followed by a rapid and aggressive development of success. The mobile striking ground forces were to move forward as far and as fast as possible, as much as their resources and equipment logistically allowed for.

Thus, the operation to break through the defence line of the Armenian troops consisted of two components: the strike (assault) forces responsible for breaking through the tactical defence zone and the development forces of the breakthrough. Strike (assault) forces consisting of assault infantry (mobile groups, raid units, blockading groups and assault groups), heavy artillery, engineering and armoured troops, broke into the position front after which moving ground strike forces were injected into the gap and turned the tactical success into an operational one.

Mobile groups and raiding units equipped with small arms, light mortars, anti-tank and man-portable air defence systems, were using hard-to-reach areas that were unoccupied by the enemy to bypass his strongholds and blocked communications, conducted ambushes and adjusted the artillery fire and strikes by drones. Under favourable conditions, they also seized important objects together with combined-arms units, attacking them from the rear. The mobile groups were to disorganize the front line of the defence, isolate and suppress its strongholds and gradually seep into the rear. They advanced along the path of least resistance. Especially strong defences in the enemy line had to be bypassed and blocked. Having quickly slipped through the zone of enemy barrage fire and not lingering on the frontal attacks of strongholds, mobile groups continuously developed the battle into the depths. After crossing the first line, they attacked the second defensive strip without stopping which was located behind the main line.

The Armenian troops, whose tactics were based on position defence, developed on the system of defensive areas and the defeat of the enemy by counterattacks of tank units, failed to effectively counter the numerous mobile groups and raid squads in their rear.

From September 29 to October 5, 2020, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, through raiding, liberated villages and important heights along the Araz River, flanking the units of the 9th Defensive District. The success of the raid was facilitated by the capture of loosely guarded outposts at night by groups of Special Operations Forces, followed by the encirclement of units of 9 defensive districts with attacks from the flanks and rear. This allowed a raid force to be launched on the morning of October 4, which, operating along the Horadiz-Soltanli road, advanced to a depth of 17 kilometers and took control of the Soltanli-Jabrayil road. In turn, this allowed the main forces of mechanized rifle formations of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces to penetrate to a depth of 18 km and, by the end of October 9, liberate the dominating heights in front of Jabrayil.

Mobile groups of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces often ambushed the enemy’s rear in order to destroy its advancing reserves. As the analysis of the combat operations shows, the effect of the use of mobile teams and raid units largely depended on the ability to supply and support them with artillery fire. This explains the relatively small depth of their actions, which rarely exceeded 20 km, and periodic tactical pauses during the performance of their tasks.

Thus, the objectives of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces offensive were achieved by the following tactical tasks:

• circumvention (infiltration) of enemy strongholds and occupation of dominant heights in their rear by mobile groups and raid units forces

• the defeat of identified weapons through artillery fire and blows by UAVs, ensuring the advance of battalion (unit) tactical groups to the objects of attack

• capturing enemy strongholds with attacks from several directions

• securing the seized strongholds and counterattacking as well as restoring the units' operational capability or replacing them

• preparation for further action.

In areas where the use of mobile teams and raiding units was hampered by the high density of defences and difficult terrain, blocking groups and assault groups were established to seize strongholds on foot, supported by artillery fire and drone strikes. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) were then incorporated into the convoys of armoured vehicles for supporting assault groups from the firing lines.

After crossing the tactical zone of defence of the enemy, impact mobile ground forces were introduced into the gaps, which were to develop success in its operational depth by repelling counterattacks, intercepting and crushing reserves on the march. The final isolation of the battlefield was ensured by aviation, which attacked the targets on the front edge of the enemy, as well as its reserves and communication nodes in the rear of the frontline.

Thus at the beginning, the attacking echelon, made up of mobile groups and raid units, blocking groups and assault groups, was to break through the tactical zone of defence of the enemy, opening the way for mobile attack ground forces, motorized and mechanized. Decisive actions of the mobile echelon of breakthrough development in the deep rear of the enemy were to deprive the front and rear of the enemy operational relationship and conclusively overturn it and move the fight into the phase of manoeuvers. Aviation was tasked with attacking enemy reserves and communication hubs from the air. The multi-layered and multi-impact strategy looked like successive waves. These waves, one by one rolling on the enemy’s defences, were to penetrate the enemy’s positioned frontline with their continuous strikes from the depth. The aviation was to secure the battlefield in the breached area, to rule out the approaching of enemy reserves. Having seized dominance in the air, the aviation was to suppress the centers of defence on the front edge and in the rear, to hit communication nodes in the operational depths of the enemy and to attack its marching reserves.

Raid squads were also widely used to promote success by manoeuvring on heavy vehicles, destroying patrolling posts and outposts of Armenian troops units and advancing at high speed into the depth of their defences without engaging in protracted fighting. The strongholds, which showed stubborn resistance, were subsequently destroyed by mechanized rifle and tank units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

Along with the actions of the mobile groups, raid units, blocking groups and assault groups, the peculiarity of the tactics of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces became the wide use of ROK and RYK complexes created on the basis of unmanned aviation. The UAVs were in the air, usually in mixed groups. A new UAV tactic was developed, which involved the massive deployment of light and relatively cheap reconnaissance and strike UAVs in conjunction with heavier reconnaissance drones equipped with radars, optical-electronic reconnaissance and radio-electronic suppression complexes, as part of the solution of the tasks of defeating the air defence systems of the enemy, such as anti-aircraft missile systems. Joint reconnaissance and strike teams with reconnaissance and strike UAVs also included barrage munitions and remotely controlled light aviation.

The disorganization of the Armenian Army’s air defence system enabled the Azerbaijani Armed Forces to concentrate their main efforts on defeating ground targets, which was carried out continuously around the clock. The unimpeded group attacks by UAVs on the enemy’s units of motor-rifle, tank and artillery units inflicted significant losses on them and contributed to the weakening of morale and the psychological state of the military personnel even before the battle.

The creation of conditions for a successful operation of unmanned aircraft by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces groups led to a significant increase in the efficiency of use of other long-range fire-fighting means, such as barrel artillery, multiple rocket launchers and tactical missile systems, which have been able to strike enemy targets in the interest of combined arms units on a time scale close to real-time, with minimal involvement of the army and assault aircraft for these purposes.

The peculiarity of the use of artillery units was the creation of artillery groups designed to fire at the enemy in the direction of the main strikes of combined-arms formations. As a rule, the artillery units performed the tasks assigned to them from firing positions located at a greater distance than in normal conditions from the front edge, beyond the reach of the main firing means of motorized rifle and tank units of the enemy.

In the context of the Azerbaijani Army’s massive use of drones, artillery, mobile groups and raid units operating in the rear, units of the Armenian Army were unable to repel the offensive of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and fight for long periods of time while being encircled.

The high vulnerability of tanks and armoured personnel carriers to UAVs and modern anti-tank missile systems had a significant impact on the types of action taken by the Armenian military units. Therefore, they were mainly used for direct support of mechanized rifle units as part of the armoured group.

The analysis shows that the success of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces was largely achieved through the use of those methods of combat operations which were appropriate to the prevailing operational and tactical situation, which made it possible to achieve the set objectives. In contrast to the rather routine and predictable actions of the Armenian Armed Forces, the units of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces operated with flexibility and unusual. So, although breaking through the enemy’s defences opened opportunities to further develop the offensive deep, the securing of strongholds was firstly organized in a short period of time and expanding the areas of breakthrough towards the flanks in order to exclude counterattacks under the base of inlay.

When crossing the defensive areas of the Armenian Armed Forces, it was planned to bypass the most fortified strongholds and conduct raid operations by mobile groups and raid units in the rear of the enemy, which was synchronized with active attacks of the front edge of the defence. These units used extensive infiltration tactics, bypassing enemy strongholds in the back of their defences. To develop the offensive, mobile ground forces were introduced. Mobile strike ground forces were independent motorized and mechanized units , either unit (UTG) or battalion tactical groups (BTG), reinforced by artillery, UAV, anti-aircraft, intelligence, technical and logistics units. Thus mobile ground strike force, UTG or BTG, could operate independently and autonomously in isolated directions and were capable of active manoeuvering.

The operations of the Azerbaijani army can be considered at each command level as three distinct but interrelated types of combat, namely, deep, close and rear. This allowed the troops to manoeuver and take risky decisions, fight in the rear of the enemy and defend against a blow from behind.

The rapid offensive of the Azerbaijani ground troops forced the Armenian troops to make manoeuvres and move, which in turn significantly increased the effectiveness of the use of unmanned aircraft and long-range weapons. The advance of the troops, as well as the strikes, was possible as a result of the use of drones and other visual and electronic reconnaissance equipment, as well as reconnaissance troops operating behind enemy lines. The ability of the Azerbaijani troops to synchronize their firepower with manoeuvre was thus crucial.

The unmanned aerial force, operating as part of a well-balanced team operating alongside the ground forces and relying on well-organized reconnaissance, successfully fought the enemy forces, who was unable to make quiet deployments and was subjected to air and artillery attacks. Like this, the synchronization of the activities of unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery and mobile strike ground forces made it possible to integrate a manoeuver, strike and fire. The strike groups of the Azerbaijani army had an advantage in terms of equipment, combat training, logistics and communications.

In the final stage of the war, units were allocated for the liberation of populated areas (in particular, the city of Shusha) for raiding actions away from the main forces with limited air and artillery support, but with simultaneous demonstrations in other directions in their interest. These were raids by special forces or mining units, armed with light weapons, MANPADS, mortars and portable anti-tank guided missiles, which were prepared for independent and autonomous combat operations in isolation from the main forces. Having made a march through difficult terrain, without entering into combat clashes with the enemy, these units suddenly appeared in the deep rear of the Armenian troops in the area of the city of Shusha. Coming out to the outskirts of the city and concentrating in the original districts, they stormed Shusha, putting the Armenian group in Karabakh on the verge of a military disaster. The operation on the liberation of Shusha requires a separate study - it is actually a unique combat operation for which it is difficult to find a resemblance.

On the basis of the above-mentioned, I note the following as the main characteristics of the Second Karabakh War:

• mountainous combat in areas accessible to the movement of armoured vehicles, which greatly limited manoeuvring by forces and means and precluded surprise

• large-scale use of hand and ROK and RYK based on extensive use of drones

• formation of artillery groups designed to attack the enemy on the main lines of combined-arms strikes

• the widespread use of mobile groups and raid squads equipped with light weapons and designed to infiltrate into enemy defences to conduct active combat operations from there

• raid operations by special units to seize populated areas, dominant heights and road hubs in order to destroy enemy reserves

• use of blocking and assault groups operating on foot, supported by artillery fire, armoured troops and drone strikes with the objective of capturing enemy strongholds

• widespread use of raid squads operating on cross-country vehicles to destroy patrol posts, outposts and develop the offensive.

The conducted analysis of the combat operations experience from the Second Karabakh War revealed some new directions of development of tactics, as well as methods of combat operations of combined-arms formations, military units and sub-units:

• the expansion of the use of weapons derived from military robotics, artificial intelligence and nanotechnology and their increasing impact on the course and outcome of hostilities have been particularly evident in the deployment of drones and UAVs, which have evolved to a level where real combat effectiveness can be combined with relative simplicity and accessibility.

• the trend towards increasing the spatial scope of combined-arms combat and expanding its fighting environment is essential for the development of tactics, since in the future all battles will become even more dispersed and of wide-scale nature, covering all spheres of military action on the front, depth and height. The peculiarity of the manifestation of this trend in the Second Karabakh War should be considered the wide use of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces mobile groups and raid detachments capable of conducting independent (semi-autonomous) combat operations apart from the main forces and neighbours, but in close cooperation with the forces and means of other branches and branches of the Armed Forces. This allowed not only significantly increased the depth of impact on the enemy, but also gave military actions of the combined-arms units a kind of “multi-sphered” nature through the integrated use of various fire-fighting means, special operations units, electronic and informational warfare units belonging to different levels of control for the benefit of mobile groups and raid teams of striker drones. The Armed Forces of Azerbaijan managed to achieve and use autonomous tactical groups, synchronizing their actions within the framework of a common plan, as well as to create ROK and RYK of different compositions, allowing them to attack enemy objects in real-time to the full depth of their combat range.

• the transition from linear to spatially distributed combat was manifested in the desire to ensure the maximum autonomy of elements of combat order through the creation of self-sufficient tactical groups formed on the principle of functional assignment. As part of the combat orders of combined-arms formations (military units and sub-units) of the assault (strike) echelon, the development of breakthrough (strike-manoeuvered), support echelons, as well as the air echelon. The tactical groups of the assault (striking) echelon were tasked with breaking through the tactical zone of the enemy defence, capturing (holding) objects that determine the stability of the enemy defence (its composition, military unit). The development of the breakthrough (strike-manoeuvered) was used to develop success, create an active front in the rear of the enemy, cover flanks and joints, as well as for the ambush of operations, manoeuvered defence. The main task of the support echelon was to carry out combat, logistics and medical support. The air echelon was used to carry out combat and support tasks for the tactical teams in the ground echelons.

• increasing the role of reliable protection of the troops from the attacks of the enemy’s air attack vehicles and in the future also from missile attacks. It is here especially necessary to take into account when fighting an enemy with a strong air component, which, along with manned aircraft, includes unmanned aerial vehicles and, eventually, cruise missiles. In order to combat these, it requires the creation of a qualitatively prepared anti-aircraft interference system in the tactical unit, well protected from blows of forces and means of an enemy air attack. It should be comprehensive: anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-unmanned.

• the increasing importance of systems for reconnaissance, control, navigation and information support of combat operations stems from the increasing equipment of the armies of many countries of the world with weapons systems based on the wide use of information technologies, as well as fast-acting intelligence, communications, automated control, electric warfare and others. In this regard, it is obvious that the desire to achieve information superiority over the enemy is becoming one of the main conditions for the successful conduct of military operations. That opposing party who will have the advantage of obtaining reliable data on the enemy, his position and condition of his troops, in the speed of its processing, bringing it to the user, making decisions and assigning tasks to the troops (the means of defeat) will naturally gain overall superiority in the management. It will in the end allow pre-empting the enemy in the blows and actions of the troops, e.g to capture and hold the initiative, which is the most important factor of success in modern combined-arms combat.

Of course, it is not possible to cover all aspects of tactical development in one article. It should also be noted that, given the specificity of the conflict, the directions presented for the development of tactics of the ground forces, of course, do not fully cover all their diversity. Nevertheless, they should, in our view, be considered as a relatively acceptable basis for the successful performance of combat tasks in modern military conflicts.

Mammad Valimammadov, military historian, an article written for Caliber.Az

Caliber.Az