Troubling truth about chameleonic propensities of Justin Trudeau government
A story of two wrecks

ANALYTICS  09 December 2022 - 18:30

At the height of the blood-infused days of the Second Karabakh War of 2020, a certain Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces did not "return to the home point", if to use military parlance or, to put it simply, did not make it back to its base. Whilst the mystery of the disappearance of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was about to begin clouding earthly minds, Artsrun Hovhannisyan, then-Spokesperson for the Defence Ministry of Armenia, issued a hasty explanation, claiming that the drone had been shot down by the Armenian Air Defence.

An imperfect theory and doubts

The available evidence is insufficiently compelling to justify the “downing” theory of Yerevan, due to the apparent lack of the latter’s capabilities to perform such a punitive measure. A year and a half after the incident, Armenian military expert Van Hambardzumyan, in one of his myriad broadcasts, suggested that it is possible, by utilising certain “functional combinations" performed by an advanced drone disabler, to remotely interfere with and paralyse the GPS systems of Bayraktars, making them initially lose their orientation in the sky, and then, after exhausting their fuel, just crash.

This, on the whole, may be deemed probable, with one major “question mark”, at least, remaining unaddressed - whether the Armenian Air Force had, at the time, such a technological capability. Let us leave aside the portentous question as to whether the unfortunate Bayraktar TB2 was genuinely shot down or simply fell as a result of the externally-induced failure of its navigation system and examine the interior of its wreckage.

Upon the examination of the fragments of the drone by, let us say, “not quite Armenian” experts, if you catch the nuance, it was established that it was equipped with the WESCAM CMX-15D system, incorporating a state-of-the-art-camera and target acquisition functions, manufactured by a Canadian company, named L3 Harris WESCAM. For reference, the price of one WESCAM CMX-15D was more than $1 million at the time, being a source of considerable income for the manufacturer.

Throngs of whingers have thrown themselves into the malaise of the open field, voicing humanitarian concerns, with the Armenian propaganda machine working overtime to peddle the narrative that lethal weapons, incorporating Canadian-made components, were used by Azerbaijan indiscriminately during the course of the 2020 campaign; black PR techniques were subsequently set in full swing against L3 Harris WESCAM, with some rumours citing the involvement of market competitors in instigating accusatory publications. Curiously, Bayraktars, in their essence, being the last word in military warfare, are essentially rather “humane”. By pinpoint targeting an aggressor, they minimise collateral damage and, if to quote Turkish Ambassador to Canada Kerim Uras, interviewed by CBC News Network’s Power and Politics on 6 October 2020, “uphold human values”.

The pressure was too much for the Canadian company in question, which was eventually compelled into cowing like a sycophant, announcing the termination of its cooperation with the Turkish customer – Baykar Makina, the producer of Bayraktar drones. This was not a big deal for the latter, as it swiftly found a quick replacement in a local subcontractor and continued to prosper. On the other hand, the beleaguered L3 Harris WESCAM went bankrupt and began to look for salvation via a merger with a bigger company.

But our story does not end here and, in some ways, begins here, for what had happened prior to the Bayraktar dilemma of 2020 amounted to a mere token of what was to come. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government of Justin Trudeau threw a piercing glance at its values and reassessed these in such a way that the Turkish-made drone’s public image miraculously transmogrified from a tormenter of the oppressed into a stalwart defender of those in need.

Such a heightened degree of emollience was induced by the Bayraktar TB2’s indispensability in Kyiv’s ability to defend itself in the face of adversity. However, chameleonic or hypocritical Canada may have looked at the time, its change of rhetoric was neither surprising nor completely incomprehensible, for the machinations of global politics have always had a tinge of the apocryphal deeply ingrained in them.

From one wreck to another

Now, we have new wreckage to glance at in a manner no less than penetrative. This time the object of our gaze comprises the remnants of Iranian Shahed-136 drones, renamed Geran-2 by the Russians, shot down by the Air Defence Forces of Ukraine during their ongoing campaign. As has recently been revealed, these kamikaze drones utilised foreign-made components, originating from outside the country of production, with most of the components being of Western manufacture.

The Shahed-136, although not as advanced and sophisticated as its UAV counterparts, nevertheless fitted the bill for Russia as an expendable and cost-effective alternative to its far more expensive aircraft, ballistic and Cruise missiles. The presence of foreign-made components, linked with more than 30 Western companies, was initially confirmed by Ukrainian intelligence.

Subsequently, a project called "Trap Aggressor" launched by StateWatch, a Kyiv-based independent NGO, revealed many further details, establishing that a single Iranian drone included a servo drive from the American Hitec USA Group, its power elements being from the Japanese giant Panasonic, and ceramic antenna from the Canadian Tallysman Wireless company, with only the engine being manufactured in Iran. Other foreign-made elements include a printed circuit board assembled from Japanese and American parts, a power supply board comprising German and Chinese components, and a control unit being supplied by Zapadpribor, a Russian company.

The complexity of the interior of the Shahed-136 is too daunting. For our present purpose, the question is how the Canadian components ended up being used. It is now the onerous and unavoidable task of the government of Justin Trudeau to investigate what came to pass, including a series of circuitous and nefarious orders, purchases and deliveries.

In an act of apparent humility, Gyles Panther, the President of the Canadian Tallysman Wireless company, stated that the company has “become painfully aware” that some of the components manufactured by itself “are being misused in sophisticated military guidance systems” in Russia’s unwarranted and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.

Well, the question needs to be dealt with. Now let us return to the moral posturing of Canada. Let us recall what it claimed during the Second Karabakh War. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 was described as an emanation of evil at the time, as it was used in Azerbaijan’s “unfair war” which, in fact, was a perfectly legitimate defensive action, to all intents and purposes, against belligerent Armenia.

Let us assume, without any prejudice for the sake of argument, purely musing on hypothetical terms, and try to think what would have been the reaction of the government of Justin Trudeau, had it been brought to the public eye that, during the Armenian-Azerbaijani military clashes in 2020, Yerevan purchased Shahed-136 UAVs from Iran. These are the self-same drones comprising Canadian-made components. What would the reaction have been? I rest my case.

Caliber.Az