Ever-changing world: MIC becoming the most lucrative investment area
Shereshevskiy's think piece

ANALYTICS  29 December 2022 - 13:40

The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times occasionally publish interesting articles on the US arms supplies to Ukraine. For example, it became known that the US did not give A-10 attack aircraft to Kyiv, although the Americans had hundreds of them in their depots, and, moreover, they were going to discard them. The reason was that the Russian Armed Forces could shoot them down (no comments necessary). Nor it was given Abrams tanks (Washington has nearly 7,000 such tanks, and about 4,000 of them are in stock). Americans said complicated logistics are needed for their maintenance (though, for example, such a "powerful in science and technology" country as Iraq that has 140 Abrams somehow copes with it). The reason that lies behind the refusal to supply ATACMS missiles is their too long range, it could anger the Kremlin and "lead to escalation".

However, the most crucial point is the fact that the US has reduced the supply of shells to the Ukrainians by several times ("problems with stocks and with production volumes"). Does this mean, however, that Americans have a problem that is unsolvable in the foreseeable future? No. Besides usual shells, the USA has a large stock of cluster munitions, which the American military was going to destroy (probably, the USA tried to show the world its humanism in such a way, as using this kind of weapon is extremely effective in the plan of destruction of enemy forces). We are talking about millions of shells or at least hundreds of thousands. The use of these munitions is not prohibited by US and Ukrainian law. Nevertheless, the Americans refused (without clear explanations) Ukraine's requests to transfer cluster munitions, which led to "shell starvation" in the AFU and dramatically reduced (although probably not eliminated altogether) the possibility of conducting major Ukrainian offensive operations.

It is possible that US policy will change in the future and at some point, the AFU will still be able to obtain or accumulate the number of shells it needs. However, the ability of the Biden administration to keep the Ukrainian army on a meager shell ratio, paralyzing its ability to conduct major offensive operations, is almost limitless.

On the other hand, the US gives the AFU many different types of weapons. Their and Europeans' cumulative deliveries to Ukraine in 2022 amounted to tens of billions of dollars, including the latest weapons, and are comparable in volume to the military budget of France. What is the reason for this ambiguity?

But a number of other questions arise. The US is now run by a team of people who know each other well - Sullivan, Blinken, Burns, Malley, and a few others. So, are they confident that this is enough to show a warning to China? More likely yes than no. China is run by a relatively pragmatic team that doesn't need much trouble. For example, the PRC leadership, as sinologist Alexander Gabuyev points out, did not initially believe in the very possibility of what happened on February 24, 'because they themselves prefer a more cautious policy'. Nevertheless, China's position is not entirely certain, either, because, hypothetically, the Chinese might find the US response in regard to Ukraine too indecisive. Washington's cautious stance could be perceived as a manifestation of weakness and could therefore trigger China's tough action against Taiwan. On the other hand, the rapid success of the AFU could lead to an increased risk of nuclear weapons use. Having probably weighed all the possibilities, the team running the US has concluded that the cumulative risks are smaller if the current course of action continues.

America is not run by fanatical ideologues for a parliamentary system and national independence like George Washington and Thomas Paine, but by ordinary bureaucrats and top corporations. They want to live quietly, profiting from their companies and their power. They, like the leaders of the PRC, do not want trouble. They want to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons as much as possible. They care about their nerves, and then about everything else. Even if they estimate the threat of the use of nuclear weapons at 1%, it would be better to have 0.1%.

But there is another facet to this policy. Observing what is happening, some states have decided to multiply spending on the modernisation of their military-industrial complex and armies. Japan and Germany are already going down this path. Everyone has now seen that US protection of allies is not a very reliable thing. This means a remilitarisation of the planet and an inevitable rapid increase in military production.

Japan and Germany are two great economic powers with mighty industries, science, and technology. But after their defeat in the Second World War, they gave up maintaining large armies and an independent foreign policy, going under the wing of the country that occupied their territories - America. The US cared about protecting these states and global production chains and markets, maintaining its order on the planet. In turn, the ruling classes of Japan and Germany profited from this, quietly developing export-oriented economies and making money. They usually did not participate in US military operations or kept their involvement to a minimum, thereby reducing military costs and risks. If, however, as is becoming apparent today, US defenses are so unreliable, the ruling classes of these countries might want to think about having strong armies of their own. But that would lead to an increasingly independent Japanese and German foreign policy.

The militarisation of other countries, such as Poland, is inevitable in such a case and it is already happening. Poland, "trapped between Russia and Germany", as the American political scientist John Mearsheimer said, decided to build one of the most modern armies in Europe, having resorted to colossal purchases of the latest weapons from South Korea and the United States.

The rapid development of the military capabilities of different countries, followed by their increasingly independent foreign policies, may lead to growing instability in different parts of the world. Which could also be seen as a decline or weakening of American hegemony.

Today, we are probably witnessing the emergence of a new geopolitical reality that will reshape the world in the 21st century. This means that from now on, the military-industrial complex will be the most lucrative area of investment from Washington to Beijing and from Seoul to Warsaw.

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