Stratfor: What to make of growing Iran-Azerbaijan tensions

REGION  03 February 2023 - 13:23

Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence platform, has published an article analysing the roots of growing tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan. Caliber.Az reprints the article.

While a direct military conflict remains unlikely, Iran-Azerbaijan tensions are poised to grow as Tehran pushes to fill the gap left by Russia in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia — altering the balance of power in the region. Concerns of a potential military conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan are rising amid the former's growing involvement in the latter's enduring conflict with Armenia. In late October, Iran began to conduct military exercises along the Iran-Azerbaijan border for the second time since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Key to the decision to conduct these exercises has been Iran's growing alignment with Armenia on political and military grounds, which has caused tensions to flare between Tehran and Azerbaijan in recent weeks. 

• On Jan. 29, Azerbaijan evacuated its embassy staff and their family members from Iran two days after a gunman shot three people at the Azerbaijani embassy there. Baku claimed the incident was a terrorist attack, encouraged by a recent ''anti-Azerbaijani campaign'' from Iran, and blamed Iran for failing to properly secure the embassy. 
• On Jan. 31, Azerbaijan then issued a travel warning urging its citizens to avoid travel to Iran due to what it called the ''unstable situation'' between the two countries. Iran, on the other hand, released footage of the attacker saying that he was motivated by his belief that his wife was held hostage in the embassy. Iran claimed that the attack had no political motivations and that it would not damage bilateral ties.
• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has stoked Iranian fears of a separatist movement in northern Iran, a region largely composed of ethnic Azeris, who Aliyev referred to on Nov. 25, 2022 as ''part of our nation.'' 

This comes as Russia has taken a step back from its traditional role as the regional hegemon as Moscow focuses its attention and resources on Ukraine. Russian peacekeepers, who have been stationed in Armenia and Azerbaijan since the end of their war in 2020, have refused to intervene in skirmishes between the two countries, such as the recent blockade by Azerbaijanis of the Lachin corridor — a key mountain road linking the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory to mainland Armenia. This has, in turn, led to questions over Russia's effectiveness as a guarantor of peace in the region amid the resulting renewed tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The recent escalation in fighting between the neighboring countries stems from the aftermath of their latest conflict over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, a self-governing area with a large ethnic Armenian population. The six-week-long war began in September 2020 and ended the following November, when the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Russian-brokered armistice agreement in November to end hostilities. The outcome was largely viewed as a decisive victory for Azerbaijan, as it resulted in the country gaining control over the majority of the disputed territory. Armenia and Azerbaijan have since sparred over the cease-fire's implementation, fueling tensions.

• In recent history, the two most notable geopolitical players in the region have been Türkiye and Russia. Türkiye has strong ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties to Azerbaijan, in addition to close political relations. Russia (which controlled both Armenia and Azerbaijan during the Soviet era) previously served as the primary mediator between the two regional rivals. Moscow, however, formally has closer ties to Armenia through the countries' shared membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (an economic union of some post-Soviet states) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia's version of NATO). But with Russia distracted with its ongoing war in Ukraine, Iran's role as a counter to Türkiye and Azerbaijan has become significantly clearer.

A Refresher on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Nagorno-Karabakh was officially placed within Azerbaijani borders, albeit with autonomous status, during the Soviet era. As the Soviet Union neared its collapse, the First Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region in 1988 and lasted six years. The two sides eventually agreed to a cease-fire in 1994, which resulted in Nagorno-Karabakh being governed by the Armenian-aligned but self-governing Republic of Artsakh. This brought relative peace to the area for the next 25 years, apart from the occasional small-scale cease-fire violations by both countries. But that ended in the fall of 2020, when Azerbaijan triggered another war in Nagorno-Karabakh by launching a military offensive that successfully recaptured many of the areas it had lost control of in the 1990s. 

The outcome of talks surrounding the contentious Zangezur corridor will be key to determining whether or not tensions among Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran will deescalate. The corridor would connect mainland Azerbaijan with its autonomous Naxcivan exclave (which is otherwise separated from the rest of the country by southern Armenia) through Armenia's territory along the Iran-Armenia border. Baku strongly supports the corridor's creation since it would directly connect mainland Azerbaijan with Türkiye through Naxcivan's northern border, and Türkiye supports the Zangezur corridor's creation for the same reason. Armenia, on the other hand, opposes the creation of the corridor due to fears that it would directly undermine Armenia's territorial sovereignty. Armenia has proposed providing new road connections, as well as reopening a Soviet-era railway link between mainland Azerbaijan and Naxcivan instead, but Azerbaijan has not accepted these alternatives. If Armenia and Azerbaijan do not change their positions, the likelihood of a military escalation would increase significantly. Tehran also strongly opposes the creation of the corridor, as it would decrease other countries' reliance on Iran for the transportation of goods and people from Naxcivan to mainland Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Additionally, the corridor would cut off Iran's land access to the Eurasian Economic Union through Armenia, and thus to one of its most important economic partners — Russia. Iran's opposition to Azerbaijan on this matter is further heightening regional tensions.

Azerbaijan and Iran also disagree about the contentious status of Iran's ethnic Azerbaijani, or Azeri, community. Although there are no Azeri separatist political parties in Iran itself, some groups operating from Azerbaijan advocate for an independent Azeri state in northern Iran, claiming to represent Iranian Azeris. Previously, Azerbaijan has been careful to refrain from making statements that Tehran could interpret as supportive of a potential separatist movement. However, since the start of massive anti-government protests in Iran in September 2022, Baku has heated up its rhetoric by referring to Azeris in Iran as ''part of our nation'' and northern Iran as ''Southern Azerbaijan.'' This shift in language indicates that Baku may be threatening to support a potential separatist movement in the north, especially if Iran intervenes militarily to support Armenia. Tehran, for its part, will attempt to quash separatist sentiment before it has the chance to culminate in a large-scale movement or secession.

• Azerbaijan has deep historic ties to Iran, having been a part of the Persian empire until the 19th century. Additionally, Iran and Azerbaijan are two of the four Shiite-majority countries in the world. Azeris are the largest ethnic minority in Iran, comprising 16% of the country's population, and they comprise the ethnic majority in the Iranian Azerbaijan region. In fact, there are significantly more ethnic Azeris in Iran than there are in Azerbaijan itself. While these overlapping populations and histories have been seen as a potential source of cooperation in the past, they have increasingly become a source of conflict as Azerbaijan seeks to use the Azeri population in Iran as leverage against the regime.
• While Azeris in Iran seek greater expansion of their linguistic and cultural rights, they are largely well-integrated into Iranian society; indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself is half Azeri. But the Iranian government still fears the potential formation of an organized secession movement — especially as it faces internal threats from the ongoing protests over Mahsa Amini, the young Iranian woman who died in September after she was arrested for improperly wearing her hijab.

Beyond this, Azerbaijan's close relations with Israel, Iran's archnemesis, have become increasingly overt. Azerbaijan and Israel have maintained close ties since formalizing their diplomatic relations in 1992. For years, Azerbaijan and Israel had largely kept their relationship quiet and out of the public eye. But that has recently started to change, with Azerbaijan appointing its first-ever ambassador to Israel on Jan. 11 — less than two months after announcing plans to become the first Shiite country to open an embassy in the Jewish state. Israel relies heavily on Azerbaijan for meeting its energy needs, buying 48% of its oil and gas from Azerbaijan. Beyond oil and gas, Tehran has claimed Azerbaijan also provides Israel with intelligence data, with Baku allegedly allowing its territory to be used as an outpost for the Israeli spy agency Mossad. In exchange for energy supplies and this reported intelligence support, Israel supplies Azerbaijan with key weapons and military technologies, as evidenced by Azerbaijan's use of Israeli-made weapons and drones against Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Iran sees Israel and Azerbaijani's increasingly close (and overt) political, economic and military ties as a threat to its security and geopolitical power — especially given that both countries have long expressed concerns over Iran's expanding regional influence. 

• On Nov. 26, Azerbaijani President Aliyev approved a historic decision by the country's parliament to open an embassy in Israel. On Jan. 14, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen publicly invited his Azeri counterpart to visit the embassy once it eventually opens. 
• Trade between Israel and Azerbaijan amounted to $200 million in 2020. Between 2016 and 2020, Israel accounted for 69% of Azerbaijan's major arms imports.
• In October 2021, Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei warned against Israel's ''military presence'' in Azerbaijan.

Despite these clear aggravating factors, a direct war between Iran and Azerbaijan in 2023 is unlikely, even if another armed conflict breaks out between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Neither Azerbaijan nor Iran want to go to war with each other, which would be costly for both countries (though for different reasons). While Azerbaijan has more troops and advanced weapons than Armenia, it remains far outmatched by Iran's powerful military. This will deter Baku from entering a direct conflict with Iran, which would risk resulting in significantly more Azeri losses on the battlefield. Iran, for its part, wants to avoid creating another security crisis on top of those it's already facing at home and abroad. A full-scale military conflict with Azerbaijan would distract Tehran from curbing rising domestic dissent amid the ongoing anti-government protests over Amini's death. Such a war would also risk angering Iranians (especially those that are ethnic Azeri), which could give way to a greater crisis of legitimacy for the Iranian regime by exacerbating growing calls for political change. In addition, Iran is currently focused on its escalating ''shadow'' conflict with Israel, as most recently evidenced by the suspected Israeli drone attack on an Iranian military facility in Isfahan on Jan. 28. This, along with its associated standoff with Arab Gulf states, will further deter Tehran from entering into direct military conflict with Azerbaijan as well. 

• Türkiye would almost certainly support the Azerbaijani position in a conflict with Iran, as top Azerbaijani and Turkish officials have described their countries as ''one nation, two states.'' Given the fact that Azerbaijan shares a border with NATO-member Türkiye, any Iranian-Azerbaijani conflict would thus have the potential to escalate onto NATO soil, which also acts as a constraint. Additionally, in the case of a war with Iran, Azerbaijan would almost definitely rely on Israeli weapons and intelligence, raising the risk for this conflict to become a proxy war that escalates directly with Israel.
• A hypothetical military conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan would likely exacerbate the global energy market disruptions brought on by Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine by disrupting oil and gas flows across the South Caucuses. 

Even if it doesn't result in an all-out war, Azerbaijan and Iran's growing rivalry will likely have key geopolitical implications depending on who emerges as the perceived victor in their current tug-of-war. If Iran backs down from its threats against the Zangezur corridor, the country's aspirations for greater influence in the South Caucasus will likely diminish, as its northern border will be exclusively controlled by unfriendly Turkic countries. Under this scenario, Tehran would lose the leverage it currently has over Türkiye and Azerbaijan as an important connection point between the two countries. Furthermore, Iran will then be forced to rely on Türkiye and Azerbaijan for all of its overland trade to the European Union. Depending on the terms of the corridor, Iran could also become more cut off from key nearby trading partners, such as Russia and Armenia — potentially harming all three countries' economies. If Azerbaijan instead backs down from its demands for the Zangezur corridor, regional tensions would ease in the short term, but it would also solidify Iran's role as a major power broker in the region, specifically as a backer of Armenia's interests. This would, in turn, have longer-term regional implications that could see Armenia increasingly turn toward Iran (and not just Russia) as a counterweight to Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

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