Iraq on the brink of becoming Iran's clone
Opinion by Shereshevskiy

ANALYTICS  16 August 2023 - 12:16

The Iranian system clones itself in countries that fall under Tehran's influence. Serious passions flared up around the case of Elizabeth Tsurkov, a citizen of Israel and Russia. She was kidnapped in Iraq, apparently in March 2023, by the pro-Iranian Shiite militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH). Iraqi authorities said they have launched a formal investigation and that the case is related to the country's national security. An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani made the statement in this regard. Tsurkov travelled to Iraq to conduct research. She is affiliated with Princeton University and specialises in the study of the Middle East and specifically Iraq, where in particular the movement of supporters of Shiite preacher Muqtada Sadr is the object of her interest.

The Iraqi Government is correct in pointing out that what happened is related to national security issues, but that remark has a very different meaning than an outside observer might think. The fact is that the Kataib Hezbollah group that kidnapped Tsurkov is part of the Iraqi regime. A pro-Iranian coalition of Shiite parties and militias called the Coordination Mechanism (CM) is in power in Baghdad. In October 2021, the alliance lost national elections, losing to another Shiite party, the Sairoun bloc led by Muqtada Sadr. But then how did it come to power? It must be said that the majority of Iraqis, suffering from poverty, lack of quality housing, jobs, clean water and power cuts in 50-degree heat, seem to have an extreme aversion to all parties, and they did not turn out for the elections. Of those who did show up - about 40 per cent - many voted for supporters of Sadr, a politician critical of corruption and the Iranians, whom he accuses of deeply infiltrating the engine of Iraqi statehood. However, all of Sadr's attempts to form a majority government have failed.

The Supreme Court, where Iranian and CM supporter Faiq Zaidan plays an important role, ruled that a simple parliamentary majority was not enough to form a government, but that a two-thirds majority was needed. Sadr could not get that much. He then ordered his supporters to leave parliament, unwilling to participate in a comedy choreographed by the Iranians and their allies. Then the pro-Iranian bloc, which came second in the elections, according to Iraqi law, won the seats of Sadr's supporters and, having collected two-thirds, formed a government headed by Prime Minister Sudani. In this way, the people who lost the elections became the government of the country.

According to Michael Knights, one of the leading scholars of Iraq, Sudani is a puppet who cannot make a move without the decisions of the leadership of the Coordination Mechanism (CM). At the head of this structure, and therefore of Iraq, are now three people - Qais Khazali, the leader of the Iranian-trained armed Shiite militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq, former Prime Minister and leader of the "Rule of Law" party Nuri al-Maliki, and the leader of the Iranian-created organisation "Badr" Hadi al-Amiri (members of "Badr" control the Iraqi Interior Ministry).

All three groups and many others are part of or affiliated with the Coordination Mechanism. Israeli journalist of Middle Eastern affairs Jonathan Spyer notes that the KH group that kidnapped Tsurkov "is part of Iraq's ruling establishment, took part in the 2021 Iraqi elections, and its political bloc Hoqq (Rights) was part of the Coordination Mechanism." If the CM is the political wing of the pro-Iranian bloc, its military wing is the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF). It includes all pro-Iranian militias. At one time, the Iranians relied on the KH as the core of the PMF.

KH leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was the de facto head of all the militias and a close friend of the second man in the Iranian leadership, Qassem Suleimani, who ran Tehran's covert operations abroad. Both were killed by a US missile fired from a drone in Baghdad on January 3, 2020. Since then, KH has lost its former influence. Today, some observers believe Qais Khazali has "gained unfathomable power." But be that as it may, the KH is part of the Iraqi government. Recently, these men, who are the true leaders of the country, have made several important and, in fact, unprecedented decisions that could determine the future of the country. First of all, the Coordination Mechanism has taken control of Iraq's National Intelligence Service, Baghdad airport, anti-corruption agencies and customs posts. The move signifies the group's growing penetration and merger with the state. At the same time, it has decided to increase control over digital media, i.e. censorship.

A number of other decisions are related to the discussion of the Iraqi budget. It will double the number of PMF to 240,000 fighters, bringing the state's expenditures on their maintenance to $1.7 billion. In fact, the PMF militias are turning into the main defence and support of the Iraqi state. And no wonder. It was these forces, along with the elite "Golden Division" (also led by Iranian proxies), that played a leading role in the defeat of ISIS.

The militias later crushed a widespread popular uprising against the regime that erupted in the autumn of 2019. They are all paid from the budget and listed as members of the official security forces. But more importantly, they are turning into the core of the regime, filling it with themselves, being present in all spheres of politics and economy.

Moreover, the pro-Iranian Shiite religious militias that make up the PMF are armed with T-90 tanks and long-range missile systems. The new Iraqi budget promises a total of 700,000 additional public sector jobs (including PMF militias), increasing the number of civil servants by 17 per cent within one year. There is little doubt that these jobs are for relatives and friends of the militias. In this way, Iranian methods are creating an active, state-funded, taxpayer-funded minority capable of defending the regime by force, while at the same time creating opportunities to funnel state money into the pockets of militants.

But perhaps an even more important measure is the decision to create a new state-owned company, the Muhandis General Company, named after the late Kataib Hezbollah leader. Knights points out that it is officially owned by the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), with "the company's scope of activity virtually unlimited: it can operate in any sector, as its full name suggests, and is essentially an empty container through which Iranian-backed militias can consolidate their control over the Iraqi economy." Uniquely for an Iraqi state-owned company, it can obtain land, state capital, and state-owned enterprises, and carry out construction and demolition for free without cabinet or parliamentary approval.

In December 2022, shortly after its creation, the Muhandis General Company received 1.2 million acres of state-owned land along the Iraqi-Saudi border for free. The project is ostensibly intended for tree planting and agriculture, but to put its scale into perspective, it should be noted that the area it covers is only half the size of Lebanon and more than 50 times the size of the largest agricultural project in Iraqi history. What's more, the area is located in an area from where Iraqi militants have repeatedly fired drones at Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since 2019...

On April 24, PMF forces also illegally expropriated a large tract of prime real estate in western Baghdad on behalf of the Muhandis General Company, simply seizing a chunk of the historic centre of the country's capital the size of 20 New York City blocks. Thus, we are talking about the creation of a state-owned (actually owned by the leaders of the PMF and CM) corporation that will be able to get its hands on any expensive assets.

The Iraqi state and society are rapidly transforming. A new structure, very similar to Iran's, is forming within the former shell. In Iran, the role of the PMF is played by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a special army composed of religious military personnel. The IRGC is the core of the Iranian regime and at the same time the largest corporation in the country. According to various estimates, about half of Iran's GDP is under the control of its companies, both state-owned and those owned by IRGC-affiliated individuals. Of course, such a system is extremely inefficient in economic terms. Up to 60 per cent of Iranians live at or below the poverty line. A narrow ruling class linked to powerbrokers and bureaucrats enriches itself from the state budget through all sorts of subsidies and lucrative contracts, but it is prosperity at the expense of the rest of the working population. It pays for an unlimited line of credit for militants, law enforcers and their relatives, who have turned into new dollar millionaires. Something similar is now happening in Iraq, a country that is the world's fourth-largest oil exporter. But such projects are expensive. The new budget assumes spending of $152 billion - 50 per cent more than in the 2021 budget. The government has pledged to maintain this level of spending for three years, until the 2025 elections.

Despite all the country's wealth, increased spending amid corruption could drive Iraq into economic bankruptcy. And it is likely to trigger a new revolution in the future on the part of the poorest population, as has been systematically happening in Iran in recent years, and as has already happened in Iraq in 2019. The Iranian system literally clones itself in countries that fall under Tehran's influence, be it Iraq or Lebanon. But the consequences are similar - massive social protests and uprisings throughout the Shia belt, including both Iran itself and its sphere of influence.

Back to the Tsurkov case. She is being held captive by the Iranians or their closest friends. Spyer, one of Israel's most knowledgeable analysts and specialists on the region, suggests that she may already be in Iran. Her fate will be decided in negotiations and deals. The Iranians will probably demand the release of some prominent Palestinian commander or activist in Israel, or they may want to talk to the Americans about it. The figureheads in Baghdad decide almost nothing in such a situation.

Caliber.Az