Tale of two alliances: Shusha, Moscow declarations revisited
Pax Caucasia in the making

ANALYTICS  27 June 2022 - 15:15

Two crucial instruments in Azerbaijan's foreign policy design, the Shusha and Moscow declarations, for all the commonalities by which they are bound, differ in some vitally critical respects, all of which in some way relate to various levels of profundities associated with the alliances in question.

Their cumulative impact, on the other hand, is set to have significant implications for the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, augmenting Azerbaijan's role, enabling it to project greater influence and entitling it to neutrality in relation to conflicts in its surrounding region, giving rise to corresponding guarantees.

Principal moments

Diplomats and lawyers know only too well that similar titles and comparable contents could still amount to different kinds of agreements. One who believes that the Moscow declaration is a reprint of the document signed in Shusha on 15 June 2021 is given to misguided oversimplification. One who is of the opinion that they are completely different, having nothing in common, would also be erroneous in their judgement.

The truth is that these two alliances forged by Baku with Ankara and Moscow are similar, yet inherently different. Drawing upon pre-existing arrangements, both documents officially upgrade the interstate relations to which they apply into the level of an alliance. Pervasive in scope, the two declarations incorporate a wide web of bilateral interaction modes, yet differ in terms of their degree of specified interconnection.

However superficial it may look, it is interesting that the Shusha declaration refers to "allied relations", whereas the Moscow agreement envisions "allied interaction". Semantically, the terms "relationship" and "interaction" are not identical. The former denotes a "closer association" or "condition of being related", whereas the latter's meaning prescribes a lesser degree of connection.

It is difficult to say if, in practical terms, in the eyes of the document drafters, these terminological nuances were of consequence. However, the principal differences between these documents can be ascertained through the careful examination of the texts and their judicious interpretation in conjunction with the practical steps taken in the light of realpolitik.

If the Moscow declaration envisions an alliance between two nations that aim to set the rules of the game in terms of coordination as to current international subjects, avoidance of competition in relation to certain energy matters and advanced cooperation in myriad fields, the Shusha declaration offers a more integrated form of interaction contingent on harmonisation.

In other words, the alliance with Russia is more about "mutual obligations", or agreeing to behave in a certain fashion, whereas the alliance with Türkiye is about a profoundly deeper relationship, guided by prospective 'oneness' in the future, or a firm intention to evolve into a unified framework.

The timing of the Shusha declaration came as no surprise. Rumours were rife after the Second Karabakh War that Ankara and Baku would sign a comprehensive document to reaffirm and reinforce their ties.

However, the Moscow declaration was signed on 22 February 2022, at a time when Russia was increasingly isolated on the international stage and just prior to the Ukrainian incursion. Both sides claim the timing is accidental.

Although it is undeniably true that the work on the documents had been underway for some considerable time, it requires some additional dose of credulity to banish the deliberate intent theory from one's mind.

Ankara and Moscow both cooperate and compete in the South Caucasus. This is a complex relationship where dichotomous elements may be co-present. By virtue of its allied relations with Türkiye and Russia, Baku ensures that (i) they are not at loggerheads in a way that could disadvantage Azerbaijani interests, whilst simultaneously, through combined security guarantees, (ii) gaining substantial freedom of manoeuvrability, allowing it to act a with a greater deal of assertiveness in the region and beyond.

Military-security specifics outlined

Both documents mandate a consolidated position on topical international issues of mutual interest, with a strong military-security concomitant.

Both allied interactions are inclusive of cooperation modes, which inter alia, could be undertaken via joint exercises, "permanent" and ad hoc consultation mechanisms to address security risks and mutual defence arrangements, with varying degrees of imperativeness. The generic outlines of the framework may be similar, but it is within the depths of the interconnection that differences may be found.

For the purpose of this analysis, it may be judicious to distinguish between the "military cooperation" and "mutual defence" segments of the overall component in question.

Military cooperation

The Moscow declaration paves the way for furthering military cooperation, covering joint operational and combat training activities, the provision of modern weapons and military equipment and other areas of mutual interest. The document on the allied interaction with Türkiye does, however, envision more expansive and all-embracing measures.

In the first instance, the Shusha declaration stipulates that joint efforts aimed at "reorganising and modernising" the armed forces of the two nations will be undertaken. Secondly, in addition to "the exchange of personnel aimed at strengthening defence and military security", the parties will cooperate in terms of "the management of weapons and ammunition", and ensure the "coordinated activities of authorised agencies and institutions for this purpose".

If the Moscow declaration suggests the framework of deep military cooperation between the allies, the Shusha document necessitates the harmonisation of the two armies, potentially leading to full integration.

In fact, President Aliyev has been unambiguous regarding Baku's objective to create a smaller version of the Turkish army, and, given the clearly stated objective of Azerbaijan, and the practical lessons of the Second Karabakh War, it should not be difficult to surmise the differences between the aforementioned declarations.

Mutual defence

Article 6 of the Moscow declaration states that Russia and Azerbaijan "express their readiness to hold urgent consultations" if, in the view of one of the parties, its security interests are threatened.

In accordance with Article 19, the two countries may provide each other "with military assistance on the basis of the UN Charter, separate international treaties and taking into account the existing international legal obligations of each of the Parties".

Article 9 of the self-same document stipulates that "the parties will refrain from any actions, including those carried out through third states, directed against each other".

The military alliance with Türkiye entails a deeper and more robust form of mutual defence assistance. The Shusha declaration stipulates that, if there is a threat or an act of aggression, the parties "will hold a joint consultation in order to eliminate the cause" and "carry out initiatives in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and provide each other with necessary assistance, in accordance with the UN Charter".

In line with the self-same declaration, upon examination of the nature and extent of the problem and the volume and form of such possible assistance, "a decision will be made to secure defence needs for the adoption of joint measures, and coordinated activities will be organised by the power-wielding and administrative agencies of the Armed Forces".

The difference between the two modes of mutual defence arrangements is that what the Moscow declaration offers is contingent on "coordinated steps and interactions, with the possibility of direct military help, if necessary". However, what the Shusha document stipulates goes far deeper, to the level of NATO’s Article 5 provision, suggesting the formula that "an attack on one of the parties is tantamount to an attack on another".

By formally acceding to allied relations with its two neighbours, Azerbaijan has managed to create favourable conditions for the maintenance of overall peace in the South Caucasus and its security, advancing an ambitious foreign policy design.

The combined effect of the declarations augments Baku's clout, providing it with substantial security guarantees, enabling it to maintain a neutral stance as to issues where it prefers to have no opinion and reinforcing its central place in the region and, above all, maintaining peace and stability for the greater good of humanity.

Caliber.Az