Pashinyan's pendulum: Between "real Armenia" and the pursuit of revenge

The newspaper Hraparak has once again accused Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of defeatism, but it is not the only one. A growing number of Armenian publications and politicians have intensified their criticism of Pashinyan, particularly in light of his recent remarks about the 1915 events and his call for a new national constitution.

However, Pashinyan's actions also raise significant questions in Azerbaijan. The primary concern here is his sincerity—specifically, whether a clause regarding the removal of the reference to the Declaration of Independence, which mentions the "reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh," will be included in the agenda of a national referendum. If it is, how actively will Pashinyan campaign for its removal?

Beneath these questions lies a more fundamental one: what is Pashinyan's true objective? While pursuing ideological shifts, Armenia under Pashinyan is also rearming, including acquiring offensive weapons, and signaling preparations for possible revenge. How do these military initiatives align with his stated efforts to reshape Armenia's national idea?

The idea that Pashinyan is trying to instil in people's minds is that Armenia must stop being the core of experiments aimed at expanding living space and start seeing itself as a self-sufficient entity. Analyzing his speeches over the past two years, one concludes that he is quite consistent in this policy.
Can we assume that the consistent arming of Armenia, and thus preparation for an attempt at revenge, does not contradict Pashinyan's ideas of a "real Armenia"?

I think we can, if we look at it from the perspective of the Prime Minister's intention to maintain power, that is, based on electoral circumstances. Torn between the camps of revanchists and proponents of peace, Pashinyan seems to find a common denominator for both, which sounds something like this: "To preserve Armenia, we must stop thinking with old concepts. And when we become strong, under favourable circumstances, we can again think about the 'miatsum'."

That is, Pashinyan does not entirely reject the idea of reviving "miatsum" (the reunification of Armenia and Karabakh); he postpones it. At the same time, the processes he has initiated in breaking the ideological paradigm could become irreversible and genuinely alter the way Armenian society perceives itself. If this happens, there will no longer be a societal demand for revenge.

Pashinyan is very vain and strives to remain in history. It can be assumed that, hypothetically, right after the removal of the Karabakh clan, he had two diametrically opposed but equally significant options for change. The first was to solidify the occupation of Karabakh, which would require winning a future war with Azerbaijan and forcing it to abandon its intentions of reclaiming the land by force. In 2019, this scenario seemed quite achievable in Pashinyan's eyes. This is exactly why he made the statement, "Karabakh is Armenia and period."

The second option, which he, being a smart person, undoubtedly also considered, was defeat in the war and the use of this catastrophe for the mental renewal of the nation. "If we don’t defeat the Azerbaijanis, at least we’ll defeat ourselves," Pashinyan might have thought. In this way, he would gain fame as the reformer of the very foundations of Armenian society. Paradoxically, the slogan "Karabakh is Armenia, and period" simultaneously served this purpose as well. The phrase "and period," when examined closely, signifies a passionate desire for the end of the whole history, the end of the painful wait for Azerbaijani retribution.

Pashinyan did not need victory or defeat in the strict sense—he needed a resolution! And he understood that it was inevitable, so through his slogans and actions, he merely accelerated it, hoping to allow more time for manoeuvring. Now, Pashinyan clearly understands that there is no alternative for him, meaning he has a carte blanche to promote innovative, truly avant-garde ideas for the Armenian consciousness. Once he holds the referendum and wins the elections again, that will be his triumph, and he will enter the history of the Armenian people as a hero.

However, as the influx of free weapons increases, their allure might cloud Pashinyan’s judgment, and he may decide to provoke. Moreover, it seems that those supplying the weapons, particularly Paris, are pushing him toward such actions.

Well, Azerbaijan is on guard and ready to resist any provocation—its response will be predictably harsh. Therefore, there are solid grounds to believe that Pashinyan will choose the path of peace and permanently change the face of his country.