Moscow to push Yerevan to make concessions to Baku: Russian expert
Caliber.Az's interview with Alexander Shatilov

INTERVIEWS  25 April 2022 - 17:18

Caliber.Az presents an interview with Alexander Shatilov, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications of the Finance University under the Government of Russia. 

- Alexander Borisovich, what do you think about the results of the recent talks between Pashinyan and Putin in Moscow?

In my opinion, Moscow is not ready for the active game in Karabakh yet, moreover, Russia does not need aggravation of the situation in this field. That is why Vladimir Putin's main task is to find a peace formula acceptable to both sides. At the same time I do not exclude that taking into account the current situation (the state of war with Ukraine, the war of sanctions, etc.) the Russian Federation will push Yerevan, inducing it to make some concessions to the Azerbaijani side.

- One of the clauses in the joint statement of the Russian and Armenian leaders in Moscow says that the sides have agreed to increase efforts to counter any manifestations of xenophobia and neo-Nazism. Doesn't this mean that Russia is considering the possible involvement of Armenia in the conflict with Ukraine?

It seems to me that the Russian leadership has now realized that none of its post-Soviet partners will "sign up" to be involved in the Ukrainian conflict. Not even Belarus, which so far has limited itself mainly to diplomatic support and the provision of its territory for the stationing of the Russian Armed Forces. Therefore, Moscow began to think and act much more realistically and pragmatically - the denazification of Ukraine will be carried out by its own forces.

As for the other "hot spots" of the post-Soviet space, it is in the Kremlin's interest to "freeze" them out.

- If Russia opposes neo-Nazism, why is this principled position not applied to Armenia, where Garegin Nzhdeh is being glorified by erecting a monument to him in the center of Yerevan?

The color revolution in Armenia in 2018 was a very unpleasant surprise for the Russian Federation. First, the Armenian elites blatantly ignored Moscow in their political games, despite the fact that it has been the main "roof" and sponsor of Armenia for many years.

Second, it was for the first time since 1998 that blatantly anti-Russian, pro-Western forces came to power in Armenia: in fact, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was once one of the main "gravediggers" of the USSR, returned to power again after a 20-year break (it was with his active participation that the Armenian Declaration of Independence was adopted in August 1990, launching the "parade of sovereignties" of other Union republics). Nikol Pashinyan was in fact Ter-Petrosian's "reincarnation" since on his way to power he used more than critical rhetoric with respect to the Russian Federation, demonstrated his pro-Western orientation in every way and cooperated actively with American and European NGOs, known for their involvement in overthrowing regimes undesirable to the West through the "color revolution" technique.

After becoming prime minister, Pashinyan continued to distance himself from Moscow and drift towards Washington and Brussels, while at the same time organizing flamboyant actions in the spirit of modern Ukraine. The glorification of Garegin Nzhdeh, a Nazi collaborator, is part of the same story. Alas, today the official Armenian authorities pay more homage not to Soviet Marshal Baghramyan but to Abwehr agent Nzhdeh. And this, of course, does not add to Moscow's enthusiasm for interaction with the modern Armenian leadership.

- Putin and Pashinyan have agreed to speed up the creation of a bilateral commission to delimit the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. How much time will this take?

I do not exclude that the process of creating a bilateral commission will be accelerated, another thing is that border delimitation may be delayed indefinitely.

- Should we expect positive signals regarding the normalization of relations between Baku and Yerevan after the meeting between Pashinyan and Putin?

I think that certain "peacemaking" signals have been sent to Pashinyan, another thing is that Moscow would like to be more closely involved in this process, which is possible only after Russia completes its special operation in Ukraine.

- In the current geopolitical situation, does Russia regard Europe's mediation initiative on the Armenian-Azerbaijani agenda as serious competition in the South Caucasus?

If we talk about the influence of the European Union as a "collective actor", then Russia is not much afraid of competition here, because now the EU is bogged down in the solution of its own problems, first of all, socio-economic in nature. However, the penetration of the Anglo-Saxons (especially the British) into the South Caucasus and their involvement in the peacemaking process may very well worry Moscow.

- Is rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey in Russia's interests?

If the matter concerns the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, Moscow will only be glad, because at the moment it is very busy in the Ukrainian direction and aggravation of the situation in the South Caucasus is clearly not in its interests. However, if Turkey tries to extend its influence on Armenia and pressures Yerevan hard, this development will obviously not please the Russian leadership.

Nevertheless, as practice shows, despite often very sharp political and economic contradictions, Putin and Erdogan usually manage to "amicably" agree.

Caliber.Az