Iran-backed Hezbollah's tentacles reaching out to Lebanese politics Shereshevskiy's excursion to Middle East
In the 1980s, the whole USSR followed the events unfolding in the Italian TV series "La Piovra" ("The Octopus"), dedicated to the lonely and hopeless struggle of courageous and very vulnerable police commissioner Corrado Cattani with a cunning and completely invulnerable Sicilian mafia, backed by influential politicians and officials. Something similar is happening in Lebanon today. The difference is that the situation is complicated by the deepest economic and political crisis in the history of the country, with elements of civil war.
Events in Lebanon usually get little attention. Who cares about a small country on the coast, immersed in its own squabbles? Meanwhile, Lebanon and Syria are part of the same political and economic ecosystem. The Syrian regime maintains funds in Lebanese banks and conducts financial transactions through Lebanon. The country's most powerful political and military force, Hezbollah, is Assad's ally and an active participant in Syria's civil war on his side; like Assad, it is closely linked to Iran, which supports them with arms and financial flows. Finally, over a million Syrian refugees live in Lebanon. If Lebanon is further destabilised and a civil war breaks out there, it will have an impact on Syria as well.
This week, Lebanese political parties and the judiciary warned of the threat of civil war and rebellion in the wake of the conflict between the country's chief prosecutor, Ghassan Oweidat, and Tariq Al-Bitar, the judicial investigator in the Beirut port bombing case. Recall that the explosion took place on August 4, 2020, killing more than 200 and injuring around 6,000 people. The blast damaged tens of thousands of buildings in the capital. The disaster was caused by 2,750 tonnes of stored ammonium nitrate confiscated by customs authorities in 2014. Those responsible for the tragedy have not yet been identified. However, it is known that the port of Beirut, like other ports in the country, is under the control of Hezbollah, which has links to Iran. Most likely this may not be a case of conspiracy, but of criminal negligence, and yet someone has to answer for it too.
For his part, prosecutor Oweidat accused the investigator of "rebellion against the judiciary", decided to ban Al-Bitar from leaving the country, and summoned him to court. The prosecutor also ordered the release of 17 suspects previously detained in the case. Al-Bitar responded by saying that he was not subordinate to the prosecutor and that the trial against him was "non-binding", citing some legal technicalities, saying he had been appointed to investigate the blast by the Minister of Justice and it was not for the prosecutor to remove him (Al-Bitar).
The incorruptible investigator Al-Bitar is becoming popular in the country because his actions are directed against the political and economic bosses hated by society. Demonstrations are held in his support. Hezbollah, for its part, holds armed demonstrations, threatening Al-Bitar. In a total crisis gripping the country, these developments could indeed bring it to the brink of civil war. "Hezbollah" cannot allow influential associates to be arrested. It will resist any such attempt and will use weapons if necessary.
The roots of Lebanon's crisis are deep. The conflict between a stern but little-influencing investigator and a mighty but extremely unpopular corrupt elite is a storm on the surface of the sea, brought on, in turn, by underlying destructive currents.
The economic and socio-political crisis
Ten years ago it might have seemed like a prosperous country. The World Bank now classifies the economic crisis in Lebanon as one of the worst in modern history. Four-fifths of the population live below the poverty line and youth unemployment is said to reach up to 50 per cent. Many Lebanese have lost most of their savings and cannot access their own money due to illegal capital controls by banks. The Lebanese pound has lost more than 97 per cent of its value. The country imports fuel, medicine, and food. Because the local currency has turned into paper, it has become difficult to buy them all. As a result, there have been power cuts and kilometre-long queues for scarce petrol have grown in car parks. Many families complain that they are spending their last savings to buy bread. Some Lebanese come to banks with guns in their hands and demand their deposits.
The Lebanese working class is largely made up of Shiites, the poorest strata of the Lebanese population (about a third of the country's citizens). But there are also refugees. And Lebanese law on refugees is the harshest in the Middle East. There are a huge number of bans on work and business for Palestinians, and now also for Syrians. Because of the ethno-confessional divide, workplaces are controlled by owners, management, and unions belonging to certain Lebanese ethno-confessional communities. Therefore, the work of any non-citizens is illegal - no one will allow them to take good jobs. In particular, they will not be allowed to do so by local unions.
The exploitation of the super-cheap labour of refugees and migrants is one of the sources of Lebanon's wealth. The country is home to 250,000 Palestinian and more than 1 million disenfranchised Syrian refugees. All this has created a dangerous social rift, with dividing lines that coincide with ethno-religious differences. However, the use of semi-slave labour of migrants with no rights, but very cheap and profitable for business, has become a trademark of the modern economy.
Banks have long been the mainstay of Lebanese capitalism, along with cheap labour for Shiites and migrant workers, which is why the country has been called the "Switzerland of the Middle East" in the past. There are about 15 million Lebanese in the world today and only a third of them live in their homeland. The huge diaspora nevertheless retains ties with the families back home. Most Lebanese are employed where they live, and those who are wealthier have set up businesses and international trading networks, from Brazil to the Gulf states. Many send money home. Lebanese banks serviced their transactions, transferring money to relatives and friends of emigrants. The banks guaranteed local and diaspora deposits with high-interest rates. In addition, as already mentioned, the top leaders of the Syrian regime kept money in the country - for them, the Lebanese banks became a gateway to the outside world. The banks attracted customers with huge interest rates, but the money was often not backed by real production of goods and services.
The problems came at a time when civil war broke out in Syria. Then the Americans enacted the so-called "Caesar's Law" - sanctions on the Assad regime, banning any dealings with Syria. Together with the Covid lockdowns, this caused the collapse of the entire banking system in Lebanon. Banks stopped issuing deposits. The financial pyramid collapsed and millions of Lebanese were simply robbed.
As early as 2019, powerful social protests started in the country, engulfing all segments of Lebanese society, especially the poorest. Even before the crisis reached its peak, in the autumn of 2019, 2 million Lebanese - half the adult population - took to the streets. Protesters not only voiced their anger by chanting slogans against the country's corrupt, bank-linked top brass but also unleashed their anger on all incumbent politicians and parties. For the first time, hundreds of thousands of Shiites came out to protest, and some of them tried to set fire to Hezbollah headquarters.
The Lebanese poor and working class demanded a system of services, electricity, fuel, food, etc. These self-organised protests were directed against all incumbent parties. Syrian and Palestinian refugees also took an active part in them. The protests were partially suppressed by security forces and Hezbollah fighters and partly forced to stop because of Covid. But public discontent has not disappeared.
At present, the leadership of the country is split. All ministers are caretakers because it has proved impossible to form a government because of the rift in parliament. However, the real power in Lebanon is in the hands of Hezbollah. It has a more powerful armed force (forged in the Syrian civil war) than the Lebanese army. The latter is divided and a large part of it is also under the control of officers close to Hezbollah. In the hands of this party, as mentioned above, is also the country's main intelligence service, MDGS. Finally, several influential groups such as the Shiite Amal Party and the larger Christian Free Patriotic Movement are in alliance with Hezbollah. Today it is Hezbollah that protects the top - the leaders of banks, ethno-confessional communities, and affiliated parties - from the wrath of the social grassroots. This is how Hezbollah, with just 13 out of 128 MPs in parliament, was able to secure control of Lebanon. In fact, 60 per cent of Lebanese did not go to the last election at all, seeing no point in participating - they have no leverage over the deputies anyway.
The current situation in Lebanon is characterised by uncertainty. The social grassroots have proved capable of huge protests. But the level of self-organisation has not been sufficient to, firstly, remove the country's top leaders and, secondly, form an alternative to the current political and economic system. No bodies of public self-government or counter-authorities in residential neighbourhoods and workplaces have been established. However, some protesters spoke of the need to abolish parliamentarism and parties and to establish direct democracy in their place. The protests have been suppressed.
The current rulers of Lebanon, on the other hand, rely mainly on force and Iran, which is pumping weapons into Hezbollah. The economy is in a terrible state, mass poverty is growing along with the anger of Lebanese society. It cannot go on like this forever.
Under these conditions, there are people like investigator Al-Bitar who try to act as the people's intercessors and heroes. But it is doubtful whether they will be able to turn the tide.