Azerbaijan keeps close watch on European presence at border EU Mission or espionage?
Caliber.Az has previously reported on the European Union’s mission along the disputed Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Over 200 personnel are stationed there, keeping a close watch, eavesdropping, and gathering intelligence. It’s their job, and they are well-equipped for it. The European Peace Facility is providing technical support, having already allocated 10 million euros to Armenia. Officially, this funding is meant “to contribute to improved protection of civilians in crises and emergencies,” though few believe this version of events. This is exactly why Azerbaijan remains vigilant, carefully monitoring the mission’s activities and scrutinizing Armenia's purchases.
Here are a few examples from the most recent events. On 12 February, at 10:09 a.m., three SUVs were observed arriving at a combat position of the Armenian Armed Forces near the Arpa settlement in the Keshishkand region of Armenia. Two of the SUVs displayed European Union flags, while the third was a UAZ-Patriot vehicle belonging to the Armenian military. The group consisted of six individuals: two military personnel and four civilians. Initially, they conducted surveillance, before moving to another combat position where they took photos and videos of Azerbaijani army positions. The activities of these individuals, identified as Euro-observers, were closely monitored using both visual and technical surveillance by Azerbaijani army units stationed in the area.
The following day, on 13 February, members of the espionage mission conducted surveillance in the border area near the Gubadli region. They were seen using binoculars to observe the surroundings and the territory of Azerbaijan. As expected, their movements were closely monitored and recorded by Azerbaijani military personnel, as the situation was tightly controlled and the border remained securely locked down.
Despite the fact that Azerbaijan strongly opposes the presence of the EU mission at the conditional border, its mandate has been extended at Armenia's request for another two years, until 19 February 2027. This extension comes even though Azerbaijan has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the situation at all levels, highlighting that the EU mission operates without coordination with Baku. Responses such as "allow the same EU mission in Azerbaijan" are not accepted—there is no place for these mission representatives on Azerbaijani soil. This is because, should the need arise, Azerbaijan prefers to engage with each EU member state individually. If Azerbaijan does communicate with any Brussels-based institution, it is merely a gesture of courtesy, considered a sign of goodwill from Azerbaijan.
From the European side's perspective, the arrival of the monitoring mission at the conditional border immediately led to a decrease in armed incidents. This should be understood as "if it weren’t for us, then...". While the sense of self-importance is certainly high, it has no bearing on reality. The number of armed incidents actually dropped right after 12 February 2024, and the Armenian side should remember this date better than any mission or the entire EU combined, though the EU does remember it as well. Let’s revisit the sequence of events: first, an Armenian sniper shoots an Azerbaijani border guard, injuring him. In response, Azerbaijan's State Border Service launches Operation Revenge and destroys an Armenian military position. The result was satisfactory for Azerbaijan, with four Armenian fighters from the "Yerkrapah" terrorist organization eliminated. But instead of acknowledging Azerbaijan's tact and restraint in punishing the enemy, Europe expressed regret over the allegedly disproportionate use of force by Azerbaijan.
By the way, in hindsight, we too regret just a little—if the use of force had been entirely proportional, the number of "Yerkrapah" members, or "Zinvor" (recruits), eliminated would have been far greater. So, if we lament anything, it’s only that only four "Yerkrapah" members were eliminated. After this exemplary lesson, the number of armed incidents dropped, and it’s easy to see why: missions are one thing, but in a future confrontation, Armenia may simply run out of "Yerkrapah" members or conscripts.
In case anyone still hasn't realized, Azerbaijan is a country whose voice holds significant weight, and its position must be respected. If anyone believes they can disregard Azerbaijan's opinion, they shouldn’t be surprised when such foolish and incompetent assumptions inevitably lead to a cooling of relations. Timing is crucial, and the question of the EU mission’s presence at the conditional (and I’d like to emphasize—conditional) border will undoubtedly be addressed when it is most strategically appropriate.
As for the potential provocations from the Armenian Armed Forces… Well, in the event of an armed confrontation, I wouldn’t place much trust in the EU mission if I were in the shoes of the Armenian military. Yes, the mission is stationed at the conditional border, but the EU itself is far removed from it. They won't have time to intervene, and even if they did, it's unlikely they'd take any real action. In the worst-case scenario, the EU will again express "deep concern" and offer condolences to the families of fallen conscripts. Then, they will demand something forcefully and, once again, receive nothing. So, if I were Armenia, I would seriously reconsider trusting those who have deceived them as many times as they've promised "territories from sea to sea." Because, when it comes down to it, Azerbaijan will teach anyone a hard lesson.