How Iraq’s PMF rise would affect the internal power dynamics? Militias' extended role

When the so-called Islamic State, a radical terrorist organization based in Iraq and Syria, was defeated on the ground in 2017 by the international coalition, which included the US, Türkiye, Russia, and local militant groups, many argued that it would ease the regional security gap and decrease the terrorist activities for an extended period.

However, shortly after ISIS's defeat, the Iraqi state sank into another enormous political violence with the involvement of the local Shi’a militant groups, notably Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of predominantly Shiite militia groups that is accorded a formal status as an auxiliary branch of the Iraqi security forces.

Since declaring ISIS defeated in late 2017, the PMF and mainly Tehran-aligned militias have emerged as a powerful force in Iraq and grown more defiant towards the government and opposition groups.

The PMF has long opposed the Iraqi government, citing the "confessional standoff" of Shi Muslims with local Sunni organizations. Despite many challenges and serious setbacks since 2018, the PMF has shown a marked ability to bounce back from weakened leadership and internal fractures, a significant electoral defeat, and the loss of political capital with large segments of the Iraqi public.

While most of the PMF groups were formally integrated into the Iraqi armed forces in 2016, many fighters remain loyal to their former militia commanders, some of whom entered the parliament during the 2021 elections.

For many years, the PMF was closely linked with Iran and its proxy groups across the Middle East, thus becoming a piece of Tehran's broader proxy warfare strategy. Although the militant group was under firm pressure from the US during Donald Trump's presidency, it made additional inroads into the Iraqi state apparatus during the Joe Biden administration.

As such, the PMF has even been raining rockets and mortars on the US Embassy in Baghdad since 2020. The power dynamic has changed due to the Biden administration's unsuccessful engagement with Iran over the nuclear talks.

When the nuclear talks with Iran stalled, the US government expressed its willingness to remain in the region, even with minimal military personnel, citing the continuation of a “national emergency” in Iraq under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or IEEPA. Indeed, disengaging militarily from Iraq will likely reduce US influence in Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Washington's weight should not be exaggerated, but it is accurate, and the presence of US troops reinforces it. During the prolonged political crisis of October 2021 to October 2022, the US low profile reflected the infeasibility of intervening publicly and intensively in that yearlong impasse.

Although the PMF activities relatively decreased in Iraq in early 2023, the political disputes and debates resurrected when Prime Minister Mohammad Shia-al Sudani assumed office. The appointment was a signal to the PMF and its supporters for the long-awaited comeback. Consequently, the Iraqi-based PMF played a critical role in enhancing Iran’s influence over the Iraqi political system. As a result, Iran has been able to outsource some of its local security requirements to proxy groups like PMF.

The PMF's discontent stems from the cordial relations of PM Sudani with the Biden administration as he supported the continued US military presence as part of the coalition against the radical Islamist organizations and has worked to reduce Iraq’s energy dependence on Iran.

Nevertheless, under Al-Sudani’s leadership, Iranian-backed proxy groups, namely the PMF and its affiliation Muhandis group, have dramatically expanded their network in Iraq. For example, in May 2023, the new PM Sudani allocated nearly $70 million in capital from the Iraqi budget to the Muhandis Company.

Undoubtedly, the Muhandis group in Iraq is going to model the Revolutionary Guard’s engineering arm with the support of the Islamic Republic. Some analysts even argue that Iran has gained the permits to establish the company in exchange for its support for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani to win office.

Indeed, such a move by the Al Sudani government will empower the PMF economically and bolster its political clout in the country. Although the PMF-linked militias have muscled in on the scrap metal trade in Mosul and have been accused of smuggling oil and running checkpoints to extract taxes from lorries carrying goods, the ruling government disregarded similar reports.

Consequently, Iraqi PM Al Sudani may judge it too dangerous for his personal safety to take bold steps to rein in the PMF and other Iranian-backed proxy groups. Despite this fact, Al Sudani's government took a firm stance to tackle corruption and economic crisis at home, and the Biden administration decided to take a patient approach to the new government and to ignite the fragile situation in favour of Tehran.