"Yerevan has no tools to influence Baku" Russian military expert on Caliber.Az

Caliber.Az presents an interview with Russian military expert and publicist Vladislav Shurygin.

- I would like to hear from you, Vladyslav Vladyslavovich, whether or not Russia used Iranian-made drones in the war with Ukraine. As you know, Moscow and Tehran do not recognize this at the official level.

- There is no doubt that the Iranian drones Geran-1 and Geran-2 were used by Russia in the war against Ukraine. And undoubtedly, at the initial stage, they provided very important support for us. But only at the initial stage, further this production was deployed on our territory, and now all these types of weapons are produced in Russia. Moreover, a purely modernized Russian type of Geran is already being produced.

There is no precise data on the quantities of Iranian drones delivered to Russia's military arsenal. But it is known that the first batch of Iranian UAVs amounted to at least two hundred. And after the Russian Federation established its own production, we are producing several hundred of them a month.

- Do you think that the joint construction of a drone production plant by Iran and Russia has something to do with Tehran's transfer of military technology to Moscow?

- I have no such information. But if we proceed from logic, joint production of drones already implies some kind of access to these technologies or large-scale supplies of components. And which of these methods was chosen is hard to say. I can assume that the Shahed UAV itself, which was delivered in the first shipment from Tehran, is quite simple and, accordingly, it would have been pointless to carry a huge number of spare parts thousands of kilometres away. It was easier to deploy everything locally based on available materials.

- And what is Russia giving Iran in return? There is an expert opinion that for the drones Moscow promised to withdraw some of its troops from Syria and transfer military bases to the Iranians. How likely is this?

- I think that's unlikely. The partition of Syria in terms of military presence is long over. Russia is not trying to occupy any new bases there but traditionally keeps control of the main points - the airfield and naval base in Tartus. Accordingly, Russian units continue to provide Syrians with military assistance in the fight against jihadists in the north and northeast of the country. And Iran has a rather powerful presence both in Damascus and in the political Syrian segment. From this point of view, there are no contradictions between the Russian Federation and Iran. Rather, as I think, the point is that Russia is ready to transfer key military technologies to Iran, which, in fact, it is doing. Tehran needs, first of all, to upgrade its air force, to correct some missile programs, especially long-range guided missile weapons. In addition to all this, there are many other things Iran would like to get from the Russian military arsenal. And I think that a consensus between Russia and Iran in this area has been reached.

- In your estimation, will Iran and Saudi Arabia succeed in forming a military alliance and what are the implications for the Middle East?

- I believe that Iran and Saudi Arabia are unlikely to be able to create a military alliance in the short term - there are too many systemic, profound contradictions between them. First of all, doctrinal and religious. But the fact that in the medium and long term, they have much more mutual interests than confrontation is also true. If the Saudi leadership acts pragmatically, a certain alliance is quite possible. Whether it will be a military alliance is hard to say, but taking into account the hydrocarbon (oil, for the most part) interests of these countries and from the point of view of protecting national interests, the division of spheres of influence and concern for their own markets may well push Saudi Arabia and Iran closer together.

- Currently, in response to US plans to deploy marines aboard oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is arming its navy with missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometres. Could this lead to a new escalation amid the absence of an agreement on Iran's nuclear program?

- I think there is no prospect of a serious military confrontation between the US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz at this stage. The US is too immersed in the conflict in Ukraine, there is a huge problem ahead related to Taiwan and growing contradictions with China, so a military conflict with Iran is unlikely for the US, at least under the current administration and given that the next year will be an election year for America. Most likely, the parties will limit themselves to mutual threats or some incidents, which, in fact, should not escalate into a serious clash.

At the same time, as the military conflict in Ukraine deepens, the dependence of Europeans on the United States becomes more and more obvious. In fact, over this year and a half, the Americans have broken European diplomacy on its knees with the help of their so-called fifth column of bureaucracy, which now plays the main role in the European Union. It is no coincidence that the main seats in the EU today are occupied by people who have gone through American schools and universities and are America's fifth column, despite the fact that they retain their countries' passports. Therefore, one should realize that all of them will do exactly what the Americans indicate. Consequently, if the US believes that in order to put Iran in its place, it will have to break the nuclear deal, it will do so.

- And lastly, a question on the South Caucasus issue. Armenia has appealed to the UN Security Council with a demand to convene an extraordinary meeting in connection with the alleged "deterioration of the humanitarian situation due to the blockade of Karabakh". How would you regard this provocative move by Armenia?

- This statement says exactly that Armenia has no more tools left to influence Azerbaijan except appealing to the international community on the UN tribune. Obviously, the payback for the lost war is just that, and the only hope for Yerevan is to try to influence Baku with the help of the international community. It has no other plan. Armenia cannot really break any treaty or withdraw from any agreement, because it has no other guarantors left but Russia, and thus no signed papers. If Armenia liquidates all the signed documents, it will thereby untie Azerbaijan's hands for a military solution in Karabakh and deprive Russian peacekeepers of their legal right to stay in the region. Therefore, Armenia's appeal to a kind of diplomatic demarche is an attempt to draw the attention of the international community to the Armenian problem, and no more.