"If Yerevan continues to hope for a 'foreign uncle', it will continue to suffer losses"
Academic Shatilov talks with Caliber.Az

INTERVIEWS  29 December 2022 - 21:22

Caliber.Az’s interview with the Dean of the Social Sciences and Mass Communications Department at the Financial University under the Russian government, Aleksandr Shatilov.

- Aleksandr Borisovich, I would like to hear your opinion on the prospects of the Trans-Caspian gas project (TCG) between Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Turkmenistan. Doesn’t the gas cooperation between the three states irritate Russia?

- The TCG project has a long history. This idea was conceived in 1996, but due to several circumstances, the project has not yet been implemented. At the same time, from the point of view of its main participants and beneficiaries (primarily the EU), now is a convenient time for its implementation: the main opponent of the TCG, namely Russia, is occupied with the “special military operation”; the Turkmen leadership in the context of the Russian special operation is now increasingly looking not at Moscow, but Ankara and the West (especially Europe) is vitally interested in increasing gas supply to the market. For Russia, such development threatens with having unpleasant consequences. In this case, there emerges an alternative to deliveries along the “Turkish Stream” and the Ukrainian gas transportation system, and Türkiye is turning not just into a gas hub, but a super hub. However, given its rather close and pragmatic cooperation with Erdogan, Moscow is unlikely to go for a harsh conflict with the TCG. Rather, the Russian side will try to expand gas cooperation with the West by restoring the supply through the “Yamal Europe” pipeline.

However, the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline carries significant risks. As the practice of the “Nord Streams” has shown, underwater gas pipelines are very vulnerable to terrorist and sabotage acts from “anonymous forces”.

- Given Russia’s direct interest in opening the Zangezur corridor, why do you think it is still not using all levers of influence on Armenia?

- In my opinion, at the moment, Moscow’s opportunities for influence on Yerevan are significantly limited.

First, the Armenian leadership has been actively flirting with the West over the past two years, relying on the support of its lobbyists in the United States and France. Moreover, Pashinyan’s team is increasingly drifting towards Washington, believing that only the United States can protect Armenia in its confrontation with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. However, it seems to me that neither the Americans nor Europeans will seriously “fit in” with Armenia.

Secondly, a certain part of the Armenian elite openly started playing the anti-Russian card, accusing Moscow of passivity and unwillingness to provide military and political assistance to Yerevan.

- Regarding “fitting in” with Armenia: Yerevan, as we know, did not wait for military support from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the conflict with Azerbaijan. In your view, why did this matter find unanimous support among all member countries of the bloc?

- The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been going on for almost 35 years, with the initiative and success being now on the side of Azerbaijan. At the same time, it is obvious that Armenia itself was not ready to fight for Karabakh: the armed forces of the republic were not properly developed, propaganda work was not being carried out and the society was being demobilized (Editor's note: the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces). Armenia did not even “officially recognize” Karabakh in all these years, and most importantly, by relying on the support of the Russian Federation “by default”, the Armenian elites did not conduct qualitative work with the Russian partners, nor with other CSTO partners. They did not even try to interest and motivate the Kremlin to assist them, and by and large, the subject had been left on its own for the past 15 years. Therefore, Yerevan was virtually alone in a critical situation. It is noteworthy that after the escalation of the conflict, Armenia never officially declared war on Azerbaijan, but demanded such a measure from Russia and the CSTO.

- How would you explain Iran’s support for Armenia’s interests, and in particular its dissatisfaction with the opening of the Zangezur corridor?

- Given Türkiye’s current activity in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran sees it as its main rival, with even the contradictions between Iran and the Arab monarchies overshadowed. Therefore, acting on the principle of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”, Tehran tactically supports Yerevan, trying to not allow its foreign policy positions to completely degrade. Therefore, Iran holds its own particular position regarding the Caspian Sea, Zangezur and Karabakh.

- What can you say about the current level of Azerbaijani-Russian and Armenian-Russian relations? Which of the two countries does Moscow prefer to cooperate with?

- Moscow tries to maneuver its relations with Baku and Yerevan, because it is absolutely not interested in the emergence of a large-scale, “hot” conflict. At the same time, while Moscow manages to build constructive and mutually beneficial relations with Baku, the Armenian leadership significantly harms the foreign policy situation for itself with its groundless political attacks against Russia. Now things have already reached a point where Pashinyan’s team is blackmailing the Kremlin by blocking the Russian military base in Gyumri, which was actually at that time set up to protect Armenia.

- What is your opinion on the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish relations?

- Any conflict, even “irreconcilable”, always ends in at least “frail peace”. It is possible that as a result of the behind-the-scenes agreements of the international mediators (the US, Russia, Türkiye and the EU), the stand-off will be frozen for a certain period within the current framework.

- A small forecast: In your opinion, what political processes could happen in the South Caucasus in the foreseeable future?

- The world is facing turbulences that is now reaching the South Caucasus as well. Much depends on the external balance of power, in particular the development of the special military operation, the relationship between Türkiye and Iran, the interest/disinterest of the West in aggravating the situation and many other factors. If Yerevan continues to act perfunctory and hope for a “foreign uncle”, it will continue to suffer losses.

Caliber.Az