Bollywood passions of Yerevan Why is India arming Armenia?

As a result of India's recent announcement in the media that it will supply Armenia with more than $240 million worth of arms, Yerevan has instantly started talking of a new level of relations with New Delhi. The recent visit of Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papikyan to India has further increased Yerevan's optimism about the future of Armenian-Indian relations, particularly in the sphere of military cooperation.

It is not by chance that the minister's trip to India coincided with the Defexpo 2022 defence exhibition in Gandhinagar. Yerevan seems to seriously hope that India will help supply the defeated Armenian army with arms. All the more so because Armenia is practically deprived of military supplies from Russia.

However, the prospect of long-term Armenian-Indian cooperation seems unlikely. There are enough reasons for this. First, Armenia is far from being a country that could interest India from a trade and economic point of view. What can a meager and poor country offer to a South Asian behemoth, given its extremely limited financial, economic, and production capabilities? Secondly, in view of the above, Armenia cannot face the prospect of a significant importer of Indian arms, while the current supply is likely to be sporadic. Therefore, no matter how much Yerevan rants about allegedly deepening bilateral ties with India, it is obvious that it is all about the desire to drive a wedge into relations between Azerbaijan and India, on the one hand, and to draw the attention of Moscow on the other.

In any case, the purchase of weapons by Armenia is unlikely to be of great importance for the Indian side, whose plans include military supplies to Africa and the Indian Ocean basin. Defence minister Rajnath Singh recently made a statement to this effect, stating that India will turn from a major importer into a leading exporter of armaments. In fact, the country was once an active importer of Russia, but in the last ten years its dependence on Russian arms has decreased and it has been buying more from France, Israel, the US, and the UK.

Meanwhile, by arming Armenia, India has certainly cast doubt on relations with Azerbaijan, with which it has long-standing diplomatic ties and trade and economic cooperation. Statistics on trade turnover between Armenia and India, last recorded in 2006, remained frozen at $23 million, while during the same period trade turnover between Azerbaijan and India had already exceeded $2 billion. During the period from January to June this year, trade turnover between Azerbaijan and India amounted to $895 million, an increase of 21.1% compared to the same period last year. That is, the difference in numerical figures on India's trade with Armenia and Azerbaijan is quite significant, which confirms the potential benefit of New Delhi's cooperation with Baku, rather than with Yerevan.

Nor should we forget the great importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline for India - the implementation of this large-scale project allowed Indian companies to buy Azerbaijani oil in Ceyhan. In turn, in addition to the annual growth of Azerbaijani exports to India, Azerbaijan purchases Indian pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs, textiles. That is, while Armenia and India are at the stage of primary contacts, Azerbaijan has long-standing trade and economic ties with India. Taking into account this important nuance, it is reasonable that the Indian government's gesture, which is not at all friendly, related to arms supplies to Armenia, causes justified displeasure of the Azerbaijani side.

If we call things by their proper names, India does not hesitate to arm the aggressor country, despite the tensions in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and being quite aware of Armenia's policy of occupation. And it is not the first military deal between India and the occupant. Back in March 2020, after Armenia's resounding defeat in the Second Karabakh War, India signed a $40 million defence agreement with it for the supply of four locally manufactured Swathi radars at cost. At the time, Baku did not blow up this clearly provocative gesture by the Indian side, giving New Delhi another chance to preserve its previous relations with Azerbaijan.

It goes without saying that the aggravation of Azerbaijani-Indian ties would directly satisfy Armenia in particular. It is noteworthy that Yerevan has shown a commitment to a pro-Indian policy, particularly on the issue of Kashmir in the conflict with Pakistan, and has expressed its distaste for Islamabad as Baku's closest ally. However, the close alliance between Azerbaijan and Pakistan is by no means directed against the interests of third countries, in particular India. If we compare its policy towards Azerbaijan, it is we who are entitled to express displeasure with its foreign policy orientation, and not vice versa. Suffice it to recall that India showed its neutrality towards the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict only in the first years after the end of the First Karabakh War, but did not take this line for long, soon reconsidering its position in favour of Armenia.

It was India that in March 2008 for the first time openly sided with Armenia, rejecting at the UN General Assembly a resolution proposed by Azerbaijan recognizing the "NKR" as Armenian-occupied territory. Only seven states voted against the resolution, which led Azerbaijan to view India's actions as support for separatism. New Delhi's inconsistent policy in such a sensitive matter for Azerbaijan was not a reason to break off ties between the two countries, but it did lead to a certain cooling of relations.

Although Baku did not take any drastic steps, later, during the Second Karabakh War, India began to provide information support to Armenia, covering events from a pro-Armenian position. The Indian Express, for example, published an article on how Indian students studying in Yerevan were collecting humanitarian aid for Armenian soldiers. India Today wrote that if Armenians do not succeed in stopping the pro-Turkish mercenaries who have entered Karabakh, they may find themselves in Kashmir tomorrow with weapons in their hands.

Similarly, India is far from neutral on Türkiye, Azerbaijan's closest ally. In particular, certain figures in India have been urging recognition of the so-called 'Armenian genocide'. True, New Delhi continues to refrain from giving a legal assessment of the 1915 events; however, Indian diplomats periodically use the phrase "Armenian genocide" in their statements, which also puts into question the future of Turkish-Indian relations, which even today cannot be called warm. Conceivably, Türkiye's growing role in regional and world politics is the main reason for the strained relations. This obviously strains India and automatically affects New Delhi's relations with Baku. Given the friendship, mutual respect, and mutual recognition of the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, India's willingness to support Armenia in the military sphere looks like a demarche against all three countries that have troubled relations with Yerevan.

By gradually ingratiating itself with the South Asian giant, Armenia is most likely hoping to earn both political and material bonuses in the form of prolonged deliveries of Indian arms, expecting to push New Delhi to diplomatically break with Azerbaijan in this way. Time will show whether India's leadership has enough political wisdom and tact to refuse the unenviable prospect of cooperation with Armenia and try to win back Baku's favor in order to restore mutually beneficial cooperation with Azerbaijan. So far, the steps taken by the Indian leadership testify to the fact that they will repeatedly step on the same rake, risking finally losing the trust of both Baku and Ankara.