Zangezur and Alaska: Washington’s role in the South Caucasus and Ukraine

The editorial team of Caliber.Az presents the latest episode of the program “Sobitiya” (Events) with Murad Abiyev, covering the main news of the week related to Azerbaijan and beyond.

Azerbaijan

Events in the South Caucasus are largely connected to the aftershocks of the Washington meeting between the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the United States.

As expected, a series of statements on this issue came from both the north and the south. Let’s start from the south. There, the question of the Zangezur corridor—or “Trump Road”—has become a trigger for a new wave of escalation between the reformist and conservative wings of the Iranian establishment. President Penehshkian, citing, among others, Foreign Minister Araqchi, is attempting to convince the Iranian people that the corridor project does not harm Iran’s interests. However, the government’s position has been criticised by influential MP Aladdin Boroujerdi and Supreme Leader Khamenei’s advisor Ali Akbar Velayati.

Interestingly, Khamenei himself remains silent, presumably because he does not want to bind himself with promises he cannot fulfill. Indeed, the Iranian leadership should primarily focus on preventing the risks of internal unrest, rather than interfering in the affairs of sovereign states.

The Russian side was marked by less contradictory statements. Although Alexey Fadeev, Deputy Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, made remarks that generally cast doubt on the Washington Declaration, the subsequent statement by Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk was far more constructive. Russia is ready to support Armenia in implementing plans to create a transport corridor with Azerbaijan, known as the “Trump route,” if Yerevan deems it necessary, Overchuk said. “Armenia is our strategic ally, and if Armenia believes something is beneficial for them, then, of course, we support Armenia in that,” he added.

As if doubting whether we had heard everything correctly, Overchuk added that the signing of the corresponding declaration in Washington could provide Armenia with greater security guarantees. “We also support the peace processes in the South Caucasus,” the deputy prime minister explained, adding that this “fully and completely aligns” with Russia’s interests.

It seems that the authority of the United States did indeed play a role and had an impact on the regional powers.

Ukraine, Russia, the US

So, the Alaska summit took place. In short, both sides – the leaders of Russia and the United States – described the conversation as constructive and productive, but so far no deal to end the war in Ukraine has been achieved.

At the same time, the U.S. president stated that “great progress” was made during the meeting, and the chances of reaching a peaceful resolution in Ukraine are “very good.” Meanwhile, Putin continued from the high podium in Alaska to speak about “fundamental threats to Russia’s national security” and the need to “eliminate the causes of the conflict.”

Under these circumstances, there is a strong temptation to say that the mountain has brought forth a mouse, but that would be a clear oversimplification and also a sign of misplaced expectations.

The purpose of the Alaska summit should not have been sought in ending the war, and even less in protecting Ukraine’s interests on behalf of the United States. Even before the summit, J.D. Vance noted that the U.S. is “tired of funding Ukraine’s war.” And Trump, just hours before the meeting, stated that during the summit with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, he would not negotiate on behalf of Ukraine. This means that Trump negotiated for the United States. And that makes perfect sense!

This becomes even more logical when considering the Anchorage meeting from the perspective of U.S.–EU relations. After the famous Scotland deal, which has left the European Union in an almost servile dependence on the United States, many – including us – suggested that in exchange, the Europeans secured American protection for Ukraine, and therefore for all of Europe.

It seems that the Alaska meeting was meant to demonstrate that America is not getting dragged into European politics, that it will not sail in Brussels’ wake, and that Europeans failed to outsmart Washington. In this sense, Moscow was used by Trump, which it gladly accepted, considering certain reputational benefits from the very fact of the meeting. And not just reputational ones. Trump did not impose new sanctions on Russia, promising to think it over for another week or two.

In this sense, Trump is, in fact, more consistent than ever. He told the Europeans that he is not ruling out the possibility of forcing Russia to peace, but said he will do it independently, in parallel with European officials. Sanctions remain a threat, and in chess—the game politics is often compared to—a threat is considered more important than the move itself.

Therefore, it is completely unfair to claim that Trump “took sides.” It would be even more foolish to think that Trump is waiting for Moscow’s absolute victory. Trump does not want to go down in history as the man who led to the collapse of Ukrainian statehood. Possibly, Washington wants to wait until the end of the summer military campaign—whether the Russians will reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk, after which Moscow could claim to have achieved the minimal goals of the so-called “special military operation” and wind down the war.

It is possible that Moscow specifically asked Washington for such a course of action. For Russia, already suffering serious economic problems, new sanctions could indeed be catastrophic. However, it cannot end the war without visible symbols of victory—a symbol could be reaching the borders of Donetsk Oblast. We are not talking about Luhansk, because it has been practically fully annexed. Thus, one can assume that Putin went to Alaska to ask Trump to wait until the end of the summer military campaign.

It is no coincidence that U.S. media, before the meeting, floated reports about Russia supposedly being ready to freeze the conflict on the condition of full control over Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Most likely, these were signals not only from Moscow but also for Moscow itself: that is, a hint that this is the maximum Trump would accept. It is also telling that the American president himself spoke of territorial exchanges, implying—for now only conceptually in Putin’s mind—the swap of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson for Donetsk and Luhansk.

In this sense, one can assume that Trump set very strict conditions before Putin, violation of which could lead to severe consequences. This is all the more likely because in such a case Trump would have a more substantial reason for resentment and anger—after all, Putin, it is presumed, promised Trump something personally, without intermediaries, who, as recent events have shown, could misunderstand things.

Even this minimum goal—reaching the borders of Donetsk Oblast—is proving very difficult for Moscow. According to recent reports, a Russian army advance near Pokrovsk, which threatened a collapse of the front, was stopped by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Now we will wait to see Europeans further tightening belts and buying weapons from the U.S. for subsequent transfer to Ukraine. After all, that deal has not been canceled yet.