Foreign Policy: NATO gets new backbone

The Foreign Policy magazine has published an article claiming that it’s time for the United States to prioritise members of the alliance that understand the Russian threat and are taking it seriously. Caliber.Az reprints the article.

The NATO alliance is more relevant than ever before, but the threats facing the coalition are quite different than at the time of its founding. The strongest, most successful alliances, however, are those that can adapt to change, and after 14 months of supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia’s brutal invasion, it’s clear that a major realignment is underway.

The backbone of NATO, once centred in Paris and Berlin, is shifting eastward and now stretches from Helsinki to the Black Sea. Eastern European nations—namely, Poland, Romania, Finland, and the Baltic states—understand more acutely than their Western neighbours the threat posed by Russia and the imperative for collective resolve in its face.

For example, perhaps no European country has committed and sacrificed more to meet the challenge imposed by Russia than Poland—a nation of only 37 million, nearly half the population of its ally Germany. Despite Poland’s relative size, there are plans to more than double the size of the Polish army, bringing it to 300,000 troops, which will make it, by far, the largest in Europe. While numbers aren’t everything, Poland and the Baltic nations are among only a handful of NATO states that have consistently met the commitment made in 2006 by all alliance members to spend a minimum of 2 per cent of their GDP on defence and invest 20 per cent of their defence budgets in major equipment to ensure NATO’s military readiness.

Going beyond these commitments, in March 2022 the Polish government passed legislation that mandates the country spend 3 per cent of its GDP on defence beginning this year, followed recently with plans to commit more than 4 per cent of its GDP on defence—far surpassing the relative contributions of all other NATO states, including countries such as Canada and Germany. Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak has doubled down on this strategy, explaining: “The criminal assault carried out by the Russian Federation, targeting Ukraine, and the unpredictable nature of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin means that we need to accelerate the equipment modernization even further.”

From my position on the House Armed Services Committee, I have worked to expedite our steadfast ally’s efforts to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, including by pressing the Biden administration to accelerate the transfer of M1A2 Abrams tanks, which Poland asked for to help deter and, if necessary, repel a Russian invasion force. US-Polish industrial co-production on anti-tank missiles and other systems such as HIMARS should also be incentivized and accelerated where possible.

This co-production will help alleviate current supply chain issues and worker shortfalls and will help more rapidly replenish European stocks of munitions. There is also a push right now, which I fully support, to upgrade our Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania to allow for the tracking of Russian cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles threatening NATO.

It should also be noted that the United States benefits from its allies’ investments in defence. Money being spent on Ukraine by Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, and Romania is actually helping to fix our systems by expanding production, hiring new workers, and standardizing NATO armaments away from Soviet legacy systems—making the US military and the entire alliance more prepared for any future fight.

Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the US Congress has given the Defense Department the authority to conduct multiyear procurement of key munitions, which will allow for purchases of items over multiple years, not annually. This move will enhance predictability, drive down costs, and help ensure that the US military is able to maintain its own readiness requirements and we can continue our support for Ukraine, Taiwan, and other allies and partners. Talks are also underway between Poland and the United Kingdom to construct a large arms factory in Poland—an important step to make European defences more self-sufficient.

When certain countries step up to meet the threat, as Poland has, the United States should take note and reorient its partnerships within the alliance toward those whose behaviours are most aligned with its strategic goals. That’s why I was pleased when it was announced that a permanent headquarters of the US Army V Corps would be established in Poland. This, along with Aegis Ashore missile defence facilities in Poland and Romania, is an example of the United States’ enduring commitment to protecting its Eastern European allies. These moves will make NATO more secure in the short term and keep Russia deterred from further aggression in the long run.

However, more must be done to boost our alliance’s defence posture and deter the shared threats we face. First, the time has come to shift current US forces in Europe to the countries that are investing most heavily in their own security. It is in the east, with the countries that truly understand the Russian threat, where our troops will be the most useful and have the largest impact on deterrence. That is why I included Section 1075 in this fiscal year’s National Defense Authorization Act—to force the Pentagon to examine moving US forces out of “Old Europe” and into “New Europe.”

Next, leaders in Washington must recognize that the NATO-Russia Founding Act has been effectively killed by Russia’s ongoing war. Signed in 1997, this agreement sought to build trust and cooperation between the two parties, but given that Putin has launched the largest land war in Europe since World War II, the political commitment of this agreement should no longer constrain US troop movements and basing in Eastern Europe as it has for the past quarter century. The alliance should act in unison and officially declare the act dead at the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, and Congress should echo these sentiments in support.

To maintain the solvency of the alliance, leaders must also be forward-looking and prepare to counter not only Russia’s current threat but also that of China, which US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has defined as the pacing challenge for the long term.

Given this, the United States should state publicly that the next NATO secretary-general must come from a country meeting its 2 per cent obligation and is willing to stand up to the Chinese Communist Party, as Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has. Having the next NATO secretary-general come from Poland, Romania, the UK, or a Baltic nation would be a wise and well-earned choice.

As we look at other threats facing NATO, French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to China and grovelling to Chinese President Xi Jinping—a dictator in the throes of a genocide—should concern the whole alliance. The sins of energy dependence on Russia should serve as a warning for anyone looking to get close to China. Fortunately, Macron’s opinion is a lonely voice in Europe, and there are strong counters to his vision for the continent’s future. One such example again comes from Poland.

Following the visit, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki immediately and clearly pushed back on Macron’s comments, saying, “Instead of building strategic autonomy from the United States, I propose a strategic partnership with the United States.”

It’s clear that the centre of gravity for the alliance’s resolve has shifted east: Warsaw, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, and Bucharest are the new backbone of NATO, and the United States should adjust its policies and posture accordingly.