Kocharyan's new "phenomenon" The liveliest corpse

On February 17, Armenia's second president, Robert Kocharyan, decided to make a loud comeback through a press conference. The questions and answers addressed both Armenia's recent past and its future. It can be assumed that the decision to speak before journalists was motivated by the need to prepare for the upcoming parliamentary elections next year, where it is crucial to stay afloat, make one's presence known, and avoid disappearing from the media radar.

Among the factors that fueled this desire was a recent article by Radio Liberty about negotiations regarding territorial exchanges in the late 1990s and the return of Donald Trump to the White House.

Let’s start with the latter. Kocharyan expressed the view that Trump's return to power opens new opportunities for Armenia's foreign policy. He praised U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's speech at the Munich Conference, aligning himself with his criticism of Europe and, consequently, criticizing the ruling party of Armenia’s push for European integration. As a key message revealing bright prospects for Armenia, Kocharyan highlighted U.S. President Donald Trump's proposal to reintegrate Russia into the G8 format. Kocharyan hopes to use this fact as a strong trump card in his pro-Russian agenda. Taking advantage of the fact that Pashinyan had tied his political future and that of Armenia to the global liberal agenda, which is now cracking under Trump’s influence, Kocharyan is trying to position himself in the eyes of voters as a bearer of new trends, almost one of the new fate-makers. Or at least, in tune with the times.

The problem is that, unlike Trump, who is viewed in a variety of ways in the U.S., but certainly not with contempt, and whom the majority of Americans elected as president, Kocharyan evokes a strong sense of disgust in the majority of Armenians. Therefore, attempting to ride the Trump wave seems doomed to fail, even if Trump indeed pursues a Russia-friendly policy.

As for more tangible proposals concerning the Armenian-Azerbaijani issue, Kocharyan stated that the OSCE Minsk Group should be maintained at all costs, arguing that "in an actively changing world, no one can predict exactly what will happen."

Here, he somewhat exaggerates. The OSCE Minsk Group was created to find a peaceful solution to the Karabakh conflict, but its existence did not rule out a military solution, which Baku ultimately pursued, tired of years of fruitless talks. The conflict is resolved, and de jure, the existence of the Minsk Group no longer has any impact. However, from a symbolic perspective, Yerevan's refusal to disband the Group reflected its unwillingness to close that chapter of history. 

In other words, the de jure existence of the Minsk Group keeps the conflict alive only in the eyes of Armenia and no one else. Yet, it seems Yerevan mistakenly believed for a long time that because Baku had repeatedly mentioned this condition, it must be of vital interest to Azerbaijan and a subject for negotiation. Yerevan must understand—though Pashinyan likely already does—that disbanding the Minsk Group is simply a matter of gaining Baku's trust and no longer serves any political function.

In addition to preserving the Minsk Group, the former president also hopes to use the issue of the Zangezur Corridor as a bargaining chip for the return of Armenians to Karabakh. He reminded that the point required by Baku regarding the road is simply a clause in the Trilateral Statement. "If they are ready to fully implement the statement, let's sit down and discuss it. This is the only way to bring the issue back to the negotiating table," Kocharyan declared boastfully. Here, it’s just the usual air-shaking. Baku previously made a goodwill gesture by removing the issue of the corridor from the negotiation agenda. By bringing it back, Yerevan would only automatically tighten the demands placed on it. And certainly, Baku will never consider this issue in the context of exchanging it for the return of Armenians, who voluntarily left Karabakh.

As for the past, the second president of Armenia spoke at length about negotiations from the late 90s to the early 2000s concerning the possible exchange of Karabakh for Meghri. The essence of his revelation was that, by agreeing to discuss this topic, he was supposedly trying to steer the negotiation process away from the central principle of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

And, as usual, the leader of the Karabakh clan accused Pashinyan of losing "Artsakh," dividing this "treacherous policy" into two periods—2018 to 2020 and from the end of 2020 to 2023.

He stated that in 2019, Nikol Pashinyan ignored the "acceptable proposals" from the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, effectively bringing the negotiation process to a standstill. "He said 'Artsakh is Armenia, period!' and that was a call for war," Kocharyan added. Here, he is only partially right—Pashinyan’s infamous statement did indeed accelerate the approach of war, but it was not the main cause. This war was driven not only by Pashinyan’s actions but by the nearly three-decade-long logic of occupation. The systematic delay of negotiations by the Karabakh clan, which Kocharyan presents as a kind of cure-all, ultimately led to a radical solution—the military liberation of Karabakh and the elimination of the discourse on "status."

Robert Kocharyan noted that the second phase of "surrendering" Karabakh was the "grave mistake made in Prague (October 2022- ed.), when Pashinyan recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan.” Once again, it’s populism and demagoguery. Pashinyan did not sign the Prague agreement willingly; he was forced into it by Baku’s effective policy.

And, as seen in the case of Trump, a common thread in Kocharyan’s statements is the theme of Russia—namely, that the root cause of all Armenia’s recent misfortunes, especially its military defeats, lies in the break with Russia, and that to revive in the new world, strategic relations with Russia must be restored. For example, he again accused Pashinyan of provocative policies toward the CSTO even before the 2020 war and linked the aforementioned Prague agreement to the fact that Russia was facing setbacks in Ukraine at the time, and Pashinyan believed Russia was on the verge of defeat.

In short, Kocharyan made an attempt to reassert himself as a living political figure. Whether Moscow supports him in this is a big question, as it is actually more beneficial for Russia to make Pashinyan, who still holds some popularity, work for them rather than backing a leader hated by the Armenian people, like the Karabakh clan’s boss. By the way, Kocharyan, of course, suspects the possibility of such a development. "In the matter of Armenian-Russian relations, Nikol Pashinyan’s position will soon change, and he will, as if nothing happened, call Putin and talk about Armenian-Russian friendship," the former president effectively sentenced himself, inwardly hoping that such a turn, if it happens, will alienate a large portion of Pashinyan’s pro-Western electorate.

After the failure of his venture with the weak Bagrat Galstanyan, Kocharyan seems to have decided to engage in an open fight, calculating that despite the hostility he faces from Armenian society, he is the only one in the entire Karabakh clique who possesses any intelligence or energy. Now, Kocharyan is looking for any emotional trigger, whether it’s the Minsk Group, the Zangezur Corridor, or even Vance’s speech, in order to use them for populist purposes and resurface in the political struggle. However, all these means are unlikely to be enough to polish the ugly image of the mafia-like, cruel, and provincial little king that remains forever in the memory of Armenian voters.