Dr Patrick Walsh on Baku-Yerevan talks, French meddling, threats from Iran and more
Caliber.Az exclusive interview / VIDEO

INTERVIEWS  10 November 2022 - 16:31

In an exclusive video interview with Caliber.Az, Dr Patrick Walsh, an eminent Irish historian, spoke to Orkhan Amashov on the current situation and future evolution of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process, elucidating on the fundamental differences between the Moscow and Brussels formats, the issue of the Russian "peacekeepers", Iran’s close ties with Yerevan and many other issues of contemporary relevance.

Dr Walsh has just published his book "44 Days: Karabakh from Occupation to Liberation", which is the essential text on the realities of the Second Karabakh War. His visit and book launch was timed to coincide with the second anniversary of Victory Day and the signing of the tripartite ceasefire between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia.

Below is the full transcript of this interview. Those desirous of watching the dynamic video version are able to do so via the link here.

Q: Dr Walsh, good afternoon. Welcome to Azerbaijan.

A: My pleasure to be here. I always enjoy coming to Baku.

Q: It gives me considerable pleasure to welcome you here in Azerbaijan and to also interview you on behalf of Caliber. I would like to start with your recent book, which has just been published. Many people, who have had the good fortune to read it, have told me that this is a very serious work of scholarship. I have only had the opportunity to read snatches of it. I'm looking forward to examining this book in its full entirety. I know that it was completed some time ago. So, what has changed in terms of the geopolitics of the region between the time you completed it and now?

A: It is a very interesting question actually. I have deliberated about that myself. It was largely a product of being written during the war itself. It was a commentary. It was meant to combat the disinformation that was appearing in the West, particularly, from the Armenian side, which Western journalists were all too ready to accept. But then, it was obviously written in the six months or so after the war to bring it into the status of a book, with more research and to look around other aspects. Then it was completed. You're right, it was completed roughly, I think, a year ago, in fact, around the end of last year.

The major thing that has changed is obviously the Ukraine war and the events related to that, which have introduced an element of flux into the situation. Because, I think, at the time of the signing of the trilateral agreement, it was pretty clear who was in charge of the process, which was essentially Russia. They managed to grab hold of the process from the OSCE Minsk Group. Russia had obviously asserted itself, being a guarantor of the settlement. Now, since February, there's been a little bit of a question mark about what the future of Russia will be after the Ukraine war is finished, what the leadership will be like in Russia, and various other aspects of the geopolitical situation of the South Caucasus.

I think the Western powers have moved a little bit to bring the Western tide back into the South Caucasus. We can see that in the initiatives of the EU and Washington. They are really not substantial yet. Obviously, this is to do with the geopolitical situation arising from the Ukraine war and that is the major thing that has brought uncertainty into the landscape. The landscape has changed a little and people are not quite sure and this affects everybody, all the actors. It affects Yerevan, in particular, in particular: they are not so quite sure what the landscape is going to be. So, they are trying to hedge their bets. And I think this has introduced uncertainty into the system that was not there about a year ago.

Q: I would like to move on to the latest Sochi meeting of President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, via the mediation of President Putin, on 31 October. Have you discerned or detected any sign of tangible progress?

A: Well, the statement itself, from what I have read in the press, tends to suggest this was a sort of a holding operation. There wasn't so much that anything had gone backwards. There was still some momentum in the system. But nothing looked like it had changed. I think, possibly, as some people have commented, the major importance of it has been the things that are omitted from the statement. The elements of Pashinyan wanting a reference to the future status or future negotiations on the status are not in the statement. And, also, certain territorial gains Azerbaijan has made, which Pashinyan wanted the Russians to reverse, I think that also is not in the statement. So, possibly, the most significant thing about the statement is what is not in the statement.

That would have disappointed Armenia. As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, the President made it clear that the issue had been settled in November 2020. Essentially, Azerbaijani sovereignty was not on the agenda, and the sovereignty of Karabakh was not on agenda. Essentially, this was about improving relations between the countries and moving forward to a full peace settlement and nothing else. There was no going back to issues that had already been settled.

Q: In that declaration, there was a clause about the Russian "peacekeepers", and their activities were positively evaluated. In your judgment, how committed is Russia to the idea of maintaining its military footprint in the region beyond 2025?

A: Oh, that's a really tricky question, to be honest. In the book, I tried to examine that issue. In terms of Karabakh itself, I don't think the Russians have any great strategic desire for it. But, in the wider region, of course, that is another question. I think they do want to maintain a sphere of influence.  Obviously, they have traditionally seen it as their sphere of influence since the time of the Tsars, since about the 1820s.

Their objective in the region has possibly two sides to it. The positive side is that Russia wants to assert its power in the region. The negative side is that they don't want other powers to assert their influence in the region, for instance, the EU, but, particularly, Washington. There are two elements to that and it would be a good idea to make a distinction there, because, fundamentally, the problem that all powers have in relation to the Russian sphere of influence is that they want to be a good neighbour of Russia, but not being under the heel of Russia, so to speak.

If we look at the different powers in the region, we see that there is a great contrast. We see Georgia having suffered a defeat in the 2008 war. We see Armenia, which obviously is almost dependent on Moscow, and we also see some of the Central Asian republics that have the same sort of problem. But Azerbaijan has negotiated that tricky journey or path very much better than anybody else. It has maintained good relations with Russia and has been a good neighbour. But it has also asserted its independence. Certain incidents in the war have brought out that in a way it had occurred.

What Azerbaijan wants to do is that it does not want to become an enemy or to be seen as a threat to Russia. At the same time, Azerbaijan is very jealous of its independence, of course. So, that is, essentially, the issue. What are the Russian objectives? They are a little unclear and they have also been thrown into a bit of flux themselves by the war and in Ukraine. I think they ultimately will want some sort of guarantee of Russian influence in the region from the parties. But we all know that they play people off against each other. It is often a carrot-and-stick approach that they have. Russia is not going to go away, so it has to be dealt with as a reality. That's what I would say.

Q: One more question about the Russian "peacekeepers". Before the Sochi meeting, President Putin gave a speech at the Valdai Discussion Club and, from what he said, it can be inferred that he effectively tied up the future withdrawal of the ‘peacekeepers’ from the region with striking the final peace deal and the process of the delimitation and demarcation of the state border. It seems Putin is not in favour of a quick peace deal, for he believes all of the issues falling under the rubric of interstate normalisation should be pursued, and then, possibly, a future peace deal could be concluded. Do you think, with this element of procrastination, the Russian "peacekeeping" contingent is becoming a sort of a malignant alien inside Azerbaijan?

A:  Well, it could be. It has the potential to be so, without a doubt. The situation is that it would not be in Russia's interest, for instance, if Armenia made immediate peace with Azerbaijan and had great relations with Turkey. This would not be in Moscow's interest at all. It would lose all influence. In fact, there is a sort of paradox in this that the only way that Armenia can really obtain true independence, which supposedly was its purpose in 1991, is by making a just peace, an honourable peace with Azerbaijan, and by improving relations with Türkiye. This would frustrate all of Moscow's designs in the area, of course. And, especially, if Azerbaijan and Armenia were able to map a peace agreement, a general agreement, in certain ways. Yes, Russia would not like this situation. Whether it can impede things is another question. I think there are ways of outmanoeuvring the Russians in politics and in the political sphere. In the military sphere, it's a very difficult and dangerous issue. But, in the political sphere, a suitable peace would be of great benefit to the Armenians, aside from the old territorial aggrandisement stuff. It could be used, especially in conjunction with the West, as leverage against Moscow. I think that this is the real key to the situation. With this type of peace agreement, if Russia almost stood against it, it would be seen as a malign influence in the region. I think the game would be up for Moscow if that occurred, but that's a very difficult thing to achieve.

Q: We have talked about Moscow. But there is also Brussels. Washington and the EU are cooperating. What are the fundamental differences in terms of their approaches to the peace negotiations, with Moscow on one side, and the EU and Washington on the other?

That's a tricky question as well. Obviously, in a sense, it starts with the idea of possession. Russia is in the box seat at the present minute or certainly was there in November 2020. The situation has changed a little since then. So, that's the major difference of where they come from. Washington has influence through diplomatic channels, various other sorts of soft power and politics. The EU, particularly, has such influence. Whether that can override the Russian sphere of influence is another question and people are jockeying for positions at the present time.

It is a bit like a chess board, a geopolitical chess board. This is particularly of concern in Yerevan because they are trying to ride a number of horses at the same time, not quite knowing how the landscape is going to be or where they're going. They're riding a very four peculiar horses actually, in terms of Washington, France, Russia, and Iran. These horses are all going in different directions. Pashinyan is probably thinking “which one shall I jump on to while at the same time trying to maintain a foot or an arm in each”. This is not an easy job. But it has led to uncertainty and obstructionism, and, probably, we'll get on to that later on.

So, the approaches are different. Obviously, the Western approach is mainly soft power. It is mainly offering things, although the Western approach seems to be to try to get Armenia to accept the sovereignty of Azerbaijan over Karabakh, which I do not see as a great deal for Armenia unless Pashinian has been promised certain other elements by the West in terms of financial-economic help that might be very attractive to lure Armenia away from the Russian sphere. I think people would be quite content if that were the case. But we still have the Russian military power, which hasn't gone away, despite events in Ukraine and may reappear. So, this is all. As I have said before, they are in a bit of flux.

Q: In his Valdai speech, a couple of days before the Sochi meeting, the President expressed some sceptical views about the so-called Washington document, which he claimed does envisage Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh and does not take into account the ‘special characteristics of Karabakh’ as a region. Was this a message to the Armenian side that a better deal could be achieved under the auspices of Moscow, rather than under those of Brussels?

That's definitely what it's all about. Moscow must be aware that there are divisions within Armenia, which presents itself rather like a monolith, but actually, it isn't a monolith at all. There are competing tendencies inside it and it is pulled in different directions by the Diaspora which is more pro-American. But the actual inhabitants of Yerevan tend to think historically of Russia as their protector and their last defence type of thing in a sea of hostile neighbours, which, we must say, have become hostile neighbours because of the activities of the Armenians and their use of outside forces against their neighbours.

Russia is playing on their sense of insecurity. Russia is basically saying “remember we are the last line of defence, we sort of made you in a sense, we put you into this place where you wouldn't have existed without us, essentially, as a state”. They were bailed out in 1920 by the Bolsheviks, obviously, by the Tsarist colonization before building up the numbers in Karabakh. So, Russia is reminding the Armenians that they are, in large part, the reason for their existence and they are playing on their insecurities after the war and that's essentially what they're doing.

This is the message Putin is sending to them: “don't take a chance with these people that are in the West, who may not come to help you in the event of a serious problem. And, in fact, they might even be referring to the situation in 1919-1920 when Britain basically evacuated the area and it was left to Russia to pick up the pieces. Of course, that's a worrying thing for the Armenians and that's the game that Putin is playing.

Q:  On 6 October, in Prague, the parties - Azerbaijan and Armenia - agreed on an EU civilian mission. The arrangement is that this is dispatched to Armenia, with Azerbaijan cooperating as much as necessary. Then, there was a decision by the EU Council for Foreign Affairs, which visibly enlarged the mandate of the mission, despite this not being agreed upon back in Prague. What are your thoughts about this mission?

A: I am not aware of all the details of this. Europe does peacekeeping, and it actually has useful historical experience in this, especially after various events of the 20th century. I presume it is trying to get an element of influence on the ground. Possibly, they are moving into an area where they feel that Russia is otherwise occupied in Ukraine and Russia may find it difficult to oppose. It seems very reasonable and it possibly is extending EU influence.

The EU has certainly been moving east since 1991 and it seems to be a continual driving force this way. The question that always worries me about the E, after the events of Ukraine in 2014, where the EU essentially destabilised the situation - we have the famous Victorian Newland's explanation about this - then were really left high and dry. The United States had to pick the pieces up. So, what I would worry about with the EU is that it doesn't have an army. Essentially, it could meddle, and it could produce difficulty if it doesn't stick to a purely progressive and helpful attitude.

Q: There is some plausible perception of the EU’s efforts, in particular, the efforts of EU Council President Charles Michel. You mentioned "meddling", and there is also the participation of France - a very important member of the European Union. There's a growing sensibility that France wants to hijack this process. How dangerous is this? And how critical is this going to be?

That's true. You've got to the nub of it, to be honest. What is the EU? What is the EU policy? Is it France? Because, if it is France, then it's not a good deal for Azerbaijan. We know that the French have a biased subjective supportive policy, and it would not be good if its policy becomes France’s policy. Well, then that's not good. That's not a balanced, objective policy. And the problem with the EU is the fact that, as we noticed during the Trump presidency, the EU actually doesn't have real leadership. It doesn't really know what to do with itself without US leadership in the world.  When Trump sort of divested himself of leadership, I think the EU actually didn't know what to do with itself and was dying for somebody like President Biden to come back and start asserting American influence again. I think that is worrying, because, essentially, it means that the EU doesn't have an independent viewpoint. It certainly doesn't have an army. It's not a state and it can involve itself irresponsibly. Particularly, if you have a country like France dominating proceedings in the South Caucasus. The other powers might be ok. The eastern European People will be okay. Germany also may be okay. But France… We know that they have a strong Armenian diaspora and they have an interest that does not run parallel to the interest of Azerbaijan or Türkiye.

Q. Iran. It is a very interesting subject. Everybody talks about it. Is the writing on the wall for Iran, at present?

A: We obviously hear a lot about this in the West. I think the Western narrative is probably false in the respect that it concentrates on certain issues that are important in the West. And they probably do not understand Iranian society fully. So, the news we get about Iran is possibly not completely dependable, but there is obviously discontent in Iran on various levels, about women's rights generally, about issues to do with national ethnic discrimination or lack of diversity permitted in the country. There are probably economic issues to do with sanctions, and difficult economic prospects for Iran related to the nuclear deal, of course, which doesn't show many signs of coming back.

There is obviously a high level of discontent within Iran. I don't think there's an existential crisis for the state.  I don't think the West, even though they might wish that upon the Iranian state, would believe that either. They think it's possibly a way of distracting Iran and preventing exerting its influence regionally and in places where it doesn't want them to exert its influence, such as Syria, for instance, and the Gulf region. Iran has serious problems and they should not be underestimated, but I don't think they present an existential crisis for the state.

Q: Iran seems to be absolutely adamant, in particular, after 2020, to improve its relations with Armenia, at the expense of alienating Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Pashinyan was in Tehran on 1 November. How is all this going to pan out?

A: There seem to be two sorts of Iran we see in the media. You sometimes see Iran's leaders meeting Azerbaijani leaders, and there are statements of mutual benefit to do with development, regional development, working together et cetera. Et cetera. At the same time, you suddenly see the hostile, brittle-type statements from other Iranian leaders, which seem to be very unhelpful. The crux of the matter is that Iran has been taken by surprise by Azerbaijan's victory in November 2020, which has changed the geopolitical landscape in the region. They were used to dealing with Azerbaijan which had always had the Karabakh problem.  Azerbaijan was weakened by it, there was a sense of depression, a sense that the state had failed by losing nearly 20 per cent of its territory and Iran was quite happy with this situation.

Iran does not really want a strong Azerbaijan for a number of reasons. There is the Israeli issue. Leaving that aside, for the time being, there is a large number of ethnic Azerbaijanis that live in Iran, and they are a worry for the Iranian state if there is ever a widespread issue in Iran. So, Iran was always happy with Azerbaijan being on the back foot, so to speak.  

Azerbaijan showed that it could reincorporate its territory.  It came out as a victorious power. It looks like a completely different animal from what it had been. Iran has not adjusted to this very well. While it does seem to adjust when there are official statements and meetings between President Aliyev and the Iranian leadership, on other occasions, its real character comes up and you can see its annoyance at Baku's success. It's a sort of seething annoyance that's below the surface. And I think that's really what the problem is. Iran has to adjust itself to this changed reality in the region.

Q: What's the actual main reason behind the Iranian opposition to the project called the Zangazur Corridor? From the Iranian perspective, so long as official statements are concerned, it amounts to the change of borders, which Iran considers as its red line. Is it really a true red line for them? What is the main reason behind their opposition beyond this argumentation?

A:  We have to recognise the reality of the situation. Iran wants its own transportation-communication corridor through Armenia for a number of reasons.  I think it is a red line for them. Everybody is fairly aware of that. They would be concerned about Azerbaijan controlling the corridor and preventing trade between Armenia and Iran. That is their main concern. They would want the Zangazur Corridor to have, let us say, as little substance as possible.  I think they will probably have to come around to it if there is an infrastructure that can actually have the corridor, but, at the same time, maintain the road links or have tunnels or have overpasses or things like this. This way things may work out. But I think they're putting down a marker that they won't tolerate or they'll be very aggressive against any attempt that will try to block them off from Armenia. That's essentially what they're doing.

Q: Iran is an important country. For all of its problems, shortcomings and deficiencies, it is still an important nation. How do Iran's time-honoured statehood and diplomatic traditions correlate with its jingoistic sabre-rattling and chest-beating on the border with Azerbaijan, particularly bearing in mind that there is a huge population of about 35-40 million Azerbaijanis living in Iran?

A: It's very unhelpful in the entire peace process. It only antagonises the situation and it would lead to a very dangerous situation if it developed. If there was open hostility between Azerbaijan and Iran, involving concurrent hostility towards Türkiye, that would, of course, be a nightmare for Russia if that were to occur. It has the seeds to blow up into a very serious conflict that would not suit anybody or anybody's interest.

I think the Iranians, since the time of the revolution, have been under, if you look at them from a charitable point of view, immense pressure from the West. They have developed a sort of siege mentality, and they have developed a particularly strong antagonism towards Israel. You hear them talking about Zionism being everywhere. Of course, there is some reason, because there have been Israeli operations in Iran, and they have been harmful to them. In Iran, they have a strong sense of paranoia towards outside influence agents.

Their politics has tended to be a sort of perverted by this type of siege mentality in the context of which they have to make sure the enemies are ever present so as to try and cohere people. And I think this is quite a normal thing in a sense, but it does lead to the rather aggressive or maximalist type of 'megaphone' diplomacy. That is probably one way of putting it. Shouting slogans is not really the stuff of international politics, certainly not in the West. But Iran exhibits that type of diplomacy and it seems that certain events bring this out and attempts are being made to divert attention from internal wrangling and problems.

Q: Thank you very much, Dr Walsh. We greatly appreciate your answers. I am very grateful to you. I know you'll be here for a couple of days more in Azerbaijan.  I am looking forward to our future meetings. Thank you very much indeed and congratulations on your book!

A: My pleasure and it is always a pleasure to talk to you as well, and have these interesting chats. Thank you.

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