Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement on Russia-Türkiye agenda What will Lavrov's upcoming visit to Istanbul bring?

The President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sent two warning messages to the West. Firstly, he assured that as long as he was president, Türkiye would not be dragged into a war with Russia, and secondly that the country would not give up its role as mediator between Russia and Ukraine.

"Had it not been for our efforts over the last two years, the 'Western Club' would have dragged Türkiye into a war against Russia. While we are here, we will not let that happen," the Turkish leader said, expressing hope that the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine could be ended if "serious and decisive mediation" was undertaken.

Significantly, Erdogan said all this ahead of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's upcoming visit to Türkiye (April 6-7). Judging by the announced agenda, the trip of Russia's chief diplomat and the upcoming talks between the sides will be very eventful. It is expected that a wide range of regional and international issues will be discussed, including the situation in Ukraine, the Syrian and Karabakh settlement, and the political situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

However, Lavrov's trip may be preparatory ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin's possible participation in the nuclear fuel loading ceremony at Türkiye's Akkuyu nuclear power plant in late April.

As for Erdogan's messages to the West ahead of Türkiye's upcoming presidential election, they are clearly not coincidental and demonstrate Ankara's unchanged foreign policy even in the current difficult geopolitical situation.

For example, Türkiye has taken a fairly balanced stance since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, and as a result of this policy, it is now trusted by both sides of the conflict, which is generally a rare phenomenon in the system of international relations. Moreover, from the first days of the hostilities in Ukraine, the state made it clear to its Western allies that it would develop its strategy while remaining part of NATO. Thanks to the Turkish leader's flexible policy, official Ankara has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, despite the displeasure of the US and Europe, and continues to provide humanitarian aid to Kyiv. Tellingly, Türkiye has many commercial, social, and cultural ties with both Russia and Ukraine.

However, even mutually beneficial ties did not prevent Türkiye from closing its Black Sea Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian warships based on the Montreux Convention literally immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This was a further confirmation of Erdogan's independent foreign policy.

Turkey's subsequent actions quite literally stunned the whole world: it proposed and did everything to conclude and then implement a historic grain deal. The deal is of great importance not only for Russia, Ukraine, and Türkiye itself but also saves the people of at least 11 African countries, which are dependent on Ukrainian and Russian grain supplies, from starvation and extinction. As a result of well-crafted political moves, Türkiye not only received considerable financial and economic bonuses, but also significantly imroved its foreign policy rating in the international arena. Even in the West it was duly appreciated.

At the same time, Türkiye has not abandoned its mediation efforts to establish a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine, although in this case Brussels and Washington are openly displeased. Regardless, the Turkish government is once again trying to arrange a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian leaders Putin and Zelenskyy in Istanbul as early as April. And the issue will likely be discussed in more detail than others during Sergei Lavrov's forthcoming visit.

Not forgotten, however, is the important issue of resolving Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, not only for Azerbaijan but also for brotherly Türkiye. Given the increasing threats to regional security posed by Yerevan's revanchist policies, this topic is highly relevant. Russia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, are striving to strengthen the stability and security in the South Caucasus achieved after the 44-day war, but still very fragile.

Furthermore, Moscow now has plenty of reasons to be unhappy with the behaviour of its ally Armenia. And these are not only justified claims against Yerevan because of its continued anti-Russian rhetoric but also the country's actual turn towards the West, which is proved, among other things, by the deployment of the European mission in the country. Other reasons for Russia's discontent include to put it mildly, unfriendly outbursts by the Armenian leadership towards the CSTO, as well as the recent demarche to accede to the Rome Statute.

Sergei Lavrov, incidentally, stressed back in January at a press conference on the results of Russian diplomacy in 2022 that the deployment of the EU mission in Armenia was counterproductive since it was carried out without Baku's consent, meaning that Moscow not only took its interests into account but also reckoned with the position of Azerbaijan. In the same context, it is appropriate to recall Lavrov's statements of February, saying that Azerbaijan returned its occupied territories during the conflict with Armenia. At that, the Russian minister focused on the fact that Armenia itself recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan on October 7, 2022. For Moscow, it is obvious that Baku remains committed to implementing the Trilateral Statements signed by the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which was confirmed by the results of Sergei Lavrov's visit to Baku in February of this year.

Overall, it is clear that Lavrov's forthcoming visit to Istanbul is likely to be eventful and productive.