Iran – Armenia: Axis against Russia? Seeking lasting peace

During his most recent speech at the European Parliament, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said, "Armenia is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the European Union considers it possible.” These words were perceived in Moscow as a clear shift in Yerevan's foreign policy, especially since this is far from the only statement by the Armenian leader that can be interpreted in this way.

As Armenia gradually turns away from its traditional strategic ally, Russia, it is tentatively exploring deeper partnerships with the likes of France and the United States. In addition to the West, Armenia is also willing to foster ties with its immediate neighbourhood, namely Iran. Iran has long been a strategic partner of Armenia since the early 1990s. As a result, the Yerevan-Tehran axis became a counterbalance against the Baku-Ankara axis in the South Caucasus.

The Yerevan-Tehran entente now looks poised to develop yet further, but geopolitics makes this a complicated proposition. Despite strategic ties with Yerevan, Iran pursued a strictly anti-Western foreign policy, opposing any attempts to establish a footprint in its immediate neighbourhood.

For Iran, Armenia is a viable option to connect with its main strategic ally – Russia, amid its invasion campaign in Ukraine and deteriorating relations with the West. Moreover, Armenia serves as a major hub to supply sanctioned (including military) goods that support Russian aggression in Ukraine and provides a direct connection between Iran and Russia.

In this vein, Iran recognises Armenian security as its top priority. For example, it is symbolic that the trade turnover between the two countries increased sharply against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine: in 2022, Armenia's exports to Iran totalled $111.2 million, a 70% increase over the previous year; Iranian imports to Armenia totalled $599.7 million, an increase of 37%.

Therefore, in the post-Karabakh war in 2020, Iran took a firm stance against Azerbaijan following its military victory. Consequently, Iran became Armenia’s main security guarantor in the wake of Azerbaijan’s assertive foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Iran attempted to capitalise on the current geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus and become a "peace mediator" between Baku and Yerevan within the 3+2 format. In October 2023, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated, "given its strong and influential position, Iran is ready to assist in resolving the existing disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia."

Despite its reproachment with the West, Armenia still considers Iran as a reliable partner, particularly at a time of straining relations with Moscow. In line with this position, the newly appointed Iranian ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani, recently hinted at the idea of Iran reducing Armenia's energy dependence on Russia.

In a mutually advantageous deal, the two countries agreed in August to extend an existing deal whereby Armenia provides Iran with electricity in return for natural gas supplies. Although the agreement has been in place since 2009, the renewed geopolitical landscape in the region will make this deal inevitable.

Notwithstanding, Russia – Armenia’s long-term security partner can still play the spoiler as it may perceive Armenia's outreach to the West and Iran as a threat to national interests. Armenia's willingness to decrease energy dependency from it and desire to rely on the gas pipeline with Iran. The gas pipeline that could be used to wean Armenia off Moscow's gas has belonged to Russian gas giant Gazprom since 2015.

Although Moscow obtains a bellicose rhetoric against the ruling Armenian government, it is unlikely that official Yerevan will switch to anti-Western rhetoric or downgrade its partnership with Iran to avert Moscow's concerns. In addition, the official narrative of Armenia is that the West has a moral responsibility to assist Armenia in the post-war period. The Armenian side is clearly seeking new allies as the hollowness of Russia's supposed protection became increasingly evident.

Instead, Armenia boosted its partnership with the West, Iran, and India. Its optimism is enhanced by India, which has emerged as a prominent provider of weapons shipped via Iran. Under a $245 million deal signed in October 2022, New Delhi agreed to supply Yerevan with multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-tank rockets and drones, and equipment for demining, communication and night-vision surveillance.

With the new foreign policy priorities, Armenia will embark on a close partnership with the West and Iran despite warnings from Russia. Nevertheless, it will be impossible for Yerevan to turn its back to Moscow entirely and work with Iran individually. On its end, official Tehran will do everything to keep Armenia close and the West at a distance due to its national security strategy.