Project Zangazur: Common sense with knobs on Contemplations with Orkhan Amashov/VIDEO

In the latest episode of Contemplations, Caliber.Az's analyst Orkhan Amashov argues that, for all its relative intricacies and contentious points Project Zangazur - an unhindered overland passage between Azerbaijan proper and its Nakchivan exclave - could eventually be implemented on the basis of “common sense with knobs on”.

Certain entitlements or pleasures in life can be felt and somewhat experienced vicariously, yet cannot be enjoyed, as such. One can, of course, envisage a certain probability and, upon imaginative participation in the past or based on the existing testimonies of others, engage in an exercise of thoughtful daydreaming. But this is only up to a point. There is a limit to the dizzying excitement of mere expectation. 

In the same vein, there is a limit to how long Azerbaijan could merely think of Project Zangazur, an unimpeded overland passage, entailing parallel railway and highway segments, taking into account its potential benefits and advantages, drawn upon the practice of similar routes elsewhere, working flat out round the clock to attain its design, yet feeling palpably content with the premise of its mere probability.

In early 2024, the issue of Azerbaijan’s access to its Nakchivan exclave via Southern Armenia as part of the wider unblocking of regional communication lines in the South Caucasus retains its relevance. President Aliyev’s interview with local TV journalists on 10 January, the horrified subsequent reaction spawned in Armenia and Prime Minister Pashinyan’s own remarks reveal that the whole subject, including its main contours and conflicting points, remain largely intact, but the sands are shifting - sometimes imperceptibly, yet more conspicuously at other times. 

Despite some practical steps taken regarding the alternative Araz route via Iran to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave, Baku maintains the view that, without the opening of the passage via Zangazur in the form and shape Baku considers apposite, the entire business of opening communication routes between Azerbaijan and Armenia will not be possible. Azerbaijan, of course, is driven by the geopolitical advantages gained subsequent to the war of 2020; it is guided by the view that its connectivity agenda is imbued with legitimacy from its hard-won gains, whereas Armenia’s undertaking is to do its bit for its implementation, the motivation for Yerevan being common sense and shared interests.

Armenia, on its part, views in Baku’s narrative an element of imposition, inducing the former to engage in an attempt to revise its obligations emanating from the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement. There is a dichotomy between Baku’s desire to solidify its gains and Yerevan’s inclination to regard this as a precursor to its further retrenchment within the balance of forces between the two countries. There is natural competition exemplified in the way the two sides behave and the pertinent question is where the common ground could lie and what arrangement could make greater sense or which scheme would be fair and practicable. 

For Azerbaijan, the alternative Iranian route is indeed an alternative that cannot fully replace an unimpeded Zangazur passage, but can serve two fundamental purposes. Firstly, whether or not Azerbaijan has access to its Nakchivan exclave via Southern Armenia, an alternative linkage via Iran would not go amiss, providing extra connectivity. Secondly, the Araz route could also be viewed as an instrument of constructive and non-aggressive pressure on Armenia to make it move more swiftly regarding the Zangazur project. 

On the whole, three sets of issues loom large as contentious. 

First of all, Baku and Yerevan are still in disagreement regarding the highway section of the passage, with Baku insisting that it should go parallel to the railway track, citing the existence of the communication infrastructure from the Soviet era, and arguing that the terrain suggested in Pashinyan’s “the Crossroads of Peace” or “the Armenian Crossroads” project is inappropriate for highway construction.

In principle, if to follow the letter and spirit of Article 9 of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement, the shortest route connecting mainland Azerbaijan and Nakchivan should be prioritised. This is not to say other routes should be ditched, but the critical centrality of the Zangazur passage is clearly there. 

Secondly, there is confusion over how unimpeded the movement via the route should be and the question of Armenian sovereignty vis-a-vis this communications line. Baku believes that citizens, cargo and vehicles moving from “Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan” that is, from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakchivan, should not undergo any inspections or be subject to customs clearance. Under the scheme offered by Azerbaijan regarding any cargo destined for a third country, customs fees must be paid in line with Armenia’s legislation, for they fail to fall within the rubric of the “from Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan” scope. 

In the same vein, it could be inferred, if to judge on the cumulative analysis of some official statements recently made by Baku; that Azerbaijan would not be averse to the self-same regime for citizens, cargo and vehicles moving from Mehri in Southern Armenia to the rest of Armenia via Nakchivan on the basis of the reciprocal “from Armenia to Armenia” arrangement. Such an arrangement would somewhat coalesce Armenia’s Article 9 obligation with the precept of “reciprocity” being reiterated throughout the negotiations. 

In other words, if Armenia is under the misapprehension that the nature of the unobstructed passage via Zangazur limits its sovereignty, the self-same regime for citizens, cargo and vehicles moving from Armenia to Armenia via Nakchivan would allow it to feel on an equal footing with Azerbaijan. 

The third and, in the view of many, most problematic issue is about control over the passage. Irrespective of the question of how unhindered the access via Zangazur should be, the issue of who will ensure the security of movement therein is a separate matter, albeit related to the subject of sovereignty. 

Although Yerevan maintains the view that it has never agreed to any transfer of control to the Border Guard Troops of the Federal Security Service of Russia, the wording of Article 9 of the 10 November 2020 Declaration remains irrefutable evidence to the contrary. The truth is that Armenia is under obligation, and this remains true until today, to cede the control element, yet it does not want to do so, for its own sensible reasons, such as not equipping the Kremlin with extra leverage, thereby further limiting Yerevan’s sovereignty.

Baku’s own view of this element remains jaundiced. Baku seems to suggest that this is, to an extent, a matter between Russia and Armenia, and if the Kremlin is prepared and willing to convince Yerevan into opening the corridor under the aegis of Russian control, then it is more than welcome. The truth is that Russian clout has not been of immediate impact and the matter remains shrouded in obscurity. 

On the other hand, if Yerevan somewhat miraculously manages to ditch Russian control via its bilateral communications with Moscow, what will Baku’s reaction be to this? Probably, Azerbaijan will need some guarantees over the security of the route, requiring perhaps its own involvement, to the maximum extent Armenia could be persuaded to consider as reasonable.

So… What will be the eventual regime of the prospective Zangazur route? Jonathan Sumption, a former Judge of the UK’s Supreme Court and renowned historian, once said that “most law is just common sense, with knobs on”. 

If we consider the regime of the prospective Zangazur Corridor as a legal framework, it should also be based on common sense with the specific natural interests of the parties and practicable exigencies taken into account and worked out to fit the bill. 

It is common sense that Baku needs to connect its mainland territory with Nakchivan via the shortest route, which is the southernmost Armenian territory. It is also common sense that two-way movement along this passage from one part of Azerbaijan to another should be simplified to the extent of being unhindered, with no intrusive inspection or customs clearance necessary. It is also common sense that Armenia could legitimately expect to adopt a similar regime for a route connecting one part of its territory - Mehri - with the rest of the country via Nakchivan. 

It is also common sense that the railway track and the highway should be constructed parallel to each other - via the shortest 42-km route. It is also common sense that Baku, in view of Yerevan’s Article 9 obligation, expects some security guarantees along the route. It does not seem very logical that Armenia, whose borders with Iran and Türkiye are guarded and controlled by Russia, should suddenly find additional Russian control along the Zangazur route to be encroaching on its sovereignty.

And what are the knobs? These are a specific range of arrangements that Baku and Yerevan should agree bilaterally, at points, taking into account mutual compromise along the tenet of “reciprocity”. However, given that it is Armenia that is obliged to provide unhindered access to Azerbaijan via Zangazur in line with the 10 November 2020 declaration and given that reciprocity regarding this could only be replicated to a limited extent for Armenia to connect its southernmost territory with the remainder, it is important that the idea of conflating the regime of the Zangazur passage with the wider process of unblocking communications should be ditched. 

As to any particular knob regarding the control element of the passage, some fluid formula could be worked out, envisaging the sharing of responsibilities between Russia and Armenia. Azerbaijan itself could be part of this arrangement, if Russia is to be sidelined from the Zangazur subject, which presently seems very unlikely, and if the whole arrangement is to be purely bilateral between Baku and Yerevan. 

What could be done now? Well, first of all, Armenia, in order to show its willingness, could begin to construct the section traversing its southernmost territory. Plus, it is vital to recall that a peace treaty could, in principle and technically, be signed prior to the opening of the corridor. But the future is unknown territory and ‘twas ever thus.