Thirty-five lost years Stiffness as fate of Armenian politics

The first Armenian rallies began exactly 35 years ago, on February 13-14, in former Stepanakert. They demanded that the central (union) government hand over to Armenia the then-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO).

The tragic events that followed, culminating in the occupation of Azerbaijani lands, became the "Armenian project's" apex. Territorial acquisitions, with all the amendments to international non-recognition, are unprecedented in Armenian history. Such a gift would not have been possible without the Soviet/Russian leadership's initial approval.

Since the 1920s, Armenians have been vigorously harassing Soviet leaders with varying degrees of success. Starting with the intrigues in the Caucasus Bureau, the body that then represented the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (b) in the Caucasus region, and ending with the events described in the late 80s. So, in the late 40s, Stalin (the one who, according to the Armenian narrative, "gave" Karabakh to the Azerbaijanis) initiated the deportation of over 100,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia to accommodate Armenian repatriates from the Middle East. But [former Soviet leader Nikita] Khrushchev, for example, was less supportive of the aspirations of the Armenian people. So, in response to Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR [Anastas] Mikoyan's proposal to annex the NKAO to Armenia at the start of 1964, he said, not without irritation, "I am ready to provide 12,000 military trucks for the resettlement of NKAO Armenians to Armenia within one day."

The coming to power of the liberals led by [eighth and final leader of the Soviet Union Mikhail] Gorbachev in the USSR, and later [Russian President Boris] Yeltsin in Russia, became a green light for the world Armenians and a favourable background for the implementation of the miatsum project [the idea of creating a "united" Armenian state at the expense of Azerbaijani lands].

Karabakh was occupied. Having committed this crime, Armenia bit off a piece that it could not swallow. Against the background of Azerbaijan's growing oil factor and Türkiye's irreconcilable position, it has practically excluded itself from all regional infrastructure projects, leaving its economy at the mercy of Russian state-owned companies.

It has become commonplace to wonder how Armenians traded Baku for Karabakh, thus suffering an additional economic and political fiasco. The Armenian community of Baku occupied a high position in the hierarchy of the Azerbaijani SSR, its members were in prominent positions in the party and state bodies, in scientific institutions, and in production. With the exodus from Azerbaijani cities and villages, the Armenians lost this huge social and financial capital. The Armenians themselves use this fact as proof of their love and affection for Karabakh and incorruptibility in matters of national honour. It sounds beautiful, but serious clarification is required here. The fact is that this choice was not determined by the Armenians in advance - in fact, then, in the late 80s of the last century, the Armenians were fully confident that they would succeed, that it would be possible to take Karabakh and Baku for themselves to "preserve". The author of the article remembers well how in high school some of his classmates of Armenian origin defended the ideas of "miatsum" with aplomb. They really thought that everything would be fine. But the Armenians underestimated not only the Azerbaijanis, who would no longer be able to share bread with them and would have obstructed them but also the [Soviet] Union Centre, whose conservative wing did not support the sharp strengthening of the Armenians in the Caucasus. The anger of the crowd of [Azerbaijani] refugees from Armenia was skillfully used by the Soviet Union's special services to organise famous events in Sumgayit [a town 30 km from Baku], and almost two years later - in Baku. Armenians left the capital region in large numbers, noteworthy, mostly to Russia, Ukraine, and other republics, rather than Armenia.

Such inability to calculate the steps ahead should have eventually led the Armenians to the disaster of 2020, in which they began to blame everyone but themselves. Regardless of how many Armenian intellectuals beat their chests, assuring that everything was not in vain, the idea pervades Armenian society that the last 30-odd years of their life and history have been thrown away. To reassure Armenians, we assure them that this is only partially true; the situation can be corrected by accurately assessing the previous 30 years and learning from them. The main lesson that this nation should learn is that Armenians have never been a strategic partner for anyone. They have always been used to solving their tasks, and the more global the task was, the more suffering the Armenian people themselves were subjected to.

The way out of this impasse is undoubtedly paradoxical for the Armenian consciousness – peace and further integration with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. But foreign emissaries have not tried for the last four centuries to make the Armenians decide everything so simply by making such a choice.

However, it cannot be said that the Armenians understood nothing. The revolution against the Karabakh clan that occurred in 2018, exactly 30 years after the "miatsum" demands, was a revolt against the Karabakh agenda, somewhere in the depths of society's subconscious. [Armenian Prime Minister Nikol] Pashinyan is a possible chance for Armenia to enter a new era, without the ballast of super ideas about national exclusivity. Possible, because Pashinyan is a dual phenomenon. Being stubborn, he does not have the appropriate will in the purest sense of the word. Pashinyan is a prisoner of two hubris, big and small. Great pride dictates signing peace treaty and going down in history, it is possible, at the cost of a career, and maybe even life. This is the logic of his fate. Just as a scorpion should sting, Pashinyan should sign the peace. By doing this, he will fulfil his destiny. But the problem is that he demands guarantees from fate. He wants to become an Armenian Sadat (Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who signed peace with Israel in 1979 and was killed by fundamentalists two years later), but not to be killed. He wants to stay in history and stay alive. And then a little pride comes into play, which whispers: "Take your time and stay in power as long as possible."

But how much longer can you keep it up? Armenia, cut off from any influence in Karabakh, froze in anticipation of the arrival of French gendarmes and other Euro-scouts. At the same time, the Kremlin is sending signals that suggest the loss of statehood. The flow of water in the Armenian funnel is irreversible. And the greatest tragedy could occur if the Armenian leader is assassinated without signing the peace treaty, without fulfilling his destiny...