"What will be the 'day after' the signing of Baku-Yerevan peace treaty?" Richard Giragosian for Caliber.Az

Caliber.Az presents its interview with Richard Giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Centre (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia.

- How does Armenian society react to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity together with Karabakh?

- Much of Armenian society has become numb to the continuing escalation of hostilities and the slow pace of diplomacy between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And for Armenia, the ongoing siege of Nagorno-Karabakh is an urgent crisis, on the verge of catastrophe.  But the Armenian prime minister’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s borders and territorial integrity is neither a new nor surprising policy.

This recognition is only a continuation of previous Armenian policy respecting the borders of modern, post-Soviet Azerbaijan, as reflected in the 1991 Almaty Declaration and reconfirmed upon Armenia’s ascension to the United Nations, Council of Europe and OSCE. The key difference, however, is that the Armenian government’s diplomatic approach has changes.  Now, the Armenian position insists on an “international mechanism” to ensure the “rights and security of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.”

Against this backdrop, however, the Armenian government is doing a poor job at articulating its position properly to its people. This lack of an effective communications strategy only means that the Armenian government cannot adequately defend its policy because it cannot effectively define its policy.  

- In your opinion, hypothetically, if parliamentary elections are held in Armenia next Sunday, will Pashinyan and his party be able to achieve the same success as in June 2021?  

- The domestic political situation in Armenia is tense and polarized. But this tension is largely driven by external developments, including escalating demands by Azerbaijan, a worsening crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh and the now evident unreliability of Russia. Politically, the Pashinyan government remains secure, reflecting a self-confidence that continues since its re-election in early elections in 2021 despite losing the war.

This is due more to the lack of any credible alternative to Pashinyan, and a weak and discredited opposition, than a reflection of overwhelming support for Pashinyan, however. The country has significantly improved its democratic credentials since the change of government in 2018. Two back-to-back, genuinely free and fair elections, a strengthening of its democratic institutions and a resolute campaign against corruption have all greatly bolstered the positive outlook for stability in Armenia.

- The negotiation process between Baku and Yerevan is taking place on three platforms at once - in Washington, Brussels and Moscow. Which platform has a higher chance of achieving progress?

- Beyond the visibility of US diplomatic activity, the real issue is broader Western engagement, composed of both the US and the European Union (EU). This broader Western engagement is both defined and driven by a geopolitical vacuum, as Russia continues to be distracted and overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, an essential reason for success by the West stems from its diplomatic focus on facilitating and not necessarily mediating, a peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Through such facilitation, the European Union has offered a platform for direct engagement and the United States has provided patronage for negotiations between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials in both Brussels and Washington. This has also been conducted with the notable absence of both Russia and the OSCE’s Minsk Group, however.

Clearly, Russia remains distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine and has lost the diplomatic initiative some time ago. Thus, Russia is merely reacting to much more intense Western efforts to engage and facilitate in a peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Thus, there are expectations for a return to diplomatic negotiations over the draft Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty, which is still reasonably expected by the end of this year.

While a peace treaty seems likely to be signed by the end of the year, any such treaty will be limited to bilateral, inter-state relations, with little real bearing on the “status or security of Nagorno-Karabakh”. An additional concern stems from the lack of any confidence in Azerbaijan to uphold the terms of such a peace treaty, making the “day after” any peace treaty a particularly significant worry. Rather, there needs to be much more done by the West to ensure a more durable and lasting peace after a treaty is concluded. And there needs to be a punitive price to pay for any violations of any such peace treaty.

- Washington has been actively moderating the negotiation process lately. What is the US purpose here - to reach a real peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia or to push Russia out of the region? 

- The short answer is both. As welcome as US engagement is in this tense and fragile post-war situation, it is the vacuum of Russian weakness as much as the necessity for facilitating diplomacy in the region that provides the broader context.

After a series of concessions and compromises from Armenia, the post-war period has done little to foster security or forge stability. In fact, since the end of the war in November 2020, a dangerous precedent remains. Such a “might makes right” lesson also undermines European values and, if left unchallenged, legitimizes the use of force as a military solution to an essentially diplomatic dispute.  

- Do you personally believe in peace between Azerbaijanis and Armenians?

- Nearly all Armenians believe in peace and seek peaceful relations with Azerbaijanis.  The core question, however, is what kind of peace and on what terms. Any possibility of a punitive peace, based on diplomacy and maximalist posturing by Azerbaijan, does nothing to inspire confidence in future peace. Yet the current diplomatic engagement is more modest and practical, and seeks “normalization,” and not “reconciliation,” as the first step toward a longer peace process in the region.

- Armenia and CSTO. Is your country's withdrawal from this organization possible? And if so, in which direction will Armenia move - east, west or south?

- As the Armenian government has already reached a difficult decision to recognize and accept its own weakness and lack of leverage, there has been a policy shift to accommodate and adjust to a new, difficult post-war reality whereby Armenia no longer has any capacity to defend or protect Karabakh.

Yet with Russia distracted and overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine and its own military losses against Ukrainian defenders, it is also now clear that Armenia can no longer rely on or expect Russia or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to meet its security obligations.

And, in terms of the outlook for Karabakh, this post-war period of insecurity and uncertainty, only one thing is certain: Russia has become clearly unreliable and consistently unpredictable. Today’s Russia poses a deadly new challenge and since Moscow’s failed invasion of Ukraine, the logic and expectations of Russian security obligation to Armenia no longer apply.

Farah Mammadli