Kashmir and the great geopolitical game Insights from Moscow’s top Middle East expert

The long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has once again escalated, drawing regional and global attention. In an exclusive interview with Caliber.Az, Natalya Zamaraeva, PhD in History and Senior Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences, shares Moscow’s perspective on the recent flare-up, the underlying causes, and the wider geopolitical implications—ranging from water disputes and drone warfare to shifting alliances in South Asia and the Middle East.

— In your opinion, why has the long-smouldering India-Pakistan conflict recently flared up again? How is the situation being assessed in Moscow? Some believe that external actors were behind the military actions. Do you agree with this?

— First of all, it is important to note the position of the Russian Federation. Just as in February and August 2019 — following the military clash and India’s subsequent constitutional amendment — Moscow issued a series of clear statements. Russia called for compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions as well as the implementation of the 1972 Lahore Declaration. In doing so, the Russian Federation reaffirmed the inadmissibility of violating international norms, according to which the future of Kashmir should be determined by its population through a referendum. The same position was reiterated during the military escalation between India and Pakistan in April–May 2025.

If we talk about the reasons for the escalation specifically in 2025, there are several. First, the situation developed against the backdrop of a diplomatic deadlock following the events of 2019. Trade relations between the countries were effectively frozen, diplomatic missions were reduced to a minimum, and restrictions were imposed, including the closure of airspace.

A distinctive feature of the current conflict has been an active phase involving the use of drones, with strikes carried out deep inside the territories of both countries, targeting military infrastructure. For example, the Indian Air Force attacked three key military facilities in the northern part of the Punjab province — which is quite deep within Pakistani territory.

Regarding the immediate trigger and what lies behind it, it is important to note the following: the first demand from the Indian side was the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty — this happened in the latter part of April. And shortly before that, on April 11, China announced the construction of the largest hydropower station in the world in southern Tibet on the Brahmaputra River, which then flows into Indian territory. This was perceived by Delhi as a violation of bilateral agreements on water resources. However, China acted very cleverly, leaving no formal grounds for complaints from New Delhi.

In response, India reacted indirectly through Pakistan — by announcing the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty. This is a huge topic that could be discussed for hours. The treaty, signed in 1960, defines how water resources are allocated between the countries. However, over the decades, river mouths and shorelines have changed, and the infrastructure has become outdated and requires modernisation.

Between April 24 and May 10, India carried out technical works to clean one of the four reservoirs of the dam on the Indus River, where sediment deposits had significantly reduced the reservoir’s capacity. One of the dams was even temporarily closed. But it is important to understand that India physically cannot completely block the water flow — the necessary infrastructure simply does not exist. The water would simply flow around the dam.

Yet even a partial restriction of water supply is perceived by Pakistan as an existential threat: 80% of Indus water is used for irrigating agricultural lands, and agriculture is the main source of income for Pakistan.

Therefore, Pakistan’s National Defence Committee regarded even the temporary closure of water as an act of aggression. This is not just a border violation — it is a matter of the country’s survival. Hence, Islamabad’s reaction carries a deeper subtext.

— Amid the conflict, Indian companies, cultural figures, media personalities, and diaspora representatives have announced a boycott of Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and this campaign is spreading. It is also worth noting that for about two years, India has been supplying weapons to Armenia, thereby disturbing the peaceful balance in the South Caucasus. However, Azerbaijan has not taken any actions against Delhi, nor has it called for boycotts or the severing of diplomatic relations. So, what is the essence of New Delhi’s behaviour towards Baku — where is the logic in this?

— Regarding the rationality of such steps, each side has its own logic. On one hand, this is reflexive behaviour by New Delhi, largely borrowed from the European Union; on the other hand, these are sovereign decisions made by the Indian government.

It is important to consider that relations between Pakistan and Azerbaijan have been developing since the early 1990s. Initially, they were connected through Muslim identity and participation in the Economic Cooperation Organisation. For the first two decades, relations were rather restrained, without an active phase of trade — the sides were more cautiously observing each other. Today, Türkiye serves as an important link between Baku and Islamabad.

According to Pakistani media, including Don and Express Tribune, Azerbaijan has supplied Pakistan with military drones. I cannot confirm the accuracy of these reports, but such information has circulated. It is possible that India perceived this very negatively. Moreover, it is clear that India reacts quite adversely to Baku’s position, which clearly supports Pakistan’s side.

Thus, the Islamic factor is indeed strengthening, and India perceives this as a challenge. The response has been an attempt to deepen ties with non-Muslim states in the region, including Armenia, particularly through arms supplies.

In addition, in February 2025, India and the United States signed an agreement that includes a chapter on deepening military cooperation. This is part of India’s strategy to transition from Russian-made weapons to Western arms. Consequently, India is actively phasing out Soviet-era weaponry.

— How are these developments perceived in Moscow? Philosophically or painfully, given that New Delhi is replacing Russian weapons—which Armenia has been supplied with for many years—with its own deliveries?

— Every country, including Russia, views events through the lens of its national priorities. Undoubtedly, there is some degree of caution. At the same time, it should be remembered that both India and Pakistan are strategic partners of Russia and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). India is part of BRICS, and Pakistan has submitted an official application to join.

— How significant is the cooperation among Muslim countries — Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and others, in the context of Middle Eastern geopolitics?

— Undoubtedly, this is an important trend. Overall, there is currently a strengthening of the Muslim bloc in the world — economically, culturally, but above all militarily. However, the region is now experiencing a temporary pause as a common position is being developed on Syria and Türkiye’s role in the region. Whether this is a challenge or, at the very least, a new pattern of power distribution in the region, it is clear that Azerbaijan is part of this region, geographically and politically situated between Türkiye and Iran — two states with historically complex relations, the tone of which tends to fluctuate. Russia is also present here, pursuing its global interests.

It is important to remember that Azerbaijan is a former Soviet republic located at a political crossroads, where Muslim identities, geopolitical ambitions, and the energy goals of various countries intersect.