Moscow's window of opportunity for Baku-Yerevan normalisation Outcome of Azerbaijani, Armenian FMs' meeting

On May 19, Moscow hosted talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers - Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan - with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in attendance. The two sides held meetings in both trilateral (with Lavrov's participation) and bilateral formats.

The Russian foreign minister, opening the trilateral meeting, pledged: "We will make every effort to ensure that the decisions concerning the stabilisation of the situation are implemented. We trust that they will be respected by all the other countries that have an interest in the region in one way or another."

The wording is definitely interesting. However, it is unclear if Moscow recognizes the presence of other countries in the region, whether it takes them as a given, or, ironically, denies them this.

At the same time, the representatives of the contracting states themselves at the tripartite meeting were quick to emphasise the importance of the “Western” negotiating track. Thus, Bayramov noted that Azerbaijan stands for consistent post-conflict normalisation between Yerevan and Baku. According to him, post-conflict normalisation includes various tracks, and Baku advocates parallel work on all tracks, considering them to be complementary.

Ararat Mirzoyan, for his part, reported progress on a number of articles of the draft peace treaty with Azerbaijan. "I would also like to note the understanding that is being felt on other topics such as opening, unblocking communications, further delimitation process based on the Alma-Ata Treaty," he said.

However, the Azerbaijani and Armenian ministers refrained from making final statements. It is true that something similar to a final communiqué was issued by Lavrov. Something similar, because some of the theses were made public by the Russian minister after his discussions with the sides, but before the end of their one-on-one talks, without the Russian colleague being present. Overall, the case is presented as if the peace process, which was mediated by Russia in 2020, had never stopped. At the same time, Lavrov has highlighted several issues from the overall context of the future peace treaty.

“A separate topic of negotiations,” he said, “is a peace treaty. The parties have begun to work on it, and it is now being actively discussed, including with the involvement of other mediators. Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers travelled to Washington, the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders were in Brussels a week ago. Work on a peace treaty is, of course, fundamental. But our partners today confirmed that without resolving issues of delimitation, unblocking transport and economic communications, without a general improvement in the security situation in Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, it is difficult to move forward on specific aspects of the peace treaty”.

So, while recognizing the right of other mediators to participate in the negotiation process, Moscow at the same time clearly outlined the "areas" that it is not ready to concede: unblocking communications and delimitation - demarcation of borders. If we visualize these issues in full detail, then we are talking about Russian control over the future Zangazur corridor and the deployment of CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organisation] units on the conditional Armenian-Azerbaijani border. And having perceived Lavrov’s words as a kind of fact (“the parties confirmed”), it should be concluded that Yerevan actually agreed to Moscow on both points, which means it refused the presence of third forces on its territory.

Along with such a tough message, it should be noted that in some places Lavrov's rhetoric indicates Moscow's acceptance of the new reality that has developed both after the establishment of a border checkpoint in Lachin by Azerbaijan and as a result of the agreements of the parties in Washington and Brussels. Firstly, the Russian minister did not mention the Trilateral Statement of November 10, 2020, using the following wording: “They exchanged [foreign ministers] assessments of the situation that is developing in the context of work to implement the agreements reached since November 2020 between Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan”.

Lavrov at no point used the phrase "Nagorno-Karabakh", which is so beloved by Russian diplomats and the military. By rejecting the old Soviet name and calling the region by its current name - Karabakh - the Russian diplomat is effectively declaring Moscow's refusal to recognise the Armenian community's right to any kind of legal personality.

It is also curious that, when referring to security issues, Lavrov used the wording “the security of Karabakh” and not “the security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh”, which gives the general context a completely new meaning, given the expected return of internally displaced Azerbaijanis.

However, it is curious that Lavrov did not announce the meeting of leaders expected on May 25 in Moscow. Instead, a purely technical program was announced: “Next week, a meeting of a trilateral group led by deputy prime ministers on issues of unblocking transport communications should take place. We hope that the outcome will be positive. The parties are already close to a final agreement. In the near future, we agreed to hold a meeting of the bilateral commission on delimitation and demarcation of the border with the advisory participation of the Russian Federation,” Lavrov informed.

On the one hand, it is the business, functional nature of the planned cooperation that is highlighted, indicating a specific date. With the aim, apparently, to emphasize that the matter has moved off the deadlock and that further progress in the negotiations will be moderated directly by Moscow. On the other hand, it is possible that such vigor is aimed at hiding the possible refusal of one or both sides to consolidate the hypothetical agreements of foreign ministers at the level of heads of state.

In this context, there is reason to hope that Russia at this stage has taken a more constructive position in the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement. This is due both to Moscow's understanding of Baku's inflexibility on the most sensitive issues for it, expressed in a consistent policy of protecting its national interests, and the need to diversify and use the possibilities of transport corridors. By the way, this applies not only to the Zangazur corridor, but also to the North-South transport route, from India to Russia through Iran and Azerbaijan. The recent agreement between Iran and Russia on the construction of a section of the Rasht-Astara railway is a kind of invitation to Azerbaijan to join the global North-South communications project.

In the meantime, we can state that Baku skillfully uses the contradictions between the centres of power to drive through the mediators to the finish line in the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement.