Navigating existential challenges in changing world EU at a crossroads

Two decades ago, the EU gave hope to hundreds of millions of people on different sides of Europe's borders that the fairy tale of a large, united and prosperous Europe could indeed become a reality for them. Today, however, there are already thoughts within the EU about its possible death.

On May 1, the European Union marked the 20th anniversary of its famous big-bang enlargement. The anniversary was celebrated especially loudly and triumphantly, of course, in the countries that became a full-fledged part of the union in 2004. These are the Eastern and Central European countries - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary - as well as Malta and Cyprus. Already after them, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia became part of the EU. However, it was the "big enlargement", which for the first time brought the EU to the expanses of the former socialist bloc and even included three former republics of the USSR, that became a kind of historical symbol of the blossoming of European integration. Some European functionaries even called it "the most significant historical achievement of the EU".

Those events of twenty years ago were indeed a milestone in the history of the European continent. They changed a lot both for the new member states and for the entire European Union. It is enough to assess the scale of the "fallen borders" and their significance for economic growth and interpersonal communication. The factor of increased mobility may seem minor at a cursory glance at big world events, but by providing an unlimited number of contacts and connections on a daily basis, it automatically lays the foundations for sustainable development and well-being.

Moreover, the "big enlargement" has also had a significant impact on many processes far beyond the EU itself. It has reshaped the geometry of the EU's relations with its immediate neighbors and has also become an important circumstance in global affairs. It has transformed some pre-existing commercial interests and political alignments across the Eurasian space. Most importantly, it has given hope to hundreds of millions of people from different sides of the European borders that the fairy tale of a large, united and prosperous Europe can indeed become a reality for them and their descendants.

In the world of the "end of history"

At the very beginning of the 21st century, all conditions were ripe for such expectations and, in general, for the triumph of the European integration project. The specter of communism has ceased to roam Europe, replaced by an almost religious faith in the magical power of capitalism and democracy and in globalization based on their principles. Instead of a continent divided by the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, Europe seemed to be rapidly and irreversibly transformed into a space of interaction, peace and prosperity. The relatively bloodless end of the Cold War, the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the blossoming of cooperation in military transparency and confidence-building measures, and the promising birth of the OSCE - everything was building up into a single chain of events. This also included the notion of the EU's enlargement to include those countries that were ready to reform themselves in the image of the states that were already part of the union.

This seemed to be no other than an empirical confirmation of Francis Fukuyama's theory of the “end of history”, which was very straightforward and therefore seemed so attractive and in some ways even intoxicating in its simplicity. According to this idea, after centuries of painful and often bloody searches for optimal forms of social organization, mankind finally came to the final point. Now, after the victory of capitalism in its existential battle with socialism/communism, human civilization knows for sure that its future lies in liberal democracies and market economies.

By this logic, the countries that still did not meet the standards of the "end of history" had to be brought to the right state through a set of systemic reforms. These reforms were described in general terms by the Washington Consensus, while the multiplication of EU documents and procedures gave them a concretized practical form. In this respect, the European Union became not just a product of the "end of history," but one of its main global drivers.

The "end of history" theory gave unambiguous prescriptions for any emerging problems inside and outside the EU. According to them, in any unclear situation, more reforms in the spirit of the Washington Consensus and more integration were needed. Even a metaphorical view of European integration as a bicycle has emerged: as long as the pedals are turning, the bicycle is moving. And while integration is deepening, the EU is reaching new heights. Against this ideological backdrop, many people have come to believe that the EU has become a universal ideal to be imitated, which is perfect in all its manifestations. It is only necessary to move forward without straying from the integration path.

Can Europe die?

If any of the eyewitnesses of the EU's "great enlargement" had fallen into a lethargic sleep for two decades, they would probably be very much surprised by what they see today. No, the bicycle of European integration has not stopped, the movement continues. The topic of further enlargement was not removed from the agenda either. In addition to the Balkan states, which have long been in the waiting mode for accession to the EU, as we know, in December 2023 the European Council decided to start membership negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and also granted candidate status to Georgia.

However, firstly, hardly any of the EU leaders who voted in favor of these decisions themselves sincerely believe that such a prospect is realistic. Secondly, the failure of the idea of the EU Constitution has shown how difficult it is for the "EU bicycle" to keep pedaling while increasing the number of member states and maintaining a balance of national and supranational powers that is minimally acceptable to all. And without such a balance, the probability that the list of those who have left the union will not be limited to the UK and will be followed by new "exit polls" increases dramatically.

Thirdly, Europe is currently experiencing the largest armed conflict since World War II, which, if current trends continue, may well spill over into the EU itself. In these conditions, the EU economy is also shaking. Moreover, in addition to immediate economic problems, European integration is facing increasingly tangible strategic challenges due to the declining competitiveness of its model.

Against this backdrop, Emmanuel Macron, a fan of pathos slogans, declares the possible death of the EU. He thunders about the prospect of the collapse of the entire "European civilization" and stresses that he means geographical, not just institutional Europe. But, in fact, he means exactly what the EU promised and aspired to twenty years ago.

Macron's endless pathos in Europe and beyond has already become a habit. It is obvious that this time, too, he is looking for an opportunity to write his loud statements into history. It is also clear that, as Hans Kundnani succinctly noted when commenting on Macron's latest revelations, "Europe is not in "mortal danger." It is simply in a state of decline relative to others. But perhaps a sense of its own exceptionalism makes it feel apocalyptic." However, Macron's words cannot be called completely unfounded either, the challenges facing the EU today are too serious.

Unformat for a new world?

Many supporters of close European integration constantly remind that the EU has repeatedly managed to find ways out of extremely complex crises in the past. There is even an entrenched view that the need of the EU member states and institutions for each other predetermines the need to constantly negotiate and find solutions acceptable to all in the most difficult circumstances, and therefore a united Europe emerges from any crisis even more united and stronger.

At the same time, many of the EU's problems are, as it were, timeless. That is, they are embedded in its very design and in the objective socio-geographical and historical peculiarities of the continent, and therefore are insurmountable and eternal. One can open publications from almost any period after the end of World War II and find discussions of the same challenges to European integration. For example, in 1950, an article by Foreign Affairs listed the following problems: lack of natural resources, large differences in standards of living and social security between the Mediterranean and northern European countries, significant differences in the approaches of states to the goals and means of economic policy. All this is still relevant today in one form or another, and predetermines the eternal dilemma between national and supranational in the EU.

However, it is impossible not to notice the key difference between the history of the previous six or seven decades and what is happening today. It lies in the fact that the development trajectory of the entire world is fundamentally changing, and this process affects absolutely all countries and regions.

For all the dramatic changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War, for the Western world, including the EU, the new era after 1991 has come only in the sense that its position has become stronger. As a result, the habitual Western way of life did not undergo any major changes, it simply improved linearly: opportunities and prosperity increased, but this happened within a familiar and understandable way of life for Western Europeans. That is, the order that existed during the Cold War within the capitalist bloc was in fact simply extended to the rest of the world (of course, with many flaws and distortions, but they were not particularly noticeable to Western Europeans). That is why many researchers consider the last 30 years of the history of international relations not as a separate period, but as a continuation of the forty-year segment of the Cold War.

Now, however, we are witnessing qualitatively different changes that European integration has never faced before. The structural transformation of the world is gradually turning Europe into a geopolitically secondary region, and the center of geo-economic gravity is also shifting. Therefore, the EU's previous experience of overcoming crises through new integration solutions is becoming less and less applicable in such realities.

At the same time, there is a growing impression that too many European officials in Brussels and the capitals of the EU member states continue to live in the era of the "end of history". As if nothing has changed fundamentally in twenty years and nothing will change, and the "Garden of Eden" can be saved by the slogans "faster, higher, stronger" and the undying precepts of Fukuyama.

The views and opinions expressed by guest columnists in their op-eds may differ from and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial staff.