Shelling Azerbaijani border positions: Armenia plays with fire Yet constitutional changes unavoidable

The spokesperson for Armenia's Foreign Ministry, Ani Badalyan, gave an interview to one of Armenia's news agencies. It is just an interview—nothing surprising; it's part of her job as a spokesperson. However, the fact is that the interview was essentially a response to a statement by Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Aykhan Hajizada, who had quite rightly accused Armenia of violating the ceasefire regime and failing to fulfil its obligations.

I think we can agree that violating the ceasefire is a serious matter—it leads to pain and consequences, as was the case on February 12, 2024. That day, after an Azerbaijani border guard was wounded by gunfire, the soldiers responsible faced severe punishment: four of them never returned home, and as for the fifth… Well, I don't know if he ever left the hospital or if he, too, will never return home.

So, when the journalist asked Ani Badalyan on what basis Azerbaijan accused Armenia of violating the ceasefire, the Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesperson gave an evasive answer. She spoke about Armenia’s willingness to investigate the evidence presented by Azerbaijan—provided that it was officially handed over to Armenia.

That’s the wrong answer. The right answer should have been: “We will never do this again. We pledge to conduct a thorough investigation and punish the Armenian Armed Forces personnel responsible for this incident.”

As for Armenia’s reference to its proposal on June 22, 2024, to establish some so-called "joint mechanism for investigating ceasefire violations," that argument doesn’t hold water. A victor and a defeated do not create joint mechanisms. The victor simply points out what they are dissatisfied with, and the defeated, with a deferential smile, rushes to correct those shortcomings. Once the shortcomings are addressed, the defeated stands at attention and, in an obsequious tone, asks whether there are any further instructions—because they are fully committed to ensuring that they do not provoke even mild displeasure from the victor. Well, you get my point.

Then, the spokesperson was asked about Yerevan’s position on the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and the need to amend Armenia’s Constitution. Ani Badalyan, with a touch of feminine guile, responded that while they agreed to disband this useless organization, they were somewhat alarmed by Baku’s discussions about Western Azerbaijan. 

Well, of course, they’re alarmed—how could they not be? Because it is in Armenia’s best interest to begin negotiations with the Western Azerbaijan Community as soon as possible regarding the fair return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia, from where they were expelled back in 1987. With pogroms and killings. 

And let’s be clear—this return has nothing to do with territorial claims. No need to panic or break into a cold sweat; this is all within the framework of human rights. In other words, Azerbaijanis must return to the lands of their ancestors, with full respect for their rights, all within the territorial integrity of Armenia.

Regarding the constitution, the spokesperson referred to a decision by the Constitutional Court of Armenia dated September 26, 2024, which supposedly demonstrated unequivocally that the Armenian Constitution does not contain territorial claims against any state. Then she proceeded, so to speak, to shift the blame from the “sick head” to the “healthy” one—claiming that it is, in fact, the Azerbaijani Constitution that contains territorial claims against Armenia. Honestly, it doesn’t; and the return of Azerbaijanis—for example, to Zangezur—is not a territorial claim at all.

Moreover, the assurances that “the agreed text records that Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity within the borders of the union republics of the USSR, that they do not have and will not have territorial claims against each other in the future. In addition, the text of the agreement emphasizes that the parties cannot invoke their domestic legislation to refuse to implement the provisions of the agreement. Also, I’d like to remind you that according to Article 5 of the Armenian Constitution, in the event of a conflict between a ratified international treaty and Armenian legislation, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail” do not inspire any confidence in us.

We simply do not trust the agreements signed by Armenia—firstly, because there is no historical precedent where a signed treaty has guaranteed the absence of revenge attempts by the defeated party, and secondly, because we are all too familiar with the old pattern: they sign first, then they lie, and as the saying goes, “everything is taken for a song.” In short, the diagnosis is clear: Armenia is merely stalling in the hope that the international situation will somehow change in its favor, that Azerbaijan will lose its vigilance, and that the West will inevitably come to Armenia’s aid.

You know, there are some questions that already have answers. For example: "Will Russia fight for Armenia?" I think everyone knows the correct answer because we've all seen it: No, not anymore, and never again.  There's another question: "Will America fight for Armenia?" And something tells me that the very phrasing of this question is rather foolish—so the answer is just as obvious. As for "Will Europe fight for Armenia?"—well, I don’t even think that question is worth asking. Europe, with its characteristic decisiveness, will once again express deep concern.  So, in the event of potential provocations or—God forbid—a revenge attempt, I would frame the question differently: Will Armenia even exist? At all. Will there still be an Armenia if it decides to persist with provocations and dreams of revenge? I don’t know. Or actually I do.

So, there’s only one way out: no more violations of the ceasefire regime (this is primarily in Armenia’s interest), prompt amendments to the constitution, initiation of negotiations with the Western Azerbaijan Community, and a rush to the Minsk Group—inform it of the good news that it must dissolve due to its irrelevance, especially since its authority in Azerbaijan is not just zero but rather less than zero.