Georgia wants to follow the US path, while Washington rejects it Serhey Bohdan's think piece

On March 10, the Georgian parliament rescinded two bills that nearly led the country into another post-Soviet Maidan and became a vivid illustration of Western attitudes toward Eastern European countries. The Georgian bills dealt with foreign funding of political and public activities.

Indeed, in a democracy, the notion of transparency and accountability of political actors is more important than other components of democracy. Citizens must know where a political force gets its money from and who it is associated with; otherwise, the whole expression of will is meaningless. Therefore, there can be no democracy without a strong state with state security and justice agencies. In fact, its building is the primary task of post-Soviet governments. But the Georgian events have shown that it is not easy to do this.

On March 7, the Georgian parliament approved in the first reading one of the above-mentioned draft laws. The MPs had to abandon the draft initiative because of the unrest that broke out. On March 8, supporters of the United National Movement of Georgia (UNMG), the party of former president Saakashvili, surrounded the parliament and tried to break in, throwing bottles and firecrackers through the windows and promising to make protests a daily occurrence.

Western media and politicians, as well as the Georgian opposition, initially labeled the foreign agents bills as "pro-Russian". Official representatives of the EU and the US have spoken in the same vein - the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state has lost any meaning for Western foreign policy. If they can interfere, they do it. Therefore, the US ambassador to Tbilisi Kelly Degnan declared it "a black day for Georgian democracy". US State Department spokesman Ned Price threatened that passage of the law on foreign agents "could jeopardize partnership between Washington and Tbilisi". The European External Action Service (EEAS) was unceremonious too, saying: "This law is not in line with EU values and standards. It contradicts Georgia's stated aim of joining the EU, which the vast majority of the Georgian population supports".

This has created a very difficult situation for Tbilisi in terms of domestic and foreign policy. The first draft law, "On the Registration of Foreign Agents", was withdrawn from parliament. The majority of MPs voted against the second one - "On Transparency of Foreign Influence".

They wanted to follow US path

What did the Georgian authorities want to do so outrageous? The draft law "On Transparency of Foreign Influence" envisaged recognising as "agents of foreign influence" any non-profit organisations and media outlets with foreign funding exceeding 20% of their annual income. Such organisations would have been required to register as "agents" and fill in an annual financial declaration. Failure to comply with these requirements was punishable by a fine. All these requirements should not have concerned organizations founded by administrative bodies and sports federations.

The Georgian opposition, represented by the UNM, referred to the first draft law as "Russian". Yes, there is the regulation of political and public activities in Russia using foreign funding. But the original norms for this were developed in the US. And so, in response to objections to the first draft, the deputies of the "People's Power" party introduced a second one, "On the Registration of Foreign Agents". It required any physical or legal entity with foreign funding to register as a "foreign agent". A violation was proposed to be punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to five years. This bill "On Registration of Foreign Agents" was a translation, with minor changes, of the current US law FARA passed in 1938. The latter act requires anyone representing the interests of foreign powers in the US in a "political or quasi-political capacity" to disclose their foreign affiliations, activities, and finances.

But the pro-Western forces also had a ready answer to this, saying that although the authors of the legislative innovations referred to American laws, they did not manage to succeed: "In the heat of the 'pride' mentioned by Mr. Kobakhidze (leader of the ruling party), lawmakers did not want to perceive arguments about the difference between the US and Georgia - not so much in terms of differences in the 'weight categories' of these countries, but in terms of the quality of their democracies. After all, American law operates in a consolidated democracy, with an independent judiciary, a powerful civil society and democratic elections. There is nothing of the kind in most post-Soviet countries, including 'sovereign and proud Georgia'". In this quote it is amazing not only how on the pages of the Russian (!) edition the country - Georgia - is actually ridiculed, but also failure to understand that no country will ever have the above-mentioned "consolidated democracy" unless it begins to protect its policies from foreign interference - even by friends. This, by the way, is what the US is doing - ignoring also the admonitions about "police violence" or the death penalty that are regularly voiced to them by other entities of the global West, harshly and demonstratively foiling intelligence activities on their soil even by such close friends as Israel.

By the way, the idea to adopt such an act in Georgia emerged in the Georgian parliament last summer, when some political forces and NGOs that receive funding from Western structures delivered an ultimatum to the government to resign and establish a "technical government" to meet the demands of foreign governments, threatening to make a "peaceful revolution" in case of non-compliance. In a Western country, this would have been interpreted as a coup d'état, causing the development. In Eastern Europe, however, they can get away with anything, and so the confrontation simply continued.

However, at the end of last month, representatives of the People's Power movement (MPs who left the ruling Georgian Dream party last year) introduced two draft laws on so-called foreign agents into the parliament - "On Transparency of Foreign Influence" and "On Registration of Foreign Agents". Because democracy is not an open-door policy of permissiveness for foreign political forces, even if they come with good intentions. Georgian citizens of all ethnicities and religions should decide for themselves how to live their lives, and the task of the state is to provide them with opportunities for such a decision, including protection from external manipulation - even those undertaken with good intentions. If the state is able to do this, it can lean on its citizens and withstand the worst of the storms. Alas, all too often in the post-Soviet space, states are trying to conform to the norms and requirements of the EU, the US and the West or the East, to earn recognition not from their own people, but from the Kremlin or Washington.

The West decides who is a "democrat" here

And here we come to the question of the essence of democracy that was put by the events in Tbilisi. What does democracy mean? Is it a political system approved by Washington (or even Brussels)? Or is it still a political system that was created by will of inhabitants of a certain country?

And let's be honest - is it possible these days for the Western establishment to recognise as 'democratic' a state that does not firmly and unequivocally tie its policies to the US, de facto applying even US law? For instance, would a country that tries to build friendly relations with the USA, the EU and the rest of the West without losing its dignity, while maintaining its sovereignty, be recognised as a "democratic" country? Trying to be a partner and ally, not a satellite and supporter of the imperial choir.

And it seems that Tbilisi's problems with the West arose precisely because of its desire to preserve its dignity and sovereignty. Recall that we are talking about a government that cannot be described as "pro-Russian". Because of its special, cautious position on the Russian-Ukrainian war, refusal to introduce its own, national sanctions against Russia in addition to Western sanctions - i.e. to be holier than the Pope, and unwillingness to escalate relations with Moscow, Tbilisi faced criticism from the West. And that is why Georgia was never granted EU candidate status last summer. It was demonstratively granted to Ukraine and Moldova - although the situation there is obviously worse in all respects, but it does not matter for the EU, as long as politically they occupy the radically anti-Russian position, "faltering along with the line" of the West. Tbilisi, on the other hand, as we can see, was not given credit for either the many years of reforms or the 2014 association agreement with the EU. Nor did they credit Georgia's longstanding participation in the West's military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and the Central African Republic. However, against the background of Türkiye's years-long attempts to join the EU (it was granted candidate status in 1999), this attitude of the West is not surprising.

Western attitudes to Eastern European countries are generally characterised by remarkable arrogance. In June, when Georgia was denied candidate status, European diplomatic chief Josep Borrell lashed out at the sovereign country. According to him, "Georgia now has a clear path to follow, tasks to be accomplished, a timetable to follow". In comparison, the accession of the countries of "old Europe" to the EU has always been a negotiated process, not a directive one, so many of them joined on their own terms, choosing what they will or will not implement. For countries outside of the "old Europe" - former Eastern bloc states, the USSR and Türkiye, no such option is available. Only instructions and a paternalistic attitude from Brussels are envisaged.

The export version of democracy

For a couple of decades now, the export of the Western model of democracy and social order has been periodically discussed in world politics. Probably this is not the best variant of the world development and it would be better if countries of the world would naturally create a variety of forms of state structure in accordance with their unique conditions and abilities. But it is not the worst option either - if we are talking about a transplantation of a truly full-fledged Western model.

But that is out of the question! Non-Western countries are only offered some kind of adapted model with reduced functions "for aborigines". Moreover, adapted not by the implementing countries themselves, according to their own conditions, but by the West, its structures and pro-Western elements in these countries - for their own purposes. This model is reminiscent of similar arms export options - when the producing countries produce weapons with a full range of functions for their armies, and with limited functionality for export. So in politics, non-Western countries are offered a model of conditional democracy in which everything depends on a merry-go-round of incessant and often meaningless elections with no real alternative, the segment of legally active political forces is narrowed (leftists are simply destroyed), and the state is undermined. In the economy, too, a model "for the natives" is proposed: the state is deregulated to a scale unimaginable in the West, all standards and social guarantees are demolished, and the state is powerless before all economic actors.

This complex undermining of the foundations of the state creates room for the neoliberal policies of Western corporations with their super-profits in the non-Western world. At the same time, it also creates the conditions for Russian intervention. If the Ukrainian authorities had monitored foreign funding of political activities in the 2000s, counter-intelligence, and policing, Ukraine would now be living a peaceful life - from Lviv to Donbas to Crimea. But restrictions on foreign interference in Ukrainian politics and the system for tracking money flows in politics were torn down to allow funding for pro-Western movements. In the end, barriers were also removed for pro-Russian movements. It ended in destabilisation and war.

The Georgian leadership is aware of this and does not want to allow such weakening of the country - after which, in fact, "Putin comes". Liberal Western and pro-Western media outlets write about the weakness of the Georgian Dream government, which has been ruling the country since 2012. They stress that the legislative initiatives were opposed by a significant part of the academic community, cultural and art figures, including the Mgzavrebi group, Dinamo club and a number of footballers, Georgian national ballet Sukhishvili, organizers of the Tbilisi Open Air festival, holders of Georgian Teachers award, no less than 110 Georgian wineries!

These are all undoubtedly important gentlemen whose opinions are worth listening to. But on the other hand, there is also a Georgian parliament elected by Georgian citizens. And the elites, represented by artists and footballers, could have more respect for these fellow citizens and their will - as in America.

Coalitions of NGOs and activists with foreign funding are reminiscent of the so-called confederations and nobilities in old Poland - the Rzeczpospolita. The central government and parliament in that country were weak, and some of the elite, in the form of the gentry (reminiscent of pro-Western "civil society" in their irrepressible claims to supremacy over the rest of the people), disagreed with the leadership's decisions and then set up the so-called confederation, backed by one foreign power or another, demanding the entry of foreign troops. There were often good reasons for their protest, but was the chosen path the right one? History has provided the answer: these men of fine manners and fair faces drove Poland to partition and its disappearance from the world map for more than a century.

Maidans and colour revolutions have become a modernised remake of those Polish revolts. The Georgian authorities are trying to fight against the Maidan-like undermining of the country - which, as history shows, is used not only by pro-Western, but also by pro-Moscow forces. The leader of the ruling party Kobakhidze recently responded to calls from Western politicians to actually allow a new Maidan in Tbilisi by saying: "What about the Maidan and what has it brought Ukraine? They lost Crimea and most of Luhansk and Donetsk; the continuation of all this is the war that is going on in Ukraine today". Does Georgia need such a "Maidan" if the goal is to make it free, successful, sovereign and in control of its entire territory?

History teaches us how to do it. At one time, countries that successfully caught up with the West in asserting their independence and development, took a curious stance towards modernisation (what is now called "reforms"). If they lacked the time and money to develop original legislation and structures they simply borrowed the entirety of relevant models from those countries where they were confident that those models would work. This is why Japan under the Meiji Restoration and Türkiye under Ataturk borrowed entire codes of laws from European countries and implemented them 'from A to Z'. So that functionality is complete until their own, original models are worked out.

Democracy is the will of a country's citizens in a transparent political and media environment, and the decisions of elected authorities, independent of the arrogant assessments of foreign politicians of the East or West. Democracy is a functioning state that can defend itself against pogroms with pseudo-democratic slogans, against external manipulators with their media and NGO networks, and against foreign intervention. In short, there is no democracy without counter-intelligence, an air defence system and simply a police force ready to use adequate means against anyone who storms state institutions.