Why is Iran's top negotiator under fire from hardliners? The regime’s dangerous gambling

On March 10, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced the restoration of diplomatic ties under the close monitoring of China. While the mediation of Beijing helped to decrease the tensions between two main arch-foes in the Gulf, it also signalled that the US might lose its indispensable role in the region. Indeed, the joint statement issued from Beijing on March 10 committed both countries to respect each other’s sovereignty and to not interfere in each other’s internal affairs, to reopen their embassies in Tehran and Riyadh within two months, to revive a bilateral security pact, and to resume trade, investment, and cultural exchanges.

The diplomatic thaw between Tehran and Riyadh became a milestone for the Iranian government amid worsening tensions with the West due to the development of the nuclear program. As such, the Islamist regime's backbone – Islamic Revolutionary Corps (IRGC), appeared to be at the epicentre of this standoff.

As the most conservative entity of the Islamist regime, the IRGC’s status is included in the preamble of Iran’s constitution of 1979, in which it is given the responsibility for “fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad in God’s way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God’s law throughout the world.” This translates into militias wreaking havoc in the region and crushing revolts at home.

Such a status enabled the IRGC to intervene in the activities of nearly all state institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Being under the strict control of hardliners, the IRGC has long been overshadowing the actions of Iranian reformists. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the current Tehran-Riyadh thaw outraged the leadership of the IRGC, while its affiliated state officials and bureaucrats recently criticized Ali Shamkhani, the long-term head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and top negotiator at the recent Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization meeting.

Although Ali Shamkhani assumed the diplomatic role in the last several years, he has long been a political chameleon — with stints in reformist, pragmatic, and conservative presidential administrations. He is the only member of the Iranian establishment to have served in the top brass of both Iran’s regular Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Unlike many hardliners in Iran, Shamkhani has advocated for change within the system, to divide and conquer those protesting, forming an unusual coalition with Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Vice President for Economic Affairs Mohsen Rezaei. Shamkhani’s and another pragmatics approach to the internal process in Iran coincide with the increased visibility of reformists and pragmatists in Tehran since the onset of the protests in September.

Moreover, Ali Shamkhani appears to be more enthusiastic about continuing nuclear talks with the West and even granting some concessions in exchange for additional security guarantees, notably ruling out the possibility of imposing new sanctions once the nuclear agreement has been reached. Shamkhani has also hedged, pushing against a complete pivot away from the West to align with China and Russia in light of their worsening reputation and the war in Ukraine. Undoubtedly, the position of Shamkhani boosted internal criticism within the hardliners' circle, demanding his removal from the position.

As such, the names of potential candidates to replace Shamkhani in his post recently circulated on social media. Among them is the chief of staff of Iran's Armed Forces, Mohammad Bagheri; the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters commander, Gholam Ali Rashid; the former defence minister, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar; and current Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi.

However, for now, Shamkhani became largely successful in maintaining a high profile within the Iranian establishment and personally with president Ebrahim Raisi and Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Considering that conservative president Ebrahim Raisi has minimal power in the governance, including in foreign policy direction, the relations with Ayatollah Khamenei are vitally important for Ali Shamkhani in order to preserve his leading role in the government.

Also, Ayatollah Khamenei will unlikely seek to replace his loyal protégé Ali Shamkhani, who has been a long-term front-runner in nuclear negotiations with the West at this uncertain time for the regime. Even if so, Khamenei will seek to elevate someone to replicate Shamkhani's skills and set at a time when the Islamic Revolution is under fire. This would likely need to be a figure able to garner cross-factional support — potentially one who served as defence or interior minister or in the foreign ministry in more pragmatic governments.