Arlington road: where will it take Armenia?

The Washington round of talks between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia did not yield visible results. Two days ago, at the conference in Shusha, President Aliyev voiced hope for progress, but was quite skeptical about a possible breakthrough, pointing to the latest comments by the Armenian side on the draft peace treaty, which still disputes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Pashinyan's repeated accusations against Baku in Prague did not add to hopes that the sides would reach the finish line soon either.

Nevertheless, there are some nuances that suggest that it would be premature to call the American talks a failure. First, their length: the four-day duration implies a discussion of details, which may indicate the possibility of a common vision on the main issues. There is also a detail: if negotiations fail completely, the moderators tend to become extremely verbose in order to gloss over the lack of results. This time, however, Secretary Blinken expressed only restrained satisfaction with the negotiations. Even more noteworthy is the absence of concluding statements by the two countries' ministers (our country's foreign ministry was limited to a short statement). This gives some hope that the apparently deliberate reticence of Blinken, Bayramov and Mirzoyan indicates that some preliminary agreements have been reached, the nuances of which have yet to be finalised. Most likely, given Pashinyan's inconsistency, the Armenian side has requested time for reflection before finally agreeing to Azerbaijan's (and apparently the US's) terms.

With the installation of the checkpoint on the Lachin road, it has become abundantly clear that no force can prevent Azerbaijan from taking legitimate action to restore sovereignty over the Karabakh economic region fully. On the one hand, in this new reality, it is very important for Pashinyan to show his electorate that he is trying to "protect at least something". On the other hand, the Armenian premier somehow intends to show that he is not the worst partner for negotiations with Azerbaijan and that it will be much more difficult to reach an agreement if someone else comes to power, for example, Kocharyan. Pashinyan's logic suggests that Baku must "yield in some points".

It should be noted that at the same time and after the Washington talks of the foreign ministers of the two countries, Nikol Pashinyan made some new statements in Prague (in an interview with Radio Liberty and at a meeting with representatives of the Armenian diaspora in the Czech Republic). As far as can be understood from these statements, Armenia still insists on some kind of international presence in the Baku-Khankendi dialogue. It also raises the issue of a demilitarised zone along the border, most likely in order to protect itself within the current borders in the absence of full recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The issue of enclaves is also mentioned - the PM seems to have expressed readiness to return occupied villages to Azerbaijan. "We say that we are ready to recognise the border line along the entire length according to maps dating back to 1975," the prime minister said. It is possible that the Armenian side is trying to make the enclaves (what it is already obliged to return) a bargaining chip.

Thus, even if some tentative agreement was reached at the talks in Arlington, Pashinyan hastened to disguise it with his usual dodgy rhetoric, perhaps trying to buy time, in the naïve hope that some exceptional event would occur and he will be able to demand something from willful Baku. Let's not forget that this week the Armenian prime minister is travelling to Moscow, where he will have to answer some uncomfortable questions, including on the details of the Washington round. The fact that the Kremlin may not yet have exercised its full arsenal of influence on the domestic political situation in Armenia cannot be discounted.

It is possible, however, that the Armenian leader is trying to play on the contradictions between Russia and the West and achieve the so vainly desired hardening of Moscow's position towards Baku. However, partly Pashinyan has already managed to justify himself in advance to Moscow for the negotiations in Washington. "In August 2022 we received a proposal from the Russian side on the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement, which we were ready to sign. But Azerbaijan rejected it. After that we have not seen Russia put these proposals on the table for a second time. I repeat, as soon as such a proposal appears, we are ready to move forward on it. We need to understand how important it is for Russia to move forward with its proposal," Pashinyan said in a somewhat subservient and ultimate manner, hinting at his desire to get some kind of preferences from the Kremlin.

And finally, as we have repeatedly mentioned, Pashinyan fears not only for his power but also for his life. The unveiling of the "Nemesis" monument, which Pashinyan himself was forced to approve, was in fact a kind of black mark from that very notional Armenian psychopath. It was not without reason that in Prague the PM voiced his fear. Speaking about the installation of a monument in Yerevan to the murderers of Turkish and Azerbaijani statesmen, the subsequent harsh reaction of Türkiye, and recognizing the event (opening of the monument) as a mistake, Pashinyan said: "Yes, it was our team. It happened against an emotional backdrop and in a situation where many in Armenia considered many traitors, and many threatened to shoot many for treason...". In this way, he not only tries to talk sense into his fringe supporters but also sends a signal to Baku about the threat of disruption of "all positive developments" in the event of a possible attempt on his life by revanchists, i.e. the need for "compromise".

The situation in Armenia is interesting and paradoxical in that Pashinyan is in fact the leader without any alternative. After all, all political forces in Armenia, including the opposition, realise that Azerbaijan will not make any concessions on the issue of its territorial integrity. Under these circumstances, no one wants to sign a peace treaty, assume the role of a capitulant and consequently become a victim of an Armenian psychopath stupefied by the "ideal of Nemesis". In confirmation of this thought, the news concerning Robert Kocharyan's intention to leave with his family for the United States has spread recently in the Telegram channels with reference to the Hraparak newspaper.

The situation that has arisen, which can perhaps be called the Armenian impasse, seems to have become a strong headache not only for Armenian society, but also for the patrons of the "land of stones". The only party not particularly bothered by the power issue in Armenia is Azerbaijan. Official Baku's position does not change from momentary sentiments or sympathies-antipathies towards a particular regime in Armenia but is instead dictated by an awareness both of its rightness under international law and of the cardinal changes resulting from the military victory in the Patriotic War. Whoever is in power in Armenia, our country will pursue its legitimate rights based on its own national interests. From a purely emotional point of view, many of us Azerbaijanis will probably be happier to see Kocharyan's signature under a peace treaty, effectively recognising Armenia's surrender. Actually, this is at the level of society, but at the level of the state Azerbaijan always acts with a strategic vision.

On the whole, understanding the fluctuations in Pashinyan's behaviour, Ilham Aliyev made a number of statements in Shusha that could well be considered programmatic, setting a kind of watershed in relations with Armenia. In particular, in the words of the Azerbaijani leader, "We already have our own place, which is very stable and which is becoming more and more solid. But for them (Armenians - ed.) it will be a big challenge", is quite a wake-up call, if not for Armenia itself, then at least for its current leader. If earlier Baku actively sought to establish peace, was the first to come up with a peace initiative, and several times sent a draft peace treaty to Yerevan, thus helping the defeated enemy to save face, then now everything is moving towards the fact that we will let Armenia, led by its leader, go walking in a minefield. Yes, we wanted to give it a place next to us, which would certainly have had a synergistic effect on the development of the entire region. But as the saying goes, there is no way around it. We did what we could, so to speak, and then it's up to them. Though let us not rush to judgment - let us wait a little longer. It will soon become apparent if the parties agreed on something in Arlington.

Azerbaijan, following its strategic course, will use any manoeuvre of both Armenia and third actors to its advantage. Our country, in any case, has only benefited from the Washington talks. Amidst the predictable dodginess of the Armenian side, these talks were an excellent chance for Azerbaijan to dialogue with the US to better present its constructive, fair and peace-loving position.