"Consent" concerns cast aspersions on the EU observation mission Is this what was agreed in Prague?

The decision taken by the EU Council (the Council) on 17 October regarding the deployment of up to 40 monitoring experts along the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan seems to ascribe a significantly greater mandate to what was envisaged to be a technical observation mission. It jeopardises the original purpose emanating from the joint statement issued following the 6 October Prague meeting between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

In the aftermath of the meeting of the two leaders, held on the margins of the European Political Community Summit two weeks ago, the feeling in the air was one of cautious optimism, with the exact mandate of the EU’s civilian border mission to be sent to Armenia causing no serious opposition per se. The original idea, as revealed in President Ilham Aliyev’s 14 October Astana speech, was for the mission to be present both on the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides of the state border. Baku refused to grant its approval, but consented to cooperate “as far as it was concerned”.

The mission’s activities in Armenia constitute a subject matter for Yerevan and Brussels only, yet when it comes to its self-declared central aspects, the question of legitimacy, or rather, the conformity of the Council's 17 October decision with what was actually agreed upon in Prague on 6 October, begs delicate handling and a piercing glance. Upon closer examination, some megalithic question marks, to say the least, cannot be simply overlooked.

Legitimacy issue

“The aim of this mission is to build confidence and, through its reports, to contribute to the border commissions,” was stated in the joint statement issued after the Prague summit. This is the provision from which the EU’s recent decision is claimed to have originated. In other words, Brussels’ observer mission was initially designed to be deployed with the purpose of assisting the border commissions set up via the consent of Baku and Yerevan.

The Council’s subsequent decision, however, has described the mission’s mandate as one “aimed at facilitating the restoration of peace and security in the area, the building of confidence, and the delimitation of the international border between the two states”. This goes far beyond the relatively innocuous purpose of contributing reports to the respective border commissions and entails the deployment of a large civilian peacekeeping mission without the consent of Azerbaijan.

The 17 October decision also refers to the “objective of monitoring, analysing, and reporting on the situation in the region”. This also appears to be an extensive stretching of the relevant provision of the 6 October joint statement.

Time framework

The Prague declaration states that “the mission will start in October for a maximum of two months”. The EU decision acknowledges that the mission could be prolongated by the Council’s decision six weeks after its deployment. This was neither included, nor generally envisaged, in the Prague declaration. Any such elongation will require a fresh agreement, in the absence of which any extension will lack any bare degree of legitimacy.

In response, the EU may retort, suggesting its decision speaks to the broader point of contributing to the peace agenda and that they are not taking on themselves anything not included in the Prague declaration. Brussels may argue that “facilitating the restoration of peace and security in the area” is logically connected with “contributing to the border commissions with reports”, and the mission’s declarative objectives are in conformity with its practical purpose envisaged in the Prague declaration. These statements could all be made with the verve and a surfeit of demagoguery.

But the essential point lies much deeper. The question is if today’s short-term mission could be the foundation for tomorrow’s large-scale venture, akin to a permanent monitoring mission. Given how creatively the Council has interpreted the relevant provisions of the Prague declaration, such a possibility cannot be overruled.

The EU has an undeniable part to play in the Azerbaijani-Armenian post-conflict normalisation. This part has been growing and has every chance of being even more consequential in the fullness of time. Yet any position played by Brussels needs to be through the clearly-mandated consent of both sides. The Council’s 17 October decision fails to meet the fundamental consent principle.

One can only speculate as to the potential involvement of France. President Emmanuel Macron was present at the quadrilateral meeting on 6 October and the probability of him exercising some leverage over the Council’s decision would neither be unlikely nor surprising. The fundamental danger is that Macron’s attempts to influence or rather hijack the EU format of the negotiations risk rendering Charles Michel’s laudable efforts null and void if left unchallenged.

Interestingly enough, the full text of the decision is unavailable at the moment of the penning of this piece for reasons that one cannot account for.

Whereas the information entailing general points as to the mission’s mandate can still be found here.

As Neil Watson, British journalist, commented: “The EU has become the Great White Hope for peace in the Caucasus. This EU move risks jeopardising everything that has been achieved and could render lasting peace a distant prospect.”