ICRC debacle on the Lachin Road Beyond a mere one-off fixation

The foiled attempts to smuggle unauthorised goods – contraband – via the vehicles displaying the official emblem of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) through the Lachin Road, which eventuated in a temporary suspension of movement therein by Azerbaijan on 11 July, does not merely reinforce Baku’s argument for tighter border control, but also strengthens the case for rethinking the route's "exclusivity" in terms of being the indispensable lifeblood for Karabakh Armenians. Furthermore, it adds fuel to the argument for augmenting the need to overhaul the operational arrangements of the aid agency in question in the area.

Despite the temporary suspension still being in force, on 14 July, a group of Armenian residents of Karabakh requiring medical assistance were permitted to traverse the Lachin border checkpoint via the mediation of the ICRC under the control of the relevant Azerbaijani authorities. This, from Baku’s perspective, reiterates the point that, in principle, the border checkpoint is operational, and confirms there are exceptions to the temporary suspension in the interim, when it comes to transportation out of medical necessity.

Facts of the case

The circumstances enveloping the case are of delicacy and require some dissection. The facts, as far as they can be ascertained, indicate that the decision by Azerbaijan to temporarily suspend passage via the Lachin border checkpoint was taken after a series of foiled attempts had been made to illegally transport undeclared mobile phones, cigarettes and petrol using ICRC vehicles, unsurprisingly driven by Armenian nationals. The information published by the State Border Service of Azerbaijan states that “a criminal case has been opened under the relevant articles of the Criminal Code”, and the suspension will remain in force “until necessary investigative measures have been completed”.

The ICRC’s response was relatively humble, measuredly apologetic and somewhat shabbily self-incriminating, despite the intent being to achieve exoneration. In a statement released on 11 July, it declared that the organisation “is aware of concerns raised” and “does not support any such activity”, emphasising that “no unauthorised material has been found in any vehicle belonging to the ICRC”, and reiterating that “all cargo is subject to customs checks by the Republic of Azerbaijan”.

The explanation as to the caveat that made such illegal attempts possible was that the four hired drivers were not ICRC staff members, being hired under service contracts that were summarily terminated subsequent to the disclosure that they “tried to transport some commercial goods in their vehicles which were displaying the ICRC emblem”.

What the statement fails to address is whether the temporary display of the ICRC emblem on these private cars was strictly authorised by the organisation. It can be inferred that, since the drivers in question were contracted by the ICRC to transport humanitarian goods on its behalf, the emblems were authorised to facilitate the transfer of cargo, which raises the question as to why due diligence was not practised to ensure that no abuse was possible. This is important, as the ICRC distinguishes between its own vehicles and those temporarily commandeered and displaying its sign, thereby propounding a view that its responsibility for the latter is rather diluted.

Likely eventualities

The question now is as to what will eventuate from the latest ICRC debacle on the Lachin Road. The suspension is temporary and once the investigation is over, it will be lifted. However, given Baku’s legitimate drive to entrench its sovereignty over Karabakh amidst other concomitant objectives, it would be naïve to assume that a mere one-off fixation would suffice to address the issue. The implications could be surmised as being manifold.

Firstly, Azerbaijan has now an even stronger case for exercising more stringent control at the Lachin border checkpoint, for even seemingly innocuous humanitarian convoys of the ICRC are now suspected of containing nefarious cargo, with the reassurances given by the aid agency failing to be convincing.

Secondly, the latest incident has added a further dose of validity to Baku's stance that, for Armenia and the separatist remnants in Karabakh, the Lachin route has never been exclusively of humanitarian nature: prior to the installation of the border checkpoint, the road had been repeatedly used for the transportation of weapons in contravention of the 10 November 2020 tripartite declaration. It appears that now, due to Azerbaijan being able to exercise its sovereign rights, the opportunities for smuggling are limited and unorthodox methods of employing ICCR convoys are deemed as the only viable option.

Thirdly, under the circumstances, there is a need to rethink the functionality of the Lachin Road and its status as “the only connection between the part of Karabakh wherein the Russian ‘peacekeeping´ contingent is temporarily deployed and Armenia”. The understanding that all humanitarian assistance to the Armenian residents of Karabakh should be transported via the Lachin route from Armenia is increasingly obsolete, with the case for the maintenance by Azerbaijan of the area’s basic food and medical supplies gaining fresh traction.

Fourthly, to this effect, both from the legal point of view and due to practical exigencies, it is now increasingly evident that it is the ICHR’s Baku office, not Yerevan headquarters, that should be closely involved in delivering humanitarian goods to Karabakh or, in fact, any related activity therein. Onnik James Krikorian, a British journalist based in Tbilisi, believes this is what Azerbaijan is aiming at now: “The ICRC has a delegation in Sukhumi, for example, but, in the 2010s, international staff travelled to Abkhazia from Georgia, thus acknowledging its internationally-recognised territorial integrity. Baku increasingly wants the same.”

On the eve of the Brussels meeting of President Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, preceded by harsh words levied by the sides against each other, it appears unlikely that Baku and Yerevan will move closer to a publicly declared understanding on how the essential needs of Karabakh Armenians are to be met.

However, one aspect remains unmistakably clear. In the post-2020 period, Azerbaijan’s modus operandi has displayed one distinct quality which has actually worked wondrously and been a source of dynamism in negotiations: in relation to any illegal activity, either within the zone of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent or regarding the Lachin Road, Baku has adopted the effective policy of warning, informing the relevant parties, making the instances of wrongdoings public, if necessary, and then, in the case of no reaction, acting decisively on the ground through legitimate unilateral actions. The pattern won’t change.