Iran: Why regime collapse could spark nuclear security crisis

In a provocative June 22 statement, U.S. President Donald Trump floated the idea of regime change in Iran, questioning the Islamic Republic’s ability to “MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN.” His comments coincided with a broad Israeli military campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—actions that, while officially framed as non-proliferation measures, have increasingly hinted at a deeper goal: destabilising and potentially toppling the Iranian regime. While a fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel has momentarily eased such discussions, a recent Foreign Policy analysis warns that any collapse of the Iranian state would trigger a nuclear security crisis far more urgent than the longstanding fear of a nuclear-armed Iran.

The article outlines a grim scenario. Despite repeated airstrikes, Iran retains vast nuclear capabilities: uranium mines, research reactors, thousands of centrifuges, and an estimated 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent—enough for 10 nuclear bombs if further refined. Even more troubling, access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been cut off since June 13, and Tehran announced a formal suspension of cooperation in July. The destruction and disarray caused by military strikes may have prompted Iran to scatter and hide critical equipment and materials, severely weakening international visibility into its nuclear program.

If the regime were to fall, this opaque and decentralised stockpile of nuclear assets would become an immediate global concern. Unlike Libya or Iraq, where nuclear materials were rudimentary or under control, Iran’s enriched uranium is weapons-adjacent and transportable—its mass equivalent to just 20 water cooler bottles. The article likens the potential security vacuum to the post-Soviet era but suggests that the Iranian case is even more acute due to the advanced state of its program and the presence of highly trained scientists with sensitive knowledge.

The solution, Foreign Policy argues, lies in preparation. Washington and its allies must be ready to deploy intelligence assets and, if necessary, special operations to secure materials before they disappear. A post-collapse Iran would also require international engagement regardless of the new regime’s legitimacy. Rebuilding ties with the IAEA, restoring safeguards, and securing nuclear sites must be prioritised above all else. Drawing on the legacy of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program—which helped secure Soviet-era nuclear assets—the article proposes a similar framework tailored to Iran, possibly including employment initiatives for Iranian nuclear scientists and international support for civilian nuclear infrastructure under strict non-proliferation guidelines.

Ultimately, the article stresses a paradox: while many in the West have long seen regime change in Iran as a pathway to nuclear disarmament, such a collapse could instead bring the world dangerously close to nuclear catastrophe. As Foreign Policy rightly cautions, preventing proliferation in the chaos of regime collapse may prove far harder than deterring a nuclear state.

By Vugar Khalilov