Iraq braces for delayed crisis amid Iran's pressure Shereshevskiy's think piece

There is a group of countries in the Middle East that experience quite strong Iran influence. It is the so-called "Shiite belt" or "Shiite crescent". In addition to Iran itself, it includes Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. That is, the region where the interests of the Iranian political, economic, and military elite prevail forms a corridor from Tehran to Beirut, from the borders with Afghanistan to the Mediterranean Sea. All of these states share common problems, but they also have their own specific ones.

Within this group, or "belt", a special place certainly belongs to Iraq. For the Iranian regime, that state is extremely important. Iraq has a population of 40 million people, predominantly Shiite (65 per cent), and is one of the world's largest oil exporters. For the sanctioned Iranian Shiite theocracy, Iraq is a virtual umbrella for getting its companies out from under sanctions. The New York Times, in particular, points out that businesses totaling 20 billion dollars (6 per cent of the country's GDP) have already moved to Iraq and will continue to do so.

Equally important for Tehran is the fact that Iraq has effectively turned into its military base with thousands of pro-Iranian militants who occasionally fire missiles at Iran's opponents - US military bases and Saudi oil installations. Militia attacks were one of the reasons why the Saudis recently decided to restore diplomatic relations with the IRI and pledged to invest in the country's economy.

In short, Iraq's exceptional strategic position has turned it into a pure gem in the crown of the Iranian empire.

But Iran's political miracle has a downside. Because of Tehran's expansionist policy, all of its foreign colonies are highly unstable. At the same time, Iranian expansion itself is based on the military and financial support of Shiite militias that share the ideology of the ayatollah regime. Many such structures have been created in Iraq as well. The Iranians are making full use of their connections in the Shiite religious establishment in general, having secured the support of influential religious authorities. Many Shiite cleric-marjahs, while indulging and facilitating Iranian interests, have also rejected Iranian influence.

In addition to such strong support, the Iranians, according to secret material published by The New York Times, bought up the network of agents of influence left behind and abandoned by the Americans after their main forces withdrew from Iraq. And among them were prominent politicians, army and intelligence generals.

As a result, in Iraq, as in some other countries under the total influence of Iran, statehood has been significantly weakened, if not destroyed. This, in turn, has had a negative impact on the economy. And these weak states, with different factions fighting among themselves, exist against a backdrop of non-state actors, primarily armed pro-Iranian Shiite militias that are part of an umbrella structure called the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF or Hashd al-Shaabi). In Iraq, the current situation is contributing to the destabilisation of the regime and creating huge problems for the economy. Militias impose their own illegal taxes on businesses, control highways and even set up a number of roadblocks on the country's borders. The most influential pro-Iranian militias are Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Badr, the latter largely controlled by the Iraqi Interior Ministry.

Pro-Iranian parties from the Coordination Mechanism bloc also play a leading role in parliament and government. Some of them are affiliated with the militias. These forces are the largest holders of national wealth and are involved in the redistribution of financial flows. Thus, the militias and pro-Iranian parties are both armed organisations, parallel to the army and police and the largest holders of jobs, and they actively embezzle public funds.

Violence, corruption, racketeering, and the breakdown of institutions that are supposed to take care of the population have led to widespread poverty. People are sometimes deprived of the most basic social conditions - electricity, clean drinking water, and good medical services. In summer, when the heat sometimes exceeds 50 degrees, the electricity in the cities may be cut off. Poisonings sometimes occur because of the lack of clean water (especially in the south of the country). Not to mention the lack of decent jobs: a large number of them are concentrated in the public sector, and, for example, to get a job as a doctor in Baghdad, you have to bribe officials to 10 thousand dollars. About half of Iraqis live below the poverty line, even though Iraq is the world's fourth-largest oil exporter selling about 3.3 million barrels a day abroad.

In the autumn of 2019, mass protests erupted across the country, mainly involving members of the social grassroots. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis took to the streets of Baghdad, Basra, and other cities in the south of the country, trying to block state institutions and setting fire to all political party headquarters. Their social demands were for jobs, clean water, electricity, health services, and the development of housing. This decentralised resistance, which rejected parties and trade unions, coordinated its work through the Internet and local street committees. The social grassroots attempt, if not to gain direct control of power and the economy, at least to improve their lot, was crushed by pro-Iranian militias, who killed and kidnapped about a thousand people and injured over 20,000.

There is now a relative political lull in Iraq. The pro-Iranian bloc has established itself in power, bringing its protégé, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, to the post of prime minister. There are no mass protests. However, the world media and various analysts are convinced this cannot go on for long. Firstly, the economic downturn continues. Poverty is persistent and the current state of affairs is unlikely to change with the current socio-political and socio-economic model. Added to these circumstances is the threat of falling oil prices.

There is talk among Iraqi officials of a delayed crisis. Jamal Cougar, a member of the parliamentary finance committee, notes that the country's infrastructure is severely dilapidated, with many agencies experiencing severe material and equipment shortages, so any drop in global oil prices or a slowdown in exports would inevitably affect Iraqi revenues. According to him, "Crude oil revenues account for more than 90 per cent of the budget funding, and this is a major source of concern and one of the problems that will not be dealt with now or in 2024 and 2025... Meanwhile, all studies show that oil prices will fall next year." As Cougar points out, the new draft budget has no proposals to cope with the effects of falling oil revenues, and it is also "devoid of administrative reforms or plans for job creation that would actually benefit Iraq rather than being patronage machines".

Second, the Iraqi political system lacks legitimacy. Only 40 per cent of the electorate participated in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Most simply do not trust the incumbent political structures and officials, believing them to be swindlers, corrupt, and gangsters. Moreover, many are convinced that the country is actually under Iranian occupation. Though it would be strange if they thought differently when pro-Iranian militias are killing them in the streets of their own, Iraqi, cities, and the leaders of these organizations and affiliated political parties talk about their loyalty to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These groups follow the Iranian state model of "velayet-e faqih" (the state of the supreme jurist-theologian), referring to a specific life-long ruler of neighbouring Iran who holds absolute power in his country. These forces in Iraq are referred to as "velayet" and are often seen as a form of Iranian control.

Third, despite the ultra-low turnout, the Iranian bloc, the Coordination Mechanism, lost the 2022 elections. It was won by a group led by an independent Iranian Shiite cleric, Muqtada Sadr. It won 73 seats in the 329-seat parliament. Sadr managed to rally most political forces around him. However, the pro-Iranian proxy Supreme Court, which is loyal to pro-Iranian factions, ruled that a two-thirds majority was required to form a governing coalition. Sadr did not have such a vast majority and his supporters left parliament, unwilling to participate in such a farce. Their parliamentary seats, according to the constitution, went to the pro-Iranian bloc, which came second in the election. This bloc then succeeded in rallying the majority of parliamentarians around itself and creating a government headed by Sudani. But the specifics of the situation are that these people did not come to power through elections - their power is based on Sadr's fraudulent manipulation and miscalculations.

Nevertheless, Sadr's bloc of supporters has its own armed militias and the support of several million of Iraq's poorest Iraqis, to whom the ministers of this wealthy Shiite cleric distribute social assistance. Some religious youth even consider Sadr the hidden Imam, Mehdi. In general, Sadr's unique position is that he is both a politician and a cleric, wielding enormous influence over his supporters as well as providing them with material aid. All this together allows him to easily change his position on several issues without losing his followers, and he has his own armed forces. Sadr has now officially withdrawn from politics. But there can be little doubt of his intentions to return to it, and that this highly ambitious player will join the street protests should they resume. However, the street, apart from his supporters, does not have much confidence in Sadr, as his militias have been involved in shooting up mass protests in the past, failing to subdue them to their influence.

Finally, within the pro-Iranian bloc itself, the Coordination Mechanism, contradictions intensified. As long as Sadr was playing an active political game, they stuck together to oppose him and prevent him from taking supreme power. But today Sadr has lurked, he is politically inactive, so this factor is not working. On the other hand, having consolidated their power, pro-Iranian militias and parties have begun to fight for control of financial flows. In an interview with London-based Middle East Eye, one of the leaders of the ruling Coordination Mechanism, who wished to remain anonymous, said that Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a pro-Iranian militia group, has begun taking significantly larger shares from state finances than its partners are comfortable with. "If this continues, this faction will turn on the others and absorb them," he said.

Under such circumstances, Sudani's government is keen to subject all militias to its centralised control. On the other hand, it has decided to double the number of militias, including pro-Iranian groups, to 250,000, allocating $1.7 billion from the budget for this, which includes payments to fighters and the purchase of new weapons. The militias even have modern tanks and air defence systems. In all likelihood, the government has come to view these armed groups as the only force capable of maintaining a pro-Iranian order. But ruling a turbulent country like Iraq with bayonets alone is unlikely to succeed.