Moscow meeting of Turkish, Syrian defence ministers as a milestone in regional security architecture Resolving crisis in the neighbourhood

On December 27, 2022, the defence minister of Türkiye Hulusi Akar and the head of its National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), Hakan Fidan, met Syrian defence minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas and Syrian intelligence chief Ali Mamlouk in Moscow along with Russia’s defence minister Sergei Shoigu. In contrast, the Moscow meeting became the first high-level meeting of Turkish and Syrian senior officials since the inception of the civil war in Syria in 2011. Since then, Ankara has pursued a firmly anti-Assad policy for many years, simultaneously conducting anti-terrorist operations against the Kurdish militant groups in the northern part of the country.

Minister Hulusi Akar positively assessed the meeting, pointing out the necessity to continue face-to-face talks for political reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus after tumultuous years of relations. Until 2022, "Ways of resolving the Syrian crisis and the problem of refugees, as well as joint efforts to combat extremist groups in Syria, have been discussed," stated the Russian Defense Ministry as a key initiator of the meeting.

The meeting in Moscow, which marks the first concrete sign of thaw in relations between two arch rivals Ankara and Damascus, came after a series of positive messages from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Damascus. Earlier this month, he expressed an openness to meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, saying there was "no place for resentment in politics."

Undoubtedly, Akar’s meeting with his Syrian counterpart will pave the way for a further discussion of Syrian leader Bashar Assad with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. However, President Erdogan for many years blamed Assad for his brutal methods of oppressing mass protests in large cities and pursuing repressions against opposition forces. Moreover, since 2015 Ankara has conducted several ground operations in northern Syria, predominantly populated by ethnic Kurds citing national security concerns. As a result, large swathes of territories in northern Syria came under the control of the Turkish Armed Forces and Free Syrian Army, an Ankara-backed local rebellion organization.

Interestingly, the diplomatic thaw between Ankara-Damascus is happening at a time when President Erdogan vowed another ground operation in northern Syria to quell the Kurdish militant groups, namely Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) linked YPG/PYD organizations. This statement followed a recent bomb attack in Istanbul, reportedly perpetrated by PKK on November 14, 2022, leaving six civilians dead. Even though the PKK denied any role in the bombing, saying, "we will not directly target civilians," Ankara seems keen to conduct a large-scale operation to establish what it calls a buffer zone in the area to prevent further terror attacks in its borders.

It is likely that the Kurdish problem, a common problem for Ankara and Damascus, was on the main agenda of defence ministers in Moscow. Ankara seemingly is willing to cooperate with the Assad government to ambush the Kurdish militia in the region and normalize ties with the neighbouring state. The long-term anarchy and chaos in its immediate borderline created hazardous challenges for Türkiye in terms of regional security. Since 2011, numerous deadly terror attacks have hit large Turkish cities and civilian settlements that inflamed domestic discontent in rural areas.

Hence, Ankara's re-approach to the Assad government for diplomatic normalization should not come as a surprise. Moreover, the possible cooperation with Bashir Assad against the Kurdish militia would be essential in the sense that it could significantly decrease the militant groups' abilities to challenge Damascus and Ankara, as well as prevent the efforts of the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity in these areas.

However, a new schism may occur between Ankara and Damascus if the latter persistently asks for the complete withdrawal of the Turkish Armed Forces from northern territories. Although the diplomatic thaw is in progress between the two states, Ankara's departure from the area would cause a security vacuum that Kurdish militants would attempt to fill quickly. Therefore, it is unlikely that Ankara will retreat from its positions in northern Syria at this point, but it could agree on joint security measures against militant groups.

Such a deal between the two states could suit the interests of Russia and the US. The Ankara-Damascus reconciliation would ease Moscow and Washington's efforts to repel back the remnants of the so-called Islamic Caliphate (ISIS) in Syria and other affiliated radical organizations. Otherwise, a new ground operation of Ankara in Syria would seriously undermine the anti-ISIS front in Syria and create favourable conditions for its undesirable revival. Moreover, the successful rapprochement will enable Türkiye to start the process of return of Syrian refugees back to their homes.

As the prominent supporter of Bashir Assad and partner of Ankara, Russia is more interested in the normalization process, as it may ease its burden in Syria and enable it to focus more on its war campaign against Ukraine. The Moscow meeting between defence ministers will resume at a higher level and result in Erdogan-Assad face-to-face meeting on a neutral platform soon. As for Ankara, the normalization with Damascus will allow Erdogan's government to strengthen border security and internal stability ahead of the critical 2023 elections.