Russia-Armenia standoff and balance of power in South Caucasus Seeking a new scapegoat

September was marked with important events for the South Caucasus region, namely the intensified diplomatic rifts between Armenia and Russia followed by a local military operation launched by Azerbaijan in an attempt to force the remnants of the Armenian armed groups out of the Garabagh region.

On September 20, after one-day intensive clashes, Azerbaijan declared military victory over the de-facto separatist regime in Khankendi, while Armenian armed groups agreed to surrender and hand over all weapons. Shortly after, on September 28, the separatist government in Khankendi officially ceased its existence and caused a mass exodus of ethnic Armenians from the region.

In addition to regional security cataclysms, heavy losses on the battlefield and a mass influx of Armenian refugees caused domestic unrest in Armenia, with protesters storming governmental buildings demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, though unsuccessfully.

However, the main object of Armenian protesters' fury was Russia, its main and historical ally. Both partner states engaged in a war of words in the last few months as Yerevan accused Moscow of not "doing enough" to prevent Azerbaijan's military actions in Garabagh.

The diplomatic rifts unfolded in early August when the Armenian government sought Russia's assistance in exerting pressure on Azerbaijan to issue additional guarantees for the ethnic Armenian community of Garabagh. In 2022, Yerevan appealed to the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to intervene during deadly clashes on the Azerbaijan-Armenian border, but the bloc agreed only to send a "fact-finding" mission to the region.

CSTO was established in 2002 as a collective security organization in the post-Soviet space. From the very beginning, Russia has played a leading role by contributing a disproportionate share of its funding and providing military resources and infrastructure to other member states in return for their support of Moscow's policies.

However, Russia's reluctance to trigger discontent in Azerbaijan triggered anti-Russian sentiments in the Armenian leadership, which in turn inflamed Armenian criticism in the Kremlin. Also, disillusion in Yerevan could represent a major turning point for the country of 2.8 million people as it has delegated much of the control of its railways, energy sector and even its borders to Russia.

In addition, Moscow’s restraint may be attributed to the fact that it was itself attacking a sovereign independent state for bogus reasons. Nevertheless, Armenia hosts a Russian military base, which includes garrisons in two locations and an airbase, and is Moscow's only strategic ally in the volatile South Caucasus.

Russia’s main narrative against Armenia’s accusations is that official Yerevan officially recognized the territorial integrity, and its demands to "take action against Azerbaijan are ungrounded". In this regard, Armenia learned this lesson and began reorienting its foreign policy toward new powerful allies — the United States and France.

For example, a few days ago, before the clashes, Yerevan invited U.S. soldiers to stage joint drills in the country as part of exercises codenamed Eagle Partner 2023. Russia has hit out at the decision. Recently, in an attempt to take more anti-Russian steps, the Armenian government revealed intentions to come under the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction and ratify the Rome Statute.

Notably, despite warnings and criticism of the Kremlin, the Armenian Parliament adopted the draft law on ratifying the Roma Statute on September 28. In response to that decision, the Kremlin spokesperson stated that the ratification of the Rome Statute by Armenia would have the most negative consequences for bilateral relations.

Under the Roma Statue, Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to be arrested and extradited to the Hague for his "notorious role in the Ukraine war and crime against humanity, " dubbed unacceptable by the Russian authorities.

In March, the International Criminal Court issued warrants for both Putin and Russia's commissioner for children's rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, concerning the abduction and forced deportation of children from Ukraine since the start of Moscow's full-scale invasion last year.

Consequently, Armenia explains its decision to join the Statute with the necessity to hold Azerbaijan accountable for alleged military aggression. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Armenian government will be able to initiate a criminal prosecution of Azerbaijan as the war-torn territories are internationally recognized borders and claims regarding the "occupation of Garabagh" are irrelevant in such cases.

As for Moscow-Yerevan rifts, the former has lost its credibility as a regional peacekeeper in Yerevan’s eyes. The current state of affairs and regional balance of power, the current Russia-Armenia standoff will increase the pressure on the latter and may provoke enormous political unrest in the foreseen future.