Russia's faltering grasp over Baku-Yerevan dynamics reaches a new low Aliyev’s riposte to Putin

Russia, albeit still at a fair distance from being deprived of its marbles over the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process, is, nevertheless, gradually losing its sway over the negotiations.

The trilateral Sochi meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders, mediated by embattled Russian President Vladimir Putin, has poignantly revealed that the Kremlin is desperate to pull the strings of the peace negotiations, but actually has very little to offer and its perceived mediatory prowess is likely to continue faltering in the months to come.

Russia is adamant to remain relevant

In some ways, for the Russian President, the objective of the 31 October convocation was the most self-serving of all gatherings conducted under his watchful eye. However, the incorporation of the written positive assessment of the Russian peacekeepers, temporarily stationed in Karabakh, in the final declaration was probably his sole achievement.

His enfeebled appraisal after the lengthy discussions was that the negotiations were “useful”, but many of the clauses included within the original draft text were not enshrined in the final document, being indicative of his personal failure to bring the sides to a compromise.

There is always an excuse for the failure of a mediator, stating that the parties that are unwilling to find common ground and an evenhanded broker cannot impose any particular way forward. This does not fully apply to Russia at this juncture.

Putin was visibly sceptical about the so-called Washington document, reflecting during his speech at the Valdai conference on 27 October, four days before the Sochi meeting, that this envisaged the recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh. It was perceived as a hint that the negotiations under the aegis of Moscow might possibly end up with a formulation that would recognise “Karabakh’s specific characteristics”.

For Azerbaijan, such a perspective is a total categorical error, and President Aliyev was crystal-clear on this in Sochi: "The Karabakh conflict is history; it was resolved two years ago. Therefore, there is practically nothing to discuss in this context, and achievement of the normalisation of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations requires very serious steps".

This could be seen not just as a reminder to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, but also as a riposte to Putin himself, given his earlier statements alluding to the judiciousness of deciding on Karabakh’s fate at a later stage.

However, Russia’s measured open-mindedness on the subject, rather than being cracked up to be a realistic eventuality, is probably intended to be a thinly veiled admonition to Armenia, aimed at persuading it to cling to the wreckage of the Kremlin-mediated raft. Pashinyan, who is yet to perfect the art of statesmanship, has, nevertheless, improved his spin in becoming a slick operator in diplomatic talks and, in Sochi, he tried to use this warning as a reality-check test to ascertain the true contours of Moscow’s pro-Armenian benevolence.  

Ungratified requests and their meaning

Throughout the trilateral meeting, he made several proposals, some of which he described as having Russian backing, and suggested their inclusion in the final text. Firstly, Pashinyan requested a Kremlin-approved document on the Basic Principles on interstate relations, reportedly entailing a clause on the determination of Karabakh’s fate at a later phase, to be subsequently incorporated in the post-meeting trilateral declaration. Secondly, the Armenian PM was also willing to seriously consider the prolongation of the term of the Russian peacekeepers for 10-20 years, after which they could be regarded as achieving semi-permanency.

Thirdly, it was Pashinyan’s design to incorporate a provision blaming Azerbaijan fairly and squarely for the recent 12–14 September escalation, thereby justifying the installation of security mechanisms on the border for delimitation. Fourthly, the return to the positions held before May 2021 was another Armenian proposal.

Fifthly, Pashinyan wanted the declaration to reflect the view that Azerbaijani control over the Farrukh height is encroaching on the temporary zone under the responsibility of the Russian contingent in Karabakh. Sixthly, Pashinyan was hellbent on procuring a clause on the repatriation of all Armenian detainees currently in Azerbaijan.  

The cumulative force of these requests seemed to beggar one indirect, but fairly clear, question: “What is that Russia is willing to provide for Armenia in the interim that the West is not ready to bestow?” Since none of the suggestions made it to the final declaration, one can assume that Moscow’s answer must have been perceived by Pashinyan as one akin to “nothing at the moment, but in the long term, the Moscow format offers a wavering flicker of a glimmer of hope over the Karabakh issue”.

Constructive ambiguity bordering on semi-eternalisation

The Sochi meeting also revealed that Russia is not just disinterested in any progress in which it does not play a mediatory role, but also averse to the proposition that the conclusion of a peace treaty should be viewed as an immediate objective. The Kremlin's perspective on the negotiations is that multi-tracked discussions on the delimitation and demarcation of the state border and the reopening of communications should be pursued, with a comprehensive deal being regarded as a declarative objective, left for hanging for an unspecified date in the future.

This ties up well with Moscow's perceived intention to ascribe to its peacekeeping contingent in Karabakh a degree of semi-permanence. To maintain its footprint on sovereign Azerbaijani territory, Russia is naturally interested in keeping the region's population in a state of existential fear that once Baku resumes de facto control, the repercussions for the locals will border on full expulsion or worse.

This also explains billionaire Ruben Vardanyan's presence in Khankandi and his appointment as the 'first minister" of the so-called illegal and manifestly unrecognised "NKR". Given the tycoon's close ties with the upper crust of the Russian political establishment, it could be safely assumed that his new role must have, at least, received a plausible nod from the Kremlin, if not full Putinesque authorisation.

In the same vein, the recent demonstration in Khankandi, prior to the Sochi meeting, voicing "seperatist" exhortations with the obvious intended recipient being Russia, rather than Armenia, cannot be extricated from Moscow's probable long-term strategic vision.

The Kremlin, as a self-serving mediator, disinterested in a "dangerously swift" progress, has prioritised the maintenance of its indispensability over other considerations. It understands only too well that it would unable to please both sides and, therefore, needs to be rangingly "benevolent" and "beastly" to the parties, so as to fix the balance.

Moscow has repeatedly snubbed Yerevan's pleas to provide on-ground backing via the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). But it has also been careful not to deprive Yerevan of its last futile hopes over Karabakh's future fate, portraying itself as the only viable medium to facilitate such a possibility.

With Azerbaijan, Moscow's clout is of a lesser degree. Russia agrees with Baku on some key aspects of the Zangazur Corridor project, and it has refused to be receptive to Armenian requests over blame apportion for the border escalation. Nevertheless, Moscow does not share Azerbaijan's view of seeing the current process as post-conflict normalisation, with the Karabakh issue itself being irreversibly shelved indefinitely.

However, fair is fair in love and war, and it would be untrue to say that Russia is not interested in mini-breakthroughs achieved under its auspices, as the absence of any progress militates against the legitimacy of its contrivedly cultivated role as an effective mediator. In Sochi, President Putin failed, indeed spectacularly, on this key aspect.

The 31 October declaration entails points on the “non-use of force” and “the mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the UN Charter and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991”. These clauses are not light years away from what was enshrined in the 6 October Prague declaration and cannot be seen as remotely new. These declarative clauses all require tight definitions so as to assume a definable meaning and Russia, whose mediatory role is understandably hinging on maintaining "constructive ambiguity", could not be expected to be the initiator of "dangerously specific" constructs.

The present context provides a new impetus for a more active role for the EU-US coalition and, going further, for exploring all possibilities providing a shortcut to bilateral talks. At this stage, with the hourglass of negotiations inexorably exhausting its last grains of sand, the discussions cannot be akin to an intellectual debate wherein the parties "agree to disagree" as a starting point and then deliberate on their differences.

What is necessary for Baku and Yerevan is to agree on the fundamental points pertaining to the mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity without double-meanings requiring later clarifications on the essentials, and proceed with verve on the full spectrum of interstate normalisation. The Moscow format does not seem to favour such a route, which is one of the reasons why it seems to be set to drift into the stale waters of irrelevance.

Neil Watson, British Commentator, reflected: “Obstreperousness and ambiguity are the watchwords of Putin’s Russia. As the old colonial power and documented aggressor against Ukraine, Russia cannot play any role in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. The EU-US route is the only path to a swift and lasting peace.”