Syria’s fragmentation: Local militias, foreign interests, and fight for control  A divided nation amidst global rivalries

At present, Syria no longer exists as a unified state. Instead, several autonomous ethno-confessional regions have emerged, controlled by various armed groups. The central government is attempting to reunite them into a single entity. However, its efforts to do so may trigger a new wave of confrontation. On the other hand, Syria’s new leadership is interested in lifting American and European sanctions, which is why it avoids a full-scale civil war—after all, the U.S. and European authorities are unlikely to lift sanctions if mass killings and riots break out.

Communal confrontation

There are several such communities in Syria. A significant portion of the country, including its largest cities—Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus—is controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, which is linked to the Sunni Muslim community. The majority of Syrians are Sunnis. For a long time, this group was affiliated with Al-Qaeda until HTS officially severed ties with it in 2016. At that time, the organization formally renounced international terrorism and instead supported the establishment of a religious autocracy in Syria. As researchers joked, HTS replaced international terrorism with a religiously infused Syrian nationalism. However, even after this shift, the group, which controls the Idlib region in northern Syria, continued to express its desire to establish a regime in the country based on Sharia law—as interpreted by its leadership.

HTS did not subject ethno-religious minorities to mass repression but granted them the status of "guests," which could be revoked at any moment, potentially leading to the confiscation of their property. The HTS leadership dissolved hundreds of independent elected municipalities in Idlib and installed its own administration. Mass protests against this policy were suppressed by force. The group did not hold any competitive elections, effectively establishing a dictatorship—an authoritarian regime led by its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

HTS overthrew Assad’s regime in a swift offensive that lasted 11 days and culminated in the fall of Damascus on December 8 of last year, forcing Assad to flee the country. However, despite recently forming a new Syrian government, the group now claims it intends to protect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and even hold elections in a few years. For now, it has unilaterally declared its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, as the country’s president.

The new leader of Syria may not have any intentions of suppressing minorities. HTS forces have distributed food aid in Shiite areas and prevented sectarian clashes between Christians and Muslims, among other efforts. However, the core issue lies in the fact that several minority-affiliated groups have formed independent armed factions advocating for the decentralisation of Syria, whereas al-Sharaa's primary objective is to concentrate power in the hands of his central government. This could lead to direct confrontations. What begins as a military-political struggle could quickly escalate into an ethno-religious conflict.

The coastal region of Latakia is also under HTS control, despite being predominantly populated by Alawites—a sect closely linked to Shiism. However, this area remains highly unstable. Clashes frequently erupt between Alawite militias—many of which were previously aligned with the Assad clan that ruled Syria for half a century, dominating both the security apparatus and 50% of the country’s GDP—and Sunni factions that refuse to submit to HTS. Instances of score-settling are widespread. The situation is further complicated by Syria’s deep-rooted societal structure, particularly in rural areas, where large family groups and tribal affiliations play a significant role. In such an environment, revenge killings over lost relatives are common, posing a real risk of plunging the country into a full-scale civil war.

Furthermore, Iran, which previously cooperated with Assad’s regime, is now working to establish a network of cells hostile to the HTS government in Damascus. Tehran’s leadership has openly stated its intentions, and there is little doubt that it has strong connections in Latakia. As a result, this region represents a ticking time bomb under the HTS regime in Syria.

A significant portion of northern and eastern Syria is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Kurdish militias. These forces are closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an organisation with influence not only among Syrian Kurds but also within the Kurdish population in Türkiye. Since the mid-1980s, the PKK has waged a terrorist campaign against Türkiye, seeking either independence or self-determination for Kurdish-populated areas. In Türkiye, the PKK is officially designated as a terrorist organisation.

In the territories controlled by the SDF and PKK in Syria, several million people reside, with roughly half being local Kurds and the other half consisting of Arab tribes. Power in these areas is concentrated in the hands of PKK political and military officials. However, on a local level, they cooperate with large family groups and tribal leaders, who, through their representation in local governing bodies, can influence policy decisions.

The SDF and PKK advocate for the federalisation of Syria, seeking to maintain an autonomous administration and independent armed forces in the areas under their control. Their negotiations with the Damascus government over forming a unified military force have failed. The Kurds insist on preserving autonomy while integrating under a shared military command, whereas the Syrian leadership demands the dissolution of the SDF and the individual incorporation of its fighters into the government army. Currently, the SDF and the autonomous administration control about one-third of Syria’s territory. More importantly, they oversee the country’s primary discovered oil reserves, hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates, and Syria’s grain belt—the key wheat-producing region.

Türkiye demands the dismantling of this enclave, viewing it as an "unrecognised state created by the PKK" on its very border and a "threat to its strategic interests." However, neither Türkiye nor the Damascus government can take direct action against the SDF and the Kurdish autonomous administration, which controls 30% of Syrian territory, as long as up to 4,000 American troops remain stationed in the region. The U.S. maintains close cooperation with the Kurds under the pretext of "combating the remnants of ISIS."

In southern Syria, the Suwayda region—home to the Druze community—operates independently from the central government, controlled by its own armed groups. The Druze follow a distinct religion, and various militias and spiritual leaders govern this enclave, which is home to approximately 600,000–700,000 Druze.

Also in the south is the Sunni-majority Daraa region, where local Sunni armed groups operate outside the control of the central government.

Syria remains devastated by both international sanctions and the 13-year-long civil war (since 2011). For the country’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, lifting sanctions is one of his top political priorities.

His other key objective is to unify Syria under his rule—meaning consolidating power under HTS, establishing a centralised system of governance, and either subjugating or eliminating the numerous independent armed groups that do not fall under HTS control. In this endeavour, al-Sharaa is heavily reliant on military, economic, and political cooperation with Türkiye. He seeks Ankara’s support in dismantling independent militias and hopes for Turkish humanitarian aid and investment to help revive Syria’s shattered economy.

The Syrian government is proceeding carefully, wary of igniting another cycle of civil war that could quickly escalate into an ethnic and sectarian conflict. Such a scenario would make it even harder to lift international sanctions. Aware of this risk, Ahmed al-Sharaa has been attempting to organise national reconciliation conferences and negotiate with various communities and armed factions. However, so far, his efforts have yielded little success.

International landscape surrounding Syria

The competing interests of global and regional powers in Syria also play a crucial role in shaping the country's trajectory.

The Syrian central government relies on cooperation with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, both of which have become key supporters of the new authorities. Al-Sharaa is committed to a unitary Syria under his complete control, though his government remains open to negotiations with different factions and communities.

Türkiye shares similar objectives—it seeks to eliminate the Kurdish threat along its borders and strengthen its allies in Damascus. However, despite its close ties with Ankara, HTS remains a powerful and independent military-political force, at times showing reluctance to fully align with Turkish interests.

At the same time, HTS is deepening its relationship with Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest country in the Middle East. Riyadh is willing to invest in Syria but is wary of Türkiye’s growing influence, seeking to curb it. This has led to tensions over key government appointments, as Saudi officials resist the placement of Türkiye-aligned figures in important HTS positions.

Israel appears to share similar concerns, unwilling to see Syria fall under the influence of a major rival power. As a result, it has taken steps to promote the country’s federalisation. The Israeli military has advanced deeper into Syrian territory, targeting stockpiles of heavy weaponry inherited by the new regime in Damascus from the Assad era.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar has held talks with Kurdish leaders, while the Israeli government has issued strong warnings against any use of force by Damascus in Suwayda, demanding the withdrawal of government troops from southern Syria. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has explicitly stated that Israel will not tolerate the presence of HTS-led government forces in the south and has called for the demilitarisation of the region. His primary objective is to ensure that Syria’s new government remains relatively weak, unable to exert full control over areas currently governed by various ethno-religious communities and independent armed factions.

At the same time, Israeli lobbyists have been actively working in Washington, as reported by Reuters. They are leading a coordinated campaign to influence U.S. policy during a critical period for Syria, when the forces that overthrew Bashar al-Assad are seeking to convince Washington to lift sanctions imposed on Damascus during Assad’s rule.

According to three American sources and one individual familiar with key U.S. officials, Israel presented its concerns to senior U.S. officials during meetings in Washington in February, as well as in subsequent discussions in Israel with U.S. Congressional representatives. "Israel's big fear is that Turkey comes in and protects this new Syrian Islamist order, which then ends up being a base for Hamas and other militants," said Aron Lund, a fellow at U.S.-based think-tank Century International.

Israel is lobbying in the United States for a special policy towards Syria, aiming to secure the country's federalization and its division into various ethnic enclaves with their own administrative structures and armed forces. As part of this policy, Israel would like the U.S. to avoid obstructing Russia's efforts to maintain its military bases in Syria, seeing them as a balancing tool against Turkish influence. Four well-informed sources familiar with the situation shared this information with Reuters.

According to these sources, it is unclear to what extent the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is considering Israel's proposals. He has said little about Syria, leaving uncertainty regarding both future sanctions and the status of U.S. forces stationed in the country's northeast. Lund points out that Israel has a strong chance of influencing U.S. opinion, describing the new administration as "wildly pro-Israeli." Furthermore, he notes, "Syria is barely even on Trump's radar now. It's low priority, and there's a policy void to fill."

According to Reuters' sources, Israeli officials have been trying to persuade U.S. officials that Russia should be allowed to keep its Mediterranean naval base in the Syrian province of Tartus and its air base in Hmeimim, located in the province of Latakia.