Tehran-2022: Goals, objectives, results Afterword by Maxim Petrov

The recent trilateral summit in Tehran, where Presidents Vladimir Putin, Ebrahim Raisi, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan held talks, had several important goals.

First, the meeting looked like an alternative to US President Joe Biden's visit to the Middle East, who visited Israel and Saudi Arabia. Biden was trying to strengthen cooperation within the bloc that is currently taking shape in the region based on the Abrahamic Accords, agreements to normalize relations between Israel and the Arab countries. The bloc is based on an alliance between Israel and the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf and is aimed primarily against Iran. The three presidents, for their part, held a meeting that looked like a continuation of the Astana format, in which the three powers - Iran, Türkiye, and Russia shared spheres of influence in Syria and the Middle East.

Second, Russia's goal was to get Iranian reconnaissance and strike drones. Moscow's policy, both internal and external, is now largely determined by the course of the situation in Ukraine. Obtaining Iranian drones is extremely important to the Kremlin, but it is still not clear how the negotiations ended. The Iranians themselves deny handing over the drones. However, some Ukrainian sources say that Iran has already handed over some of the required drones. However, the US has reported that it sees no signs of Iran selling drones to Russia. This was stated by the Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council, John Kirby. Earlier, State Department spokesman Ned Price said that the sale of drones to Russia by Iran would lead to a number of US sanctions. That could have stopped the Iranians, who continue indirect negotiations with the Americans on the nuclear deal and would like to have the sanctions lifted (the Iranian economy is seriously suffering from them).

But the issue can hardly be considered closed. For Washington, the Ukrainian crisis is as important as it is for Moscow, Russia's policy is called an "acute threat" in the US national security strategy. The Iranians could use drone deliveries to Moscow as leverage against the United States, saying: "Either you will meet us halfway during the negotiations on the nuclear deal, lift sanctions against us (in exchange for our refusal to build nuclear weapons), and, moreover, give in to us on some controversial issues, or our strike drones will end up in Ukraine and will fight for the Russian armed forces."

Thirdly, there may have been discussions about an agreement to supply Russian and Ukrainian grain to international markets. The fate of this agreement (Türkiye acts as an intermediary between Russia and Ukraine) is not yet clear.

Fourthly, Syria was discussed. This country has long been an object of the division of spheres of influence between the four powers - Iran, Türkiye, Russia, and the United States. All four states rely on their allies there. All of them, except the US, are seeking to expand their spheres of influence.

The regime of President Bashar al-Assad controls the capital, Damascus, and about 60% of Syrian territory. However, the loyalist armed forces and militias are not large and rely on military support from Iran and Russia. Assad is heavily dependent on both powers. The Iranians and Russians are actively creating and training various militias in Assad-controlled territory that are under their full or partial control. For example, the 5th Corps is pro-Russian, while the 4th Division, commanded by Assad's brother Maher (second-in-command), is pro-Iranian. Overall, Iranian influence is rather predominant, also because the Iranians have infiltrated deeply the structures of the Assad regime and its armed formations. The pro-Iranian structures (especially the 4th Division) have taxed local businesses.

Türkiye, with the help of its armed forces, controls some regions in the north and north-west of the country - greater Idlib and some other areas, in total about 15% of the territory of Syria. In these areas, it relies on anti-Assad Sunni rebel forces. Assad's main enemies here are the Islamists from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the SNA (Syrian National Army) formations. While the SNA as a whole is a pro-Turkish structure, however, consisting of many rather independent small groups, there is tension between the HTS and Türkiye. The HTS and the SNA are now and then engaged in armed conflicts or are trying to set up joint headquarters to conduct operations against their common enemies. There are also sharp disagreements within the SNA, which at times lead to shootings (the reasons for conflicts are not only ideological but also material, related to the redistribution of spheres of influence, collection of tribute/taxes from local businesses, and control over important highways).

Finally, 25% of Syria's territory in the north and northeast is controlled by the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Forces. At the core of this structure are the Kurdish People Protection Units (YPG), allied with a number of Arab, Assyrian, Armenian, and other tribal militias. The command of the YPG, as well as the political leadership of the territory, consists mainly of representatives and personnel of the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party. It is a multi-layered system and it is easy to get confused by acronyms, so for the sake of simplicity, it is important to know that the PKK actually dominates the region, which is the main political force and provides military leadership. The main Syrian oil and gas fields are concentrated here. There is also about a thousand US military personnel in the area. The US is cooperating with the Kurds and the SDF to fight the remnants of ISIS.

Türkiye is not happy with what is happening. The PKK is fighting for independence or autonomy (at present it is not completely clear in its statements) of the Kurds in Türkiye, home to a multimillion Kurdish community. In Türkiye, the PKK is officially recognized as a terrorist organization.

The PKK has military bases in Northern Iraq, in the Kandil Mountains, from where they conduct operations against the Turkish army. The PKK's goal is to create a continuous line of communications, political centers, and military bases on the borders of Syria and Iraq with Türkiye. Accordingly, Türkiye's politico-military objective is to destroy this entire system and create a 30 km deep safe zone in the area.

The Turkish army is currently conducting military operations against PKK and its affiliated units in Northern Iraq and is preparing a similar operation in Northern Syria. In the past, Türkiye has already undertaken three military operations to drive out Kurdish fighters. Today, the country's leadership is talking about a fourth. But in order to conduct it, it is necessary to obtain the consent of Iran, Russia, and the United States. All the more so because there are also pro-Iranian formations in Kurdish-controlled areas today. According to the information available today, Putin and Raisi have not agreed to the Turkish operation. Conducting a special operation without the consent of Russia and Iran is theoretically possible, but it carries high risks associated with possible clashes with the military and/or loyalists of those states. Not to mention possible clashes with Assad's Syrian army, which, however, is not a force capable of confronting Türkiye's Armed Forces.

Overall, we can say that the meeting between Putin, Erdogan, and Raisi had contradictory results. The Turkish media called the talks "historic." On the one hand, all three have indeed demonstrated their willingness to continue the negotiation process related to the delimitation and redistribution of spheres of influence in the Middle East. On the other hand, it is still difficult to talk about any concrete results.