Yerevan's Janus-faced Russia policy Making or losing friends?

Judging by the short report in the media, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, where he arrived at the invitation of the Russian President, was formally a working meeting. It was only reported in advance that it was planned to discuss bilateral and regional agenda issues, as well as the situation in the Russian peacekeepers' area of responsibility in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. However, given the current tensions in Armenian-Russian relations, it can be assumed that, among other things, Pashinyan had to explain himself on a number of uncomfortable issues.

In particular, in recent times, Russia, Armenia's closest ally, has been the target of a number of impertinent statements made by the figures of this country. Moscow paid back in its own coin, responding harshly and distinctly.

Russia has already officially expressed its dissatisfaction with Yerevan's increased attention to the EU and the US through its Foreign Ministry, which means that Armenia is already openly trying to align itself with the West, looking for a new overlord. However, Moscow is not satisfied with this and demands to make up its mind: if you want to remain an outpost with relevant privileges, you should stay on the same foreign policy course. That is, with Moscow. This is first of all.

And secondly, the Kremlin is trying to make the West believe that Russia is the main moderator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations and that the normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan can only be achieved on the basis of the Trilateral Statement signed in 2020. That is, exclusively on the Russian track. Moscow is aware that it is Armenia that refuses to implement these agreements. That's why Pashinyan had to repeat his hackneyed argument in Sochi that Azerbaijan is allegedly avoiding the implementation of the agreements, with the "situation in the Lachin corridor" and the "blockade of the Karabakh Armenians" as examples. In the same vein, Pashinyan invited Putin to discuss the situation in the zone of temporary responsibility of peacekeepers in Karabakh.

There is no doubt that the Armenian premier also had to justify himself for the recent unflattering remarks about Moscow by the secretary of the Armenian Security Council, Armen Grigoryan, on public television. The Russian Foreign Ministry subsequently called them a provocative slur. Grigoryan said that after unblocking economic and transport communications with Azerbaijan, Armenia is not going to provide Russia with control functions on border and customs checkpoints on the entrance and exit to the Zangazur corridor. Russian MFA spokesperson Maria Zakharova admonished the Armenian official, pointing out that the issue is thoroughly examined by deputy PMs of Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia and this means that the issue is not within Grigoryan's competence, but is assigned to appropriate persons. That is, Moscow has theoretically closed this issue, although it is possible that it was discussed in more detail in Sochi.

And there is another important detail. While Moscow used to react quite restrainedly to periodic anti-Russian statements from Armenia, it now seems to have run out of patience, and Yerevan faces the ultimate loss of favour with its only ally. The prime minister is most likely aware of the fragility of the situation in Armenia, although he continues to cozy up to both Western figures and Russian leadership. In other words, realising the danger of the situation, he continues to play a double game, playing up to one or the other.

By the way, a vivid example of Pashinyan's dual policy was his presence at the parade in Moscow on May 9, followed by his participation in the European summit in Chisinau. That is, on the one hand, Pashinyan is trying on the role of a pro-Western democrat, but, on the other hand, he does not abandon the image of a follower of Russian interests. Other Armenian officials demonstrate similar behaviour: when they go to the US and the EU, they habitually scold Russian policy, and then rush to Moscow and just as ardently assure it of their readiness to act exclusively in its interests and at its behest.

Taking into account such opposite hypostases of the Armenian authorities, Pashinyan's visit to Russia can be regarded as another hypocritical attempt to demonstrate his loyalty to the Kremlin and to shift all the "faults" to Baku, as usual. It is possible that in Sochi Pashinyan was explained to what consequences may lead the dreams associated with the withdrawal of Armenia from the CSTO and the EEU, the desire to pave the way to the West, and the negative statements about Moscow by those in the Armenian prime minister's inner circle. But it is unlikely that Yerevan will draw the right conclusions and reconsider its dual orientations. In the case of Armenia, alas, not only do the laws and norms of international law not work, as demonstrated by the almost 30 years of occupation of Azerbaijani territories, but there is also no concept of a code of the state and simply human morality.