Yerevan’s rush vs. Baku’s restraint: Real motives behind Armenia’s push for peace deal Expert opinions on Caliber.Az

Negotiations on the text of the peace treaty have been concluded, but key obstacles to its signing remain unresolved, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated during a conversation with his Dutch counterpart, Caspar Veldkamp. According to him, in order to finalise the agreement, all remaining disagreements must be addressed, including Armenia's territorial claims enshrined in its Constitution, as well as Yerevan’s stance on the OSCE Minsk Group. The Azerbaijani foreign minister conveyed these same points in a phone call with the UK Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, David Lammy.

Meanwhile, Yerevan continues to push for the swift signing of the peace treaty. Nikol Pashinyan once again declared that he is "ready to put his signature on the document." Such insistence seems excessive, given that the Armenian prime minister has yet to clarify a key issue—what the draft of Armenia’s new Constitution will look like and whether it will exclude territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

What is the Armenian side actually trying to convey, and what is behind Pashinyan’s urgency? To explore these questions, a Caliber.Az correspondent reached out to foreign experts.

Andrey Petrov, Deputy Director General of the Vestnik Kavkaza news agency and a Russian political analyst, believes that there are few positive aspects in Armenia’s actions. In his view, Yerevan continues to use the peace treaty as a tool to advance its foreign policy agenda.

"Yerevan does not see the peace treaty as a path to lasting stability with Azerbaijan. Rather, it is a means to secure certain foreign policy dividends. The timing of the final text’s approval is particularly telling. After all, the last two points could have been settled as early as last summer—precisely when Pashinyan proposed signing 15 out of 17 clauses, leaving two for later. Do you remember that rather odd proposal of his? I believe there was nothing preventing an agreement on the clause regarding the non-deployment of third-party forces at the border or the mutual withdrawal of lawsuits in international courts. While we do not know the exact wording, I am confident that it has not changed significantly since then. Until March 13, Pashinyan was saying, 'This is inconvenient,' and now, all of a sudden, he says, 'Yes, fine, we agree,’" the political analyst noted.

Why did he do it now? According to Petrov, this is because Yerevan has finally determined what the Trump administration's policy toward the South Caucasus will be for the next four years.

"Until now, they couldn't draw clear conclusions—they were waiting, observing, analyzing. But now they have understood: the new administration in Washington has no time for Yerevan. The U.S. will not support a country that openly backed the Democratic candidate and, in the final days of Biden’s presidency, signed a strategic partnership document with the U.S. that was inconvenient for Washington," the political analyst noted.

According to him, on the contrary, the Trump administration prefers to develop relations with Baku—just as it did during the previous term, when U.S.-Azerbaijan cooperation under the Republicans was characterized by a high level of mutual understanding.

"And now, everything is expected to follow the same pattern. Armenia has realized that it has lost the support it enjoyed under Biden and now risks losing its influence in Washington altogether. This is one of Yerevan’s most crucial foreign policy fronts. That’s why Pashinyan’s government is urgently seeking a way out of this situation. Since Trump positions himself as a peacemaker, Yerevan decided it was time to demonstrate readiness for a settlement. Their agreement on the disputed points can now be presented to the Trump administration and Secretary of State Marco Rubio as proof of a constructive approach—essentially saying, ‘We’ve agreed on everything, we’re ready to sign even tomorrow,’” the expert emphasized.

Petrov added that Yerevan initiated the agreement on the treaty’s text solely to regain ground in its relations with the U.S.—and did so with perfect timing. Just a day after the official announcement of the agreement, U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, arrived in Baku, reportedly to discuss prospects for bilateral cooperation between Washington and Baku.

Petrov also pointed out that Yerevan will continue its current tactics—portraying itself as a peacemaker while blaming Azerbaijan for delaying the process.

"Armenia simply has no new strategy. Everything it does is about optics rather than substance. Meanwhile, it continues to ignore two key conditions—the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and the removal of territorial claims from its constitution. In this situation, Azerbaijan must continue adhering to its established stance, maintaining its position based on its legitimacy and fairness.

It is crucial to understand that progress toward peace will have to come solely through Baku’s efforts, as there is still no genuine desire for a settlement from Yerevan. Armenia remains minimally engaged in regional processes and continues to rely on external partners, primarily the West. Azerbaijan must remain firm, persistent, and principled. This approach will yield results. Sooner or later, Armenia will be forced to concede—on both the Minsk Group and its constitution. Until that happens, signing a peace treaty is impossible, as there is no trust in Pashinyan’s government, and its actions do nothing to inspire confidence," Petrov concluded.

Ihor Semyvolos, Executive Director of the Centre for Middle East Studies (Kyiv), believes that Yerevan is eager to begin negotiations with Türkiye on resolving disputes and restoring diplomatic relations as soon as possible. In his view, this factor directly influences Armenia’s interest in the swift signing of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan.

"For Yerevan, concluding the agreement is beneficial at the very least because delaying negotiations increases internal turbulence—something the current government wants to avoid at all costs. Baku fully understands this and is acting according to a well-thought-out strategy, without giving in to external pressure," the expert noted.

Speaking about possible amendments to Armenia’s Constitution, Semyvolos stressed that, at present, there is insufficient parliamentary support for their implementation.

"The authorities do not want to engage in an obviously futile struggle that could trigger yet another political crisis. Therefore, the issue will be postponed until a more favourable time—likely after certain foreign policy achievements by Pashinyan.

As for the OSCE Minsk Group, Armenia still sees it as a tool for external support. It is doubtful that even within the ruling party there is consensus on its complete dissolution," Semyvolos noted.

In his view, the current stance of the Armenian leadership resembles a waiting game rather than a definitive rejection of peaceful settlement.

"The government is avoiding drastic steps toward a full-fledged peace due to internal instability, high public discontent, and the complex geopolitical environment. The further development of the situation will depend on how relations with Azerbaijan, Russia, and Western countries evolve," the expert concluded.