Chronicle of the day: Blinken-mediated meeting and the panel exchange “Two-track” principle reaffirmed, border checkpoints proposed
In what was the very first historic meeting featuring all three leaders of the South Caucasian nations, the panel discussion held on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, on 18 February, enabled observers to have a glimpse of how the get-together of President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, through the good offices of US State Secretary Antony Blinken, which took place a few hours earlier, may have looked.
What can be inferred from the two major events of the day, is that the negotiations are moving slowly, albeit with some fresh tempo jettisoned into their dynamism as of late, resolutely within a framework dictated by Baku. It could also be surmised that the immediate prospect of a breakthrough culminating in a quick peace treaty is elusive.
Azerbaijan appears to be exercising strategic patience, combined with the reserved hope for openly acknowledged Armenian reciprocity. The overall impression is that Yerevan has been forcibly coerced into some verbal commitments behind closed doors and has yet to muster the courage to be candid about these, knowing of the potential internal and external ramifications. It was the Azerbaijani leader that revealed the nature of the common understandings achieved in the presence of the Armenian Premier, with the latter issuing a silent affirmation, preferring quibbles over extraneous matters to reflecting on the essential.
On a more specific level, the major takeaways of the Munich discussions could be provisionally viewed in five parts. First of all, it was confirmed that the division of the peace process into two segments, namely into the interstate issues between Baku and Yerevan around a peace treaty, with no mention of Karabakh; and the Baku-Khankandi dialogue within the internal Azerbaijani realm, are central to the ongoing discussions.
Secondly, the latter element necessitates Russian puppet Ruben Vardanyan’s forthwith removal from Karabakh, as there is no remote possibility that his maligned presence could be further tolerated. Thirdly, Baku’s proposal to install mutually controlled border checkpoints along the interstate border is an essential prerequisite to the opening of communications, concurrently removing all obstacles encountered en-route to the realisation of the Zangazur Corridor project.
Fourthly, the concurrent Brussels and Washington platforms function should operate in close cooperation, with both formats entailing a trilateral construct. Aliyev reiterated the sheer impossibility of any meaningful involvement of France, stating that, although the OSCE Minsk Group is no longer functional, its legacy is being transfused, albeit in diluted form, into the presently active mechanisms, with Armenian-slanted Official Paris constituting an exception. Fifthly, it should not be overlooked that, despite Armenia’s insistence on avoiding negotiations because of the prickly situation around the Lachin-Khankendi Road, Yerevan was effectively forced to resume negotiations, conceding to Baku over what it had earlier declared a principle point upon which it would not compromise.
Days preceding 18 February
There are a few eventualities ultimately more disheartening than a false hope in the midst of sensible pessimism. Prior to the Munich Security Conference, there was no absolute certainty that the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders would meet. Although the possibility had never been ruled out, the likelihood of such dialogue giving rise to any significant headway was not deemed more than faintly probable. Pashinyan’s apparent dread to encounter Aliyev face-to-face was another reason downplaying the prospects of a meeting.
When the word went out, in the late hours of 17 February, that US State Secretary Anthony Blinken would meet President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, there emerged in the air a near-instantaneous excitement, mingled with a daunting allowance for wastage. A “new milestone”, “momentum”, “ice-breaker” and many other cliché jargons of similar import seemed to assume a fresh relevance for employment with regard to the succeeding day’s developments, which included a panel discussion involving the participation of the leaders of the three South Caucasian nations
To say that the gates of one’s confidence were opening to an unprecedented extent would have been a gross exaggeration. What is true is that one was expectant, within the confines of a reason not prone to hoary thinking. The major questions were how close the sides could or would come to a common understanding for moving towards a conclusive peace deal, and what the increased efforts of Washington, coupled with the new impetus gained during the Turkish-Armenian normalisation, would elicit for Baku-Yerevan dynamics.
Baku drives the process, Yerevan concurs in silence
Pashinyan’s demeanour during the panel exchange contained a tinge of suppressed indignation at being forced to commitments of which he did not want to speak. Shrinking away from openly subscribing to the “common understandings” referred to by Aliyev, he practically said nothing about the kernel of peace negotiations, instead focusing on the situation around the Lachin-Khankandi Road in excessive self-serving microcosm, combined with a dash of historic revisionism regarding the destruction of mosques during the Soviet age, which was a waste of essential minutes during the time-limited discussion.
Aliyev’s panel remarks, on the other hand, were from the contrasting realm: being sculpted and whittled from the bulk of the actual negotiations, and they were the comments that were most elucidating on what constitutes a common understanding between the sides. It was the Azerbaijani leader that voiced the most critical element regarding the present phase of the talks, that is, the separation of the interstate Baku-Yerevan segment from the internal dialogue between Baku and the Armenian community in Karabakh. To Aliyev’s point on this delineation of the issues being an agreed precept, Pashinyan had no counter-comment.
What was also particularly noteworthy was Aliyev’s interview after the Blinken-initiated meeting, during which he voiced Azerbaijan’s proposal to install border checkpoints on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, including at the entrance to the Lachin Road, as a necessary precursor to the reopening of communications. This is a constructive move, also with potential consequences for the Zangazur Corridor, which could sensibly placate Yerevan’s extraterritoriality concerns through mutual compromises.
If Pashinyan was intent on amplifying the predicament of the allegedly beleaguered Karabakh Armenians through an invented story of a group of schoolchildren being terrorised, Aliyev pointed at the source of the genuine malice, Russian oligarch Ruben Vardanyan, whose “smuggling into” Karabakh, constitutes an obstacle on what is to be the second element within the two-track framework.
The subject of the alleged blockade of the Lachin-Khankendi Road cropped up, as anticipated, with Aliyev refuting the claim with two strong arguments being left without objection by Pashinayn. First of all, the ease with which Ruben Vardanyan has been moving between Khankandi, Yerevan and Moscow is one clear indication that the idea of the blockage is not valid. Secondly, the number of trucks belonging to the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent and the International Committee of the Red Cross that have passed through the road is also indicative of the unhindered nature of the movement.
Anti-Kremlin sentiments were very noticeable during the conference, and have also had their bearing on the panel discussions. As we expectantly anticipate what could emerge from today’s events, it is more than probable that Russia is oiling its spoiler machinery to intervene if any ‘untoward’ developments come to pass. There are two rules in Moscow’s Karabakh textbook: no definitive peace treaty on the horizon based on mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the avoidance of any progress regarding items beyond its aegis.