Nascent Azerbaijani internal dialogue with Karabakh Armenians Hopes and challenges

It looks like we are finally there. Azerbaijan is now publicly in contact with the Armenians living in Karabakh. This long-anticipated internal dialogue or conversation has commenced and is very encouraging. Encouraging indeed, but still very challenging, for the illegal Armenian forces have not yet withdrawn from Karabakh, in contravention of Article 4 of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement and the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent does seem to have no appetite to route them out.

But first things first. On 1 March, Ramin Mammadov MP, who is now the designated point person for contacts with the Armenian residents of the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, met the representatives of the locals living in the area. This constitutes a historic first public meeting. Previous contacts, prior to Ruben Vardanyan’s presence in Karabakh, were not publicly declared, being undertaken with the purpose of addressing specific one-off issues.

The difference is that, now, we have a far more comprehensive outlook. The format of this essential dialogue is in the making. It will be further shaped. The sensibility is that instances of communications of this kind will become more regular, eventually acquiring some permanence and being organised within a more defined institutional framework.

At present, dialogue is very embryonic. Within the emergent format, as previously stated, we have a contact group led by Ramin Mammadov, a member of the Azerbaijani parliament: his function, as far as we can see, is to be a point person that will listen to the day-to-day concerns of the Armenians living in the Azerbaijani region of Karabakh, tasked with coordinating the process of dealing with them.

Together with Ramin Mammadov, in the first meeting, were Masim Mammadov, head of the monitoring group for the inspection of illicit exploitation of Karabakh’s natural resources, and other members of the self-same group – experts from the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, the State Service on Property Issues under the Ministry of the Economy and from the AzerGold Closed Joined-Stock Company.

Effectively, these conversations will investigate the subject of the mineral deposits within the zone under the temporary responsibility of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent, agreeing on the process of necessary monitoring to establish the extent of the damage and to deal with the consequences of the damage done, if possible – the key demands of the dedicated eco-protestors currently gathered on the Lachin-Khankandi Road.

Although the dialogue is yet to assume its full purview, it is very obvious that future discussions will also address broader matters, such as the issues related to the security and rights of the Armenians living in the Karabakh Economic Region of Azerbaijan.

Irrespective of how we may define the very meeting that took place on 1 March, this is the beginning of the process which will culminate in the establishment of Azerbaijan’s direct administrative control in Khankandi and environs and the reintegration of Karabakh Armenians into Azerbaijani society.

The subject under discussion is inextricably connected with the logic of the Azerbaijan-Armenian peace process, which has been visible, albeit not in a sufficiently satisfactory way, intensified in the wake of the Munich Security Conference held in February. Baku and Yerevan share a common understanding that the peace process has two elements, the interstate process between the two sides, and Azerbaijan’s internal dialogue with the Armenians of Karabakh.

Baku has no intention of discussing the fate of Karabakh Armenians with anyone but the Armenians residing in the region themselves. Baku does not want or need any intermediary in this process. During the first meeting, which was arranged at the headquarters of the Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Khojaly, the Commander of the contingent was present. His function therein was not of one of a mediator or, perish the thought, an arbiter, but one of a silent facilitator, and so long as the ‘peacekeepers’ are temporarily stationed in the region, this technical function is acceptable. What is critical is that the dialogue was direct and the wheels are now in motion with an inexorable thrust. And, if the next meeting is held outside the zone of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent, somewhere in Aghdam, for instance, there should be no requirement for such a facilitatory role.

Although the dialogue is internal, it is also public and there is a probability that the propulsion inaugurated on 1 March could later develop into an externally observable platform from the precipice of which Armenia may see a mechanism through which the security and rights of Armenians are discussed and ensured. Baku correctly seems to be all in favour of transparency, provided there is no external interference.

The launch of this dialogue in this fashion may be deemed belated, and this is undeniably true. In this vein, we can better appreciate the poisonous impact of Vardanyan’s role, which was primarily designed by Russia to derail this nascent contact between Azerbaijani representatives and local Armenians.

It should not be overlooked that Russia, through its mediatory efforts, has always given the impression of opposing this dialogue, for it wanted all communications to be made through the prism of its so-called ‘peacekeepers’, in a sense becoming the wall between Karabakh’s Armenian-populated section and the rest of Azerbaijan.

Ironically, the point regarding Baku’s direct contacts with Karabakh Armenians, as a second element within the entire peace architecture, is the result of the negotiations attained through the mediation of Washington. What we recognised as being achieved through the Western platform is now being applied through the technical-facilitatory role of the Russian ‘peacekeepers’.

It is vital that the dialogue intensifies and becomes the platform for creating favourable conditions to ensure that, by 2025, when Azerbaijan will be able to exercise its veto in relation to the prolongation of the term of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent, the practical need for its presence is minimised or completely negated and superseded.

Of course, not everything is as rosy as it may appear. There will be snags and attempts to derail the dialogue. Although Vardanyan lost his position within the separatist regime, he is poised within the zone of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ contingent, imbibing copious amounts of cognac, and may well try to exert some unwanted and unwarranted influence. 

And, as we now know, on 5 March, according to the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, there was an attempt to transport ammunition and personnel from Armenia to the temporary zone of Russian responsibility, using the Khankandi-Khalfali-Turshsu unsurfaced road. Although the attempt was counteracted with casualties, it indicates that the desire to fuel the separatism remains palpably unextinguished and that the installation of an Azerbaijani border checkpoint at the entrance to the Lachin Road is a must.

There is another issue which will remain for some time. For Baku, this is the dialogue with the representatives of the Armenian residents of Karabakh. But the shattered remnants of the separatist entity remain still physically in Khankandi. It has not yet been de facto liquidated.

Although the separatists in Khankandi may portray this dialogue as a conversation between the so-called illegal ‘NKR’ and Azerbaijan on some humanitarian matters as being on an equal footing, the framework is defined by Baku. Gradually, Azerbaijan is expected to entrench its ground presence in the area, ensuring that all the basic needs of the region’s population are satisfied through its means.

Throughout the process, a constructive new local power centre, comprising representatives of local Armenians regularly in touch with what is now the contact group currently led by Ramin Mammadov, is likely to emerge and replace the illegal separatist regime. The legitimate Armenian community will then be further integrated into Azerbaijani administrative control. It won't happen overnight. Again, the vital aspect, for now, is to maintain traction.

This is how I see the future, on the basis of my understanding of what Baku seems to consider acceptable and what the local Armenians are expected to acquiesce with, as they realise that any separatist escapade is doomed to failure.