Azerbaijani control over the Lachin Road begins to assume its official contours An act of politico-legal finery

The long-awaited installation of an Azerbaijani border checkpoint at the entrance to the Lachin-Khankandi Road on 23 April was momentous in import, exquisite in timing, near-spotless in substantiation and commendably fine in execution. The move itself was predictable. So was, to a large extent, the reaction it elicited from various interested actors. What is beyond the contestable is that the move is irrevocable and the facts on the ground have changed irreversibly.

If the consequences of the Second Karabakh War ultimately produced a sea-change effect on Baku-Yerevan dynamics, shifting the balance firmly in favour of the former, the establishment of an Azerbaijani control at the very entrance to the only road connecting Armenia with the territory under the temporary control of the Russian ´peacekeeping’ contingent based in Karabakh has spawned a critical intensifier, destined to galvanise the post-2020 logic of the process with a gravitas sufficiently propulsive to see the peace journey through to conclusion. There is more to come and the 23 April development exemplifies how and in what shape and form the future will be manifested.

Build-up: Azerbaijan’s sovereign right and Article 6 interlinked

Baku had long been in preparation for this decisive move, carefully building up an argument founded on two intertwined keystones. Firstly, Azerbaijan has steadfastly maintained the view that it is within its sovereign rights, stemming from international law, to install a checkpoint at the commencement of the Lachin-Khankandi Road, and no provision of the 10 November 2020 trilateral statement could or does militate against such a step.

Secondly, in its reasoning, Baku linked its sovereign rights with Article 6 of the self-same statement, cogently arguing that, since it is incumbent upon it to “guarantee safe movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions along the Lachin corridor”, a border checkpoint is obligatory for the fulfilment of this obligation. With an array of examples pointing to the illegal use of the Lachin route by Armenia, due to the wilful myopia of the Russian peacekeepers, in contravention of its humanitarian regime, Baku had also set in motion the build-up of a critical mass of evidence amounting to the inexorability of a new control element.

When, in February 2023, President Aliyev offered the bilateral installation of a checkpoint at the section of the conditional interstate border commensurate with the starting point of the Lachin-Khankandi Road, Armenia demurred and Russia was quick to point out that no such measure had either been envisaged in the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement or been subsequently discussed in the trilateral format mediated by the Kremlin.

In this vein, Baku’s proposal of a reciprocal resolution met with joint Russo-Armenian opposition, emphasising the necessity of achieving a trilateral accord on the matter. This was, in effect, counteracted by Baku, claiming that, although the question of a border checkpoint per se is beyond the scope of the Moscow-moderated tripartite platform, it could be established outside its realm without prejudicing the documents signed under the aegis of Russia, such a measure being deemed as completing the logic of Article 6 of the 10 November 2020 statement, wherein Azerbaijan undertook its obligation to guarantee safe movement along the Lachin Road. It follows from Baku's reasoning that, now that it has a border checkpoint, it can fully comply with its obligation to guarantee a safe movement through the road, which can only benefit the Armenians residing in Karabakh. 

What is also very interesting is that, although the world at large, including Russia, France and the US, not to mention Armenia, perceived Baku’s move on 23 April as a unilateral act, Azerbaijan fashioned the installation of a border checkpoint as a response to a similar measure undertaken by Yerevan the day before, pointing to the recorded movement of "two military-purpose container houses and a convoy of military vehicles” belonging to Armenia, contrary to the 10 November 2020 statement and international law, and that “later, the placement of military-purpose container houses and the construction of military infrastructure were observed near the Azerbaijani-Armenian conditional state border”. 

International reaction

The overall tone of the international reaction was one couched in a language designed to elicit "concern" and a premonition of danger, without expressing any likelihood of meaningful counteractive measures. The French Foreign Ministry was more vocal, accusing Baku of "breaching the commitments made under the ceasefire agreement and jeopardising the negotiation process” and “urging for free movement to be restored”.

The US State Department expressed its “concern” and described Baku’s move as “undermining efforts to establish confidence in the peace process". Although both statements appear to view the regime of the Lachin Road as "extraterritorial", with Baku's role circumscribed to merely "guaranteeing" bidirectional movement without being involved in "controlling" it in any meaningful way, it is highly improbable that what emanated from the logic of sovereignty -  a point for which Washington takes great store -  will be strongly opposed by the US, to say the least. 

On 24 April, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement, noting “the unacceptability of any universal steps” in violation of the 10 November 2020 trilateral statement, drawing attention to “an uncoordinated change in the regime of the ‘Lachin Corridor’” and “attempts to use it for purposes not keeping with the peace agenda”. The statement was perceived to be two-pronged, for it implied dissatisfaction with the measures taken by Baku on 23 April and implicitly denounced the instances of the illegal use of the road by Yerevan, amnesiacally omitting the fact that they took place beneath its aegis. 

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's statement was more "alarming", disparaging Azerbaijan for its "unilateral and uncoordinated" actions. Yet behind the externally visible, there is a realm of practicality, in light of which Moscow's real actions are expected to be one of implicit concurrence. Russia, despite its opposition to the establishment of the checkpoint, had been presumably in anticipation of the development, and, given the role assigned to it in its implementation, is unlikely to exert significantly unwelcome pressure on Azerbaijan. 

Armenia wails but largely acquiesces 

As to Yerevan, a screeching U-turn by it is unlikely, for it is too conscious to palliate its own indignity. Baku’s modus operandi is one of offering something sensible, waiting for an answer and then acting upon the failure of the other side to respond. It is probable that this will continue to be the mould in which the future will be shaped. 

In this scheme, the assorted mode of behaviour for Armenia is to acquiesce, albeit swaddling the entire development in the cottonwood of obscurity, raising concerns internationally and then ceasing to murmur. Yerevan presently contends that the 23 April development now constitutes “an official blockade” of the Lachin Road, with the physical presence of Azerbaijani Eco-protestors at the entrance to Khankandi constituting an unofficial form of the blockade. It is probable Armenia will continue to subscribe to the self-same rhetoric, eventually coming to Baku’s worldview for, in essence, it has very little room for manoeuvrability at its disposal.

Implications 

If the replacement of the old Lachin Corridor with a new road in August 2022 was considered to be a significant hammer-blow to separatist Armenian aspirations, the establishment of a border checkpoint has virtually nullified all the “agency” hopes for the remnants of the illegal and unrecognised “NKR”, adding a new impetus to its de-facto dissolution and the withdrawal of the remnants of Armenian forces from Karabakh. 

For the intra-state track of the negotiations, namely dialogue between Baku and the Armenian residents of Karabakh, the border checkpoint denotes the likelihood of a new meeting and fostering of the reintegration agenda, which, given new elements of Azerbaijani control in and around Karabakh, acquired fresh urgency and irreversibility. 

It is probable the change of the factual reality on the ground will induce a new positive atmosphere, for the installation of the border checkpoint on the Lachin Road paves the way to mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the conclusion of a peace deal on the self-same basis. This development correspondingly signifies similar arrangements at both entrances of the route connecting Azerbaijan’s main part with Nakchivan, passing through Southern Armenia, with the regime along the passage being a new challenge for a Yerevan that had been unwilling to give control to Russia, as envisaged in the 10 November 2020 statement.